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Aerial panorama of Lake Taupō and the surrounding region. Hidden beneath the Lake’s surface is the 
Taupō Volcanic Centre, part of the wider Taupō Volcanic Zone in Aotearoa-New Zealand’s central North 





Aotearoa-New Zealand’s (A-NZ) caldera volcanoes, located within the Taupō Volcanic Zone 
(TVZ) in the central North Island, have typically been characterised as a low probability, high 
consequence risk. These volcanoes are capable of a broad and complex range of geophysical 
activity creating multiple hazards of variable intensity, both spatially and temporally. These 
can have diverse, complex, and potentially severe impacts on society. Equally, the societal 
responses to such impacts, both potential and actual, can be just as diverse and driven by a 
complex variety of factors across social, cultural, economic, built, and natural environments – 
also spatially and temporally sensitive.  
One important tool for disaster risk management is the development of scenarios, which can 
be used to illustrate one (of many) potential outcome(s) of a complex and highly variable 
system. By determining fixed values on otherwise uncertain inputs, it allows easier 
understanding of how a complete caldera unrest and/or eruption may unfold. The use of 
scenarios, built from a common framework, can allow exploration of the diversity of potential 
outcomes from the complex volcanic system that is the TVZ. This common framework, in turn, 
partially addresses a key limitation of the approach. 
More recently, collaborative development of scenarios, jointly by scientists, practitioners and 
representatives for the community, has been used to create products which are both ‘credible’ 
(informed by robust scientific knowledge) and ‘relevant’ (useful and useable for end-users), 
and so can be considered ‘legitimate’ – where the scenarios reflect the various stakeholders’ 
different values and priorities, and are ideally trusted by all and fit-for-purpose.  
The aim of this thesis is to develop a modular, adaptable framework for the development of 
scenarios to underpin the management of A-NZ’s caldera volcanic hazard risk within the 
ECLIPSE programme. This involves addressing the following objectives; 
1. Identify and understand the hazards associated with silicic volcanoes in the Taupō 
Volcanic Zone. 
2. Develop methods for disaster hazard and impact scenario development for silicic 
volcanism. 
3. Evaluate the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework and ECLIPSE Scenarios through 
stakeholder engagement. 
 III 
To achieve these objectives, an extensive literature review was undertaken to identify the 
hazards associated with caldera volcanoes in the TVZ and to identify potential methods for the 
development of volcanic scenarios. An inclusive co-production method was then used to 
identify and engage with key stakeholders, identify their respective requirements, and tailor 
the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework and ECLIPSE Scenarios to meet these requirements. Finally, 
the framework and scenarios were then evaluated in one-on-one interviews with stakeholders 
to assess the usefulness and useability of the framework and scenarios within the ECLIPSE 
community and the wider disaster risk management community. 
The engagement workshops and interviews highlighted that the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework 
provided a useful foundation for combining cross boundary wants and needs from various 
stakeholder groups. Stakeholders stated that the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework (and ECLIPSE 
Scenarios) had given them a tangible output to structure discussions around caldera risk 
management from. They also stated it had provided guidance on where research should 
continue to develop in future, by highlighting research gaps – such as more in-depth social, 
cultural, and economic attributes and narratives within the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework and 
ECLIPSE Scenarios. 
In summary, this thesis: 
- Presents the first iteration of the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework – a framework for 
hazard and impact scenario development for silicic volcanoes in A-NZ. 
- Presents two pillar scenarios developed from the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework as 
examples of how the framework can be used and what it can produce – ECLIPSE 
Scenario A: Taupō Unrest Scenario and ECLIPSE Scenario B: Taupō Eruption Scenario. 
- Outlines a transparent, robust, co-production methodology for developing volcanic 
scenarios within A-NZ’s  caldera volcano risk management community. 
- Provides recommendations for future development of caldera scenarios using the 
ECLIPSE Scenario Framework within both the ECLIPSE programme and the wider 
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1.1 RESEARCH CONTEXT 
Aotearoa-New Zealand (A-NZ) sits at the boundary between the Pacific and Australian tectonic 
plates. This dynamic plate boundary results in A-NZ being home to several major natural 
hazards, from the Alpine Fault and the plate-boundary-related fault system in the South Island, 
to the active volcanic systems across the North Island (Figure 1.1), amongst other more 
frequent hazards such as storms, flooding, and landslides (National Emergency Management 
Agency (NEMA), 2007). 
 
Figure 1.1: Aotearoa-New Zealand’s seismic and volcanic hazardscape. 
There are many factors across the natural, built, social, cultural, and economic environments 




result in serious disruptions to society and its functionality, which can cause significant social 
and economic capital loss (Ministry of Civil Defence Emergency Management (MCDEM), 2018). 
Given that society generally cannot control these events, developing an understanding of how 
these complex systems interact is potentially a key to success in disaster risk management. 
 
Figure 1.2: Resilience Environments that disaster risk management strategies work within in A-NZ. Adapted from 
the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA)’s National Disaster Resilience Strategy (MCDEM, 2018). 
A-NZ is home to just under five million residents, with just over one million of these residents 
located within the central North Island (Statistics New Zealand (StatsNZ), 2017a). In addition 
to the almost five million residents, hundreds of thousands of tourists visit annually, with over 
three million visitor arrivals across A-NZ in 2018 (StatsNZ, 2018). These tourists spent NZD$4.6 
million in the Waikato and Bay of Plenty regions in 2019 (Ministry of Business, Innovation and 
Employment (MBIE), 2019a). The central North Island further provides a quarter of A-NZ’s 
total renewable power generation through geothermal and hydro generation, accounting for 
approximately 15% and 10% of A-NZ’s total renewable electricity generation respectively 
(MBIE, 2014a; Mercury, 2016). The central North Island also contributes to other significant 




reservoir for Auckland, A-NZ’s largest city (Gillingham, 2008; GreatSights, 2014; StatsNZ, 
2017b).  
This abundance of activity surrounding A-NZ’s central North Island, makes the Taupō Volcanic 
Zone (TVZ; Figure 1.5), a particular area of interest when investigating caldera volcano risk 
management in A-NZ. The TVZ is home to eight caldera centres, or “supervolcanoes”, and is 
the world’s most frequently active caldera system. Caldera volcanoes, which are depressions 
in the ground formed by the withdrawal and eruption of magma causing the roof of the magma 
chamber to collapse, are widely considered some of the most destructive volcanoes globally 
(Figure 1.3).  
 
Figure 1.3: Notable caldera volcanoes across the world, including Campi Flegrei (Italy), Yellowstone (United States 
of America; USA), and Long Valley (USA), which are “sister volcanoes” to the Taupō Volcanic Centre (A-NZ) and 
the ECLIPSE programme. 
Caldera volcanoes are also the largest and most unpredictable of A-NZ’s volcanoes (Potter, 
Scott & Jolly, 2012; Barker et al., 2018). These volcanoes are characterised by frequent minor 
activity, such as earthquakes and geothermal system changes, with infrequent but moderate 
to large eruptions, including so called “super-eruptions”. These caldera-forming super-




pumice (collectively referred to as tephra) across the landscape. An example of this is the 
26.5ka Oruanui eruption which represents one of the youngest caldera-forming events in the 
TVZ in A-NZ, consisting of pyroclastic flows that reached as far as 90km from the edge of Lake 
Taupō (Wilson, 2001). 
Although these calderas are usually formed from one or two of these super-eruptions, their 
magma systems can also be the source of many comparatively smaller eruptions throughout 
their lifetimes. They can also experience periods of disruptive volcanic unrest, which is 
anomalous volcanic activity above normal background levels that is potentially, but not 
necessarily, precursory to an eruption; and periods of quiescence, gaps between eruptions 
with no or minimal background activity (Newhall & Hoblitt, 2002; Potter, Scott & Jolly, 2012). 
These periods of quiescence contribute to the challenge in understanding the processes 
involved with the build-up of magma necessary for caldera-forming events. The precursors to 
caldera-forming events remain elusive as they have rarely been witnessed, let alone 
documented by modern equipment (Potter, Scott & Jolly, 2012).  
These caldera systems are complex, diverse, and present a wide range of hazards with 
potentially disastrous consequences. These systems are dynamic and sensitive to changes in 
and around them; most volcanic unrest at silicic caldera systems occurs in response to 
frequently experienced geologic phenomena, such as minor tectonic strain (Newhall & 
Dzurisin, 1988).  As a result, forecasting the outcomes of these caldera events (unrest and/or 
eruption) is extremely difficult and there is no one simple solution to volcanic risk management 
(Newhall & Dzurisin, 1988). 
One volcanic risk management approach, hazard and impact scenario development, has 
proven to be an effective disaster risk management tool, particularly within collaborative or 
co-produced research (Hayes et al., 2018; Oven et al., 2016; Johnston et al., 2000). Scenario 
development integrates knowledge from diverse disaster risk management domains and 
stakeholders throughout all development stages. This increases the credibility, relevancy, and 
legitimacy of outputs (scenarios) and nurtures more useful and useable products for relevant 
stakeholders (Boaz & Hayden, 2002; Tonini, Sandri & Thompson, 2015; Doyle et al., 2018; 





1.1.1 The ECLIPSE Programme 
This research is part of an Endeavour Fund research programme “Eruption or Catastrophe: 
Learning to Implement Preparedness for future Supervolcano Eruptions” (ECLIPSE). The 
Endeavour Fund is a Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) fund that is an 
investment mechanism supporting research ideas with credible and high potential for positively 
transforming A-NZ’s future (MBIE, 2019b). ECLIPSE is a five year MBIE-funded science 
programme with the strategic objective to use co-produced research to inform better 
management of risk from A-NZ’s caldera volcanoes – which have been comparatively under-
studied compared to the Auckland Volcanic Field (AVF) and the cone volcanoes (Mt. Taranaki, 
Mt. Ruapehu and Tongariro). The ECLIPSE programme brings together geological, 
geochemical and geophysical scientists, and applied disaster and social scientists, with key 
stakeholders such as GeoNet, Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups, and Iwi. 
The programme aims to use co-produced research to provide a sound science basis for the 
interpretation and response to unrest and possible eruption at A-NZ’s caldera volcanoes 
(ECLIPSE, 2018). 
 
1.2 RESEARCH AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
The aim of this thesis is to develop a modular, adaptable framework for the development of 
scenarios to underpin the management of A-NZ’s caldera volcanic hazard risk within the 
ECLIPSE programme.  
The specific objectives of this thesis were developed to ensure that the scenario framework 
development approach used co-production methods (outlined in Chapter 2) to undertake a 
transparent and inclusive process. This process identified the diverse range of potential 
stakeholders and their respective requirements, and tailored the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework 
and ECLIPSE Scenarios to most effectively meet these requirements. This adaptable 
framework will allow the scenarios to be updated as new science becomes available and as 
practitioner and policy requirements change. These objectives were to: 
1. Identify and understand the hazards associated with silicic volcanoes in the 




This involved undertaking a hazard assessment (through literature review) in the TVZ and 
aligning it with and drawing similarities from global case studies of similar silicic systems.  
2. Develop methods for disaster hazard and impact scenario development for 
silicic volcanism. 
This was achieved through the development of a modular, adaptable hazard and impact 
scenario framework for A-NZ’s caldera volcanoes. This objective was scoped through literature 
review and workshops held with stakeholders throughout the development process. 
3. Evaluate the Scenario Framework and scenarios through stakeholder 
engagement. 
The aim of this objective was to identify and use stakeholder and end-user wants and needs 
to help shape the scenario development. This was achieved through workshops with 
stakeholders throughout the development process and one-on-one interview evaluations at 
the end of the thesis. 
These objectives were undertaken throughout the scenario framework development process 
and the conceptual workflow in Figure 1.4 illustrates this process. The workflow demonstrates 
how the “build and review” phases, that link to Objectives Two and Three, were the main part 
of the research, focusing on utilising co-production and collaborative approaches to develop 
the scenario framework and scenarios. 
 
Figure 1.4: ECLIPSE Scenario Framework development process phases illustrated with major engagement activities 
and the research project's timeframe. 
 
1.3 THESIS STRUCTURE 
This chapter, Chapter 1, introduces the thesis and establishes the context for this study. Firstly, 




management at global and local scales is outlined, before volcanic risk management is 
introduced. Finally, a literature review on scenarios, as a tool for disaster risk management in 
A-NZ, are described, alongside literature addressing how frameworks for scenarios can be 
developed. This chapter addresses Objective One. 
Chapter 2 outlines the development approach behind the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework and 
ECLIPSE Scenarios. This begins with a literature review of traditional disaster risk management 
approaches and outlines the conceptual disaster risk management framework used to guide 
this research. The second part of Chapter 2 further describes the various stakeholder 
engagement workshops, discussions, and interviews undertaken throughout the thesis that 
were used to inform and evaluate the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework and ECLIPSE Scenarios. 
Chapter 2 addresses part of Objective Two. 
The first part of Chapter 3 presents the results from the various stakeholder engagements 
undertaken throughout the research, while the second part outlines discussion and analysis of 
those findings and how they shaped the development of the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework. 
The third part of Chapter 3 addresses the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework itself, with the fourth 
part of Chapter 3 presents the evaluation from stakeholders through the results from the one-
on-one interviews. Chapter 3 addresses part of Objectives Two and Three. 
Chapter 4 outlines the two ECLIPSE scenarios developed from the ECLIPSE Scenario 
Framework as part of this research, including the justification for each scenarios’ development 
and the hazards and impacts included in the scenarios. Chapter 4 addresses part of Objectives 
Two and Three. 
Chapter 5, which addresses Objective Three, discusses the conclusions from this thesis 
research (including implications of the research), the limitations of the ECLIPSE Scenario 
Framework (and ECLIPSE Scenarios), and the future recommendations beyond this research 
project. 
 
1.4 SILICIC VOLCANISM IN AOTEAROA-NEW ZEALAND 
This section of Chapter 1 addresses Objective One; to undertake a hazard assessment, through 




studies of similar silicic systems. This section starts by characterising the TVZ, its caldera 
volcanoes, and the hazards presented by these volcanoes. 
A-NZ’s North Island sits upon the boundary of the Pacific and Australian tectonic plates, with 
the Pacific plate being subducted westward beneath the Australian plate. The partial melting 
of the subducting Pacific plate has caused magma to accumulate over millions of years under 
the central North Island and form a volcanic arc, whose surface expression is the TVZ. The 
TVZ stretches from Mt. Ruapehu in the south to Whakaari/White Island in the north (Figure 
1.5), and is composed of several volcanic features, ranging from predominantly andesitic 
stratovolcanoes at the southern and northern ends of the zone, to silicic volcanic centres, 
known as caldera volcanoes, in the central section (Nairn, 1993; GNS Science, 2010b). 
 
Figure 1.5: The Taupō Volcanic Zone in A-NZ's central North Island. 
This central section hosts eight caldera volcanoes (Figure 1.5) and is the world’s most active 
caldera system, with at least 28 major eruptions from the central TVZ in the last 26,000 years 
(Table 1.1; Froggatt, 1997). Two of these caldera volcanoes are of particular interest; the 
Taupō Volcanic Centre (TaVC), which is one of the world’s most frequently active calderas and 




the Okataina Volcanic Centre (OVC), in which the most recent central TVZ eruption, the 1886 
Tarawera eruption, occurred (Nairn, 1993; Froggatt, 1997; Wilson, 2001; GNS Science, 
2010b).  
Volcanism has had the greatest impact on the North Island’s landscape and environments 
during the last 1.6 million years through a range of complex and diverse volcanic events 
(Wilson, Houghton & Scott, 1995). Historical and geological records (Table 1.1) indicate that 
the central TVZ experiences unrest every few decades and erupts every few hundred years. 
These eruption events can be violent, similar to other rhyolitic (high-silica content magma) 
volcanoes, such as Chaitén in Chile and Rabaul caldera in Papua New Guinea, with the Taupō 
Volcanic Centre (TaVC) having erupted over 35km3 of volcanic material over its recent lifetime 
(Potter et al., 2015ab). 
Table 1.1: TVZ volcanoes' activity history and significant eruptions (Froggatt, 1997; GNS Science, 2010b; Nairn, 
1993). 
VOLCANO SIGNIFICANT ERUPTIONS 
(YEAR) 
OVERALL ACTIVITY 
Mt. Ruapehu 1895, 1995, 1995-1996 Started erupting 250,000 years ago 
60+ minor eruptions since 1945 
Tongariro Volcanic Centre  Consists of 12 vents, formed over 
275,000 years 
Mt. Nguaruhoe 1954, 1973, 1974, 1975 Youngest, most active cone if the TVC 
60 eruptions since 1839 
Mt. Tongariro Te Maari crater – 2012 The Red and Te Maari craters were 
active in the 1800s 
Taupō Oruanui eruption – 27,000 years 
ago 
‘Taupō Eruption’ – 1,800 years 
ago (232 AD) 
Began erupting 300,000 years ago 
26 eruptions between Oruanui and 
Taupō eruptions 
Okataina Volcanic Centre   
Mt. Tarawera 
 
18,000, 15,000, 11,000, 800 
years ago 
Rhyolitic eruption 18,000 years ago 




1886 Eruption marked a dramatic change in 
the style of the volcano from rhyolitic 




Haroharo 7,500, 5,000 years ago Rhyolite composition 
Haroharo/Okareka 21,000 years ago Rhyolite composition 
Haroharo/Rotoma 9,000 years ago Rhyolite composition 
Rotokawau 3,500 years ago Basalt composition 
Okareka 13,500 years ago Rhyolite composition 
Whakaari (White Island) 1975-2001 
2019 
Frequent small eruptions 
 
 
Notable events from the central TVZ are the Oruanui eruption 26,000 years ago, the “Taupō 
Eruption” 1,800 years ago, the Kaharoa eruption in 1314 AD, and the Tarawera eruption in 
1886. The Oruanui eruption, from the TaVC, was so significant that almost all of A-NZ 
experienced ash fall and the “Taupō Eruption”, also from the TaVC, caused widespread impacts 
with areas near Lake Taupō buried in more than 100m of pyroclastic flow deposits (Froggatt, 
1997). The 1314 AD Kaharoa eruption, from the Okataina caldera (OVC), was the largest 
eruption to have occurred in A-NZ in the last 1000 years, ejecting ash that covered much of 
the northern North Island, with an eruption of its size today likely having widespread and long-
term impacts on A-NZ’s environment, infrastructure, industries and economic activity 
(Johnston et al., 2000; Johnston, Nairn & Martin, 2002). The 1886 Mt. Tarawera eruption, also 
from the OVC, devastated the surrounding region with significant surges and ash fall and 
resulted in the deaths of more than 100 people (Nairn, 1993). These prominent events from 
the central TVZ demonstrate the potential complexity, diversity and magnitude of impacts that 
A-NZ populations could experience in the future. 
The hazards generated by these events from caldera volcanoes, such as pyroclastic flows and 
ash fall, can cause widespread impacts across the North Island, and, in the case of larger 
eruptions (VEI 5 and above; Table 1.2), may also affect the South Island. These volcanic 
impacts have the potential to disrupt and/or severely damage the built, social, cultural and 
economic environments (Scott, Houghton & Wilson, 1995; Potter et al., 2015b). 
Table 1.2: The Volcano Explosivity Index (VEI) is a numeric scale that measures the relative explosivity of eruptions. 
It is derived from characteristics of eruptions such as volume of products ejected and eruption column height and 
ranges from VEI 0 to VEI 8. The scale is logarithmic, with each interval representing a tenfold increase in observed 




The VEI values within this table were derived from Newhall & Self, 1982; Wilson, 2001; USGS, 2015; Bennet, 
Hampton & Hikuroa, 2016; and Global Volcanism Program (GVP), 2019. 
VEI VOLUME OF EJECTA CLASSIFICATION ERUPTIONS 
0 <104m3 Hawaiian Mt. St. Helens, 2004 
1 104-106m3 Hawaiian/Strombolian Mt. Ruapehu, 2007 
2 106-107m3 Strombolian/Vulcanian Whakaari (White Island), 2001 
 
3 107-108m3 Vulcanian Mt. Ruapehu, 1995-96 
4 108-109m3 Vulcanian/Plinian Mt. Pelée, 1902-05 
Eyjafjallajökull, 2010 
Calbuco, 2015 
5 109-1010m3 Plinian/Ultraplinian Kaharoa, 1314 AD 
Tarawera, 1886 
Mt. St. Helens, 1980 
Cordon-Caulle, 2011 
6 1010-1011m3 Plinian/Ultraplinian ‘Taupō Eruption’, 1,800 years ago 
Mt. Pinatubo, 1991 
7 1011-1012m3 Plinian/Ultraplinian Mt. Tambora, 1812 
8 >1012m3 Plinian/Ultraplinian Oruanui Eruption, 27,000 years ago 
Yellowstone Mesa Falls, 1.3 million years 
ago 
 
These impacts can be the result of direct primary and secondary hazards (Table 1.3), such as,  
pyroclastic flows (primary hazard), which are hot, gaseous clouds that are laterally transported 
away from the vent source at speeds up to hundreds of metres per second. Pyroclastic flows 
are difficult to survive, especially without severe injuries, and will most likely severely damage, 
if not destroy, infrastructure and buildings in their path (Johnston & Houghton, 1995). Lahars 
are both a primary and secondary hazard as they can occur both during and decades after the 
eruption itself has ceased. This prolonged occurrence is a result of lahars’ ability to be triggered 
by excess rainfall or lake-burst water mixing with loose deposited volcanic material 




physical landscape through the blocking of pre-established waterways. This occurred after the 
“Taupō Eruption”, where valleys and depressions in the Waikato River system were filled with 
up to 70m of pyroclastic material, which blocked the Lake Taupō outlet into the Waikato River, 
resulting in the outlet breaching due to subsequent refilling of the lake. This triggered the 
release of 20km3 of floodwater down the Waikato River, which would affect several 
communities in today’s landscape (Manville, 2002). Impacts can also be indirectly associated 
with the volcano, for example, ash fall can directly affect critical infrastructure (electricity, 
water, transport etc.) and, thereby indirectly affect the functionality of those critical 
infrastructure providers and users. This has the potential to severely disrupt society through 
losses in power generation and supply, damage to water systems, loss of transport, and 
mechanical damage, amongst other potential impacts (Johnston & Houghton, 1995). These 
impacts can also be linked to unrest factors, where socioeconomic issues, such as population 
anxiety, general unease, or decreases in tourism, can indirectly impact residents, businesses, 
and sometimes even national economic environments. 
Table 1.3: Types of hazards presented by the Taupō Volcanic Zone volcanoes, their potential threats to life and 
property, and spatial extents (adapted from Scott, Houghton & Wilson, 1995). 
HAZARD THREAT TO LIFE THREAT TO PROPERTY AREAS AFFECTED 
Acid Rain Low Moderate Local to regional 
Ballistics High High Near vent/Local 
Ground deformation Low Variable, dependent on 
location 
Local 
Lava flows Low Extremely high Local 




Extremely High Extremely High Local 
Pyroclastic flows Extremely high Extremely high Local to regional 
Seismic shaking Low Variable, dependent on 
intensity of shaking 
Local 
Tephra (ash and 
pumice) fall 
Generally low, except 
close to vent 
Variable, dependant on 
thickness of deposit 
Local to regional 





1.5 RISK FROM SILICIC VOLCANISM 
This section starts by outlining how volcanic risk is quantified, followed by an explanation of 
how disaster risk is managed both globally and within A-NZ (Section 1.5.1). This is further 
refined through a closer look at volcanic risk management globally and in A-NZ, including how 
this risk has been characterised by organisations within A-NZ’s volcanic risk management space 
(Section 1.5.2). This section addresses parts of Objectives One and Two. 
Risk is a function of hazard, exposure, and vulnerability (Figure 1.6). The hazard refers to the 
likelihood and intensity of a potentially destructive natural event, the exposure refers to the 
location, attributes, and value of assets and populations that are exposed to the hazard, and 
the vulnerability refers to the potential extent to which the assets and populations may become 
damaged or disrupted when exposed to the hazard event. Risk evolves spatially and temporally 
in response to changes in the hazard, exposure, and/or vulnerability and the interactions 
between these elements (Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR), 2016). 
 
Figure 1.6: Risk equation (GFDRR, 2016). 
International experience from other large silicic events demonstrates that unrest and/or 
eruptions from caldera volcanoes are a credible risk. These events can be complex involving 
multiple hazards, spanning over large areas, for prolonged periods of time. Understanding the 
potential consequences is an essential part of managing the risk associated with these events, 
particularly across a range of diverse environments (Figure 1.2) (UNDRR, 2015). 
 
1.5.1 Disaster Risk Management 
The latter part of the 20th Century saw a change in the global perception of disasters from 
“inevitable” to “manageable” through the implementation of preparedness and reduction 




hazards (MCDEM, 2018). As a result, in the 21st Century, both the developed and developing 
worlds have made considerable progress towards the development and improvement of 
disaster risk management (Nirupama, 2016). 
Disaster risk management (DRM), as defined by the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk 
Reduction (UNDRR), is “the application of disaster risk reduction policies and strategies to 
prevent new disaster risk, reduce existing disaster risk and manage residual risk, contributing 
to strengthening of resilience and reduction of disaster losses” (2017) and at a global scale, is 
guided by the UNDRR’s Sendai Framework (2015). The Sendai Framework recognises that the 
State has the primary role to reduce disaster risk, but that responsibility should be shared with 
other stakeholders including local government, the private sector, and indigenous communities 
(UNDRR, 2020). This perception change in disaster risk management is not only reflected in 
the Sendai Framework, but also in the change of risk planning methods, with a transition from 
“top-down” methods (closed systems where one agency identifies the problem, collects data, 
undertakes analysis, and implements one chosen output without wider consultation) to 
collaborative methods. These invite the consultation of diverse stakeholder groups and have 
seen a more reliable and transparent process develop (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Lane, 2005; 
Twigg, 2004). Collaborative disaster risk management allows stakeholders to have a better 
understanding of each other’s values, perspectives, and needs prior to an event, reducing the 
potential disaster impacts and increasing the overall resilience. Furthermore, bridging across 
these traditional scientific boundaries allows for improved communication and trust between 
stakeholders, which effective disaster risk management relies on, and allows for a better 
framing of decision-making contexts (Gottsmann, Komorowski & Barclay, 2017; Leonard et 
al., 2014; Potter, Scott & Jolly, 2012). 
 
1.5.1.1 Disaster Risk Management in Aotearoa-New Zealand 
In recent decades A-NZ has experienced significant natural events, such as the Mt. Ruapehu 
eruption in 1995-96 and the Christchurch Earthquake Sequence (CES) in 2010-11 (Wilson et 
al., 2014; Woods et al., 2017). As a result, disaster risk management in A-NZ has evolved 
significantly (MCDEM, 2018). In A-NZ, disaster risk management is underpinned by a legislative 
framework including the Resource Management Act (RMA) (1991), the Building Act (2004), 
and the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act (CDEM Act) (2002). Regional and local level 




and develop response plans around these (Potter, Scott & Jolly, 2012). The complex nature of 
natural hazards requires a disaster risk management method (see Section 1.6) that can collate 
and organise knowledge in an effective, transparent manner (Ritchey, 2006). The legislation 
aims to achieve this by promoting the sustainable management of impacts from natural 
hazards through collaborative efforts amongst a wide range of agencies involved in A-NZ 
disaster risk management, prior to an event. 
Table 1.4: Volcanic hazard ranking by the Bay of Plenty and Waikato Regional CDEM Groups in their respective 
group plans. These hazard rankings are based on the combined likelihood and perceived consequence of each 
hazard (Bay of Plenty CDEM (BoP CDEM), 2018; Waikato CDEM; 2016). 
VOLCANIC HAZARD REGIONAL CDEM GROUPS HAZARD RANKING 
BAY OF PLENTY WAIKATO 
Ash fall only - Very High 
Caldera unrest only High Very High 
Caldera eruption - High 
Eruption - Very High 
Local Source High - 
Distal Source High - 
 
1.5.2 Volcanic Risk Management 
Global volcanic disasters in 1902 resulted in the establishment of volcano observatories and 
emphasised the importance of volcanology as a multidisciplinary science, while disasters since 
1980 have enhanced the public awareness surrounding volcanoes and their hazards (Tilling & 
Lipman, 1993). In A-NZ, the Mt. Ruapehu 1995-96 eruption provided valuable experience in 
the communication and dissemination of information between science agencies and 
emergency management agencies. For example, of the 30 response agencies involved in the 
event, only one had formally approached GNS Science (the national volcano science institute) 
to discuss their specific information needs, indicating that there was a need for more 
systematic links between scientists and emergency management agencies (Ronan et al., 
2000). 
Experiences from recent eruptions have emphasised the multi-hazard, multi-scale and trans-
boundary nature of volcanic hazards, such as the Icelandic Eyjafjallajökull eruption in 2010.  
This event illustrated that disasters and their impacts are not restricted within regional or 
district boundaries or national borders, as the eruption’s source resided in Iceland, but its ash 
fall related impacts were felt across Iceland, the United Kingdom, and other countries whose 




eruption demonstrated the unprecedented vulnerability of modern infrastructure to volcanic 
hazards, with the aviation industry experiencing US$2.5 billion in losses as a result of the 
eruption (Gottsmann, Komorowski & Barclay, 2017). Bird and Gísladóttir (2012) found that the 
Eyjafjallajökull eruption also identified that disaster management plans often focus on the 
immediate response to preserve life, but lack development in dealing with an ongoing crisis or 
strategies to preserve livelihoods, as Icelandic residents became frustrated and anxious about 
the prolonged inability to return to their homes, schools or workplaces. This is an important 
volcanic risk management gap to acknowledge as caldera unrest can continue for decades 
before eruption (such as what was experienced at Rabaul caldera), and having the ability to 
adapt, change, and function within such a dynamic environment is critical for effective 
response to caldera events. 
Modern volcanic impact management has shifted from a purely geological focus (such as 
eruption size), to a more holistic approach, incorporating factors such as the proximity or 
density of nearby populations and even the pre-event response structures and plans already 
in place (Tilling & Lipman, 1993). This is because monitoring data or eruption forecasts alone 
will not reduce volcanic impacts unless they can be communicated effectively to, and acted 
upon by, emergency management authorities (as taught by the 1985 eruption at Nevado del 
Ruiz in Colombia; Voight, 1990). Therefore, effective communication between scientists, 
government, officials, news media and affected populations must be established prior to an 
event and is essential for providing an integrated response to an event (Tilling & Lipman, 
1993; Ronan et al., 2000). Building these relationships and communication pathways prior to 
an event is also necessary due to the inherent diversity and complexity of the hazards, 
potential consequences, and agency information needs, as well as the geographical and 
temporal changes that can occur within hazards (Ronan et al., 2000). 
Often, retrospective accounts of volcanic events advocate that some kind of co-operative 
partnership between scientists and authorities is necessary to ensure that relevant information 
is presented in meaningful and timely ways and is acted upon appropriately (Barclay et al., 
2008). But it is not just other volcanic events that have taught important lessons about disaster 
risk management. The magnitude 7.8 Kaikōura earthquake that occurred in A-NZ in 2016 
emphasised the importance of having a clear structure for how science research and civil 
defence emergency management response and recovery decision-making can be integrated, 
particularly for events which may require a large co-ordinated response from stakeholders 




or products that included stakeholder engagement in their development were more effective 
at communicating risk information to communities (Barclay et al., 2008). 
 
1.5.2.1 Volcanic Risk Management in Aotearoa-New Zealand 
When compared to other hazards, such as extreme weather events, flood and earthquakes, 
volcanic impact and risk assessments are comparatively poorly developed, especially for 
caldera volcanoes. This can be partially attributed to few and infrequent, damaging volcanic 
events occurring in A-NZ over the past few decades, causing these events to be perceived as 
“exotic” (Wilson et al., 2014; Gottsmann, Komorowski & Barclay, 2017). Furthermore, for most 
individuals, threats presented by volcanic events are relatively rare and can be tolerated in 
return for the many benefits of living near these caldera volcanoes (Marzocchi, Newhall & 
Woo, 2012). 
This underdevelopment can also be attributed to the inherently complex nature of volcanic 
events as volcanic activity is highly variable, with events ranging from unrest that presents no 
immediate eruption to violent explosive eruptions that are locally catastrophic and can have 
effects on the global climate (Stirling et al., 2017; Barclay et al., 2008). This becomes more 
complex as one single event can lead to multiple cascading and compounding hazards that 
can last for significant periods of time (Rabaul caldera, Papua New Guinea, experienced unrest 
for decades before an eruption occurred; Potter, Scott & Jolly, 2012) and affect vast areas. 
Methods that better deal with this multi-hazard risk context are more likely to help emergency 
managers and communities at risk to better understand and cope with the uncertainty of 
caldera volcanoes (Gottsmann, Komorowski & Barclay, 2017). 
Large volcanic eruptions tend to be low probability but high consequence geohazards with the 
potential to cause national to global-scale disasters. A large caldera event from the TVZ has 
been identified by the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) as a low likelihood, 
high consequence risk for A-NZ (Security and Intelligence Group (SIG), 2011; 2016). This can 
be seen on the risk plot below (Figure 1.7) that provides a visual comparison of the 
approximate scale of the main components of significant risks within A-NZ and, therefore, the 





Figure 1.7: A-NZ's Indicative National Risks determined by the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) 
(SIG, 2011). 
The importance of understanding and preparing for volcanic events from New Zealand’s 
caldera volcanoes is emphasised by the specific characteristics of these events, particularly in 
comparison to other hazards. Volcanic events present a wide range of initial events to begin 
with. Then, from each of these individual events, the paths can evolve into a vast range of 
outcomes, each with its own range of threats to life and property and its own related 
uncertainty as to what specific set of outcomes eventually occurs. The dynamic complexity of 
potential volcanic hazards and the significant exposure of populations and assets in the central 
North Island mean that a comprehensive risk management strategy is required to mitigate 
future volcanic events. 
Caldera volcanoes also present a difficult challenge as potential super-volcanic eruptions from 
caldera centres are often the focus of significant public and media interest. In addition, 
eruptions associated with calderas are often misunderstood as always generating catastrophic 
disasters, which is not actually the case (NZIER, 2009; Potter, Scott & Jolly, 2012). Rather, 




these events do not present immediate eruptive hazards, they do present very real risks of 
their own (Gottsmann, Komorowski & Barclay, 2017). Unrest episodes can include several 
hazards, such as landslides, triggered by significant earthquake shaking, or flooding, triggered 
by ground deformation activity. The perception that unrest will always lead to immediate and 
catastrophic eruption causes significant anxiety amongst the public and, combined with the 
inherent uncertainty of these potentially long-lived, non-eruptive events, can have profound 
impacts on event management (Barclay et al., 2008; Gottsmann, Komorowski & Barclay, 
2017). It is also important to emphasise to those unfamiliar that while these events can 
manifest in super-eruptions, smaller-scale eruptions (VEI 4 and below) are far more likely to 
occur, and unrest episodes, resulting in no eruption, are even more likely. 
Management of these complex small eruption or unrest episode events, with its inevitable 
uncertainty in terms of potential outcomes, creates major challenges for scientists, authorities, 
the public and the media (Gottsmann, Komorowski & Barclay, 2017). Therefore, the capacity 
to identify the issues of and solutions for potential volcanic crises relies on dialogue and 
collaboration between scientists, emergency managers and those at risk, and can be built from 
a framework that can collate and organise knowledge and practical experience from a wide 
range of disciplines (Fearnley & Beaven, 2017).  This is particularly important because potential 
future volcanic risk management strategies are adopted by these stakeholders, and used to 
develop organisational strategies and improve preparedness, in the context of uncertain 
futures (Keough & Shanahan, 2008; BoP CDEM, 2018; Waikato CDEM, 2016). This, therefore, 
requires this knowledge to be easily accessible and understood by all stakeholders and end-
users; ideally it should be produced within a modular, sustainable framework that can be 
updated as the science and policy that drives volcanic risk management evolves (Ritchey, 
2006). This framework would need to acknowledge that different groups involved in volcanic 
risk management will use science information to meet distinct and different needs (Johnston 
et al., 2000). 
 
1.6 SCENARIOS AND SCENARIO FRAMEWORKS 
This section of Chapter 1 provides a literature review/context on scenarios (Section 1.6.1) and 
scenario frameworks (Section 1.6.2), outlining what they are, how they work, what their 




potential methods of development for scenarios and scenario frameworks are outlined in 
Chapter 2.  
 
1.6.1 Scenarios as a tool for Disaster Risk Management 
Scenarios are prospective stories about how future volcanic events may evolve, including their 
impacts on surrounding environments (Bowman et al., 2013). They are a credible, detailed, 
process-focused decision-making tool that is a part of A-NZ’s disaster risk management toolbox 
for future strategic planning (Keough & Shanahan, 2008). These scenarios typically bring 
together many complex parts into coherent stories and are an effective platform for integrating 
knowledge from various diverse disaster risk management domains, allowing this integration 
throughout all stages of development, nurturing more useful and useable products for all 
relevant stakeholders (Boaz & Hayden, 2002; Tonini, Sandri & Thompson, 2015; Doyle et al., 
2018; Loughlin et al., 2015). 
Volcanic event scenarios have proven useful for several purposes within volcanic risk 
management; such as evaluating impacts and mitigation measures on environments, 
comparing volcanic hazards, identifying weaknesses in pre-established exercises and 
preparedness applications, and as decision support tools for authorities and communities 
(Johnston et al., 2000; Zuccaro et al., 2013; Biass et al., 2016ab; Reichardt, Ulfarsson, 
Pétursdóttir, 2019; Deligne et al., 2017ab; Hayes et al., 2018). These scenarios are a tool that 
can be used through all stages of volcanic risk management – pre-event preparedness, crisis 
response, and recovery stages – and have been identified as an under-utilised resource for 
disaster risk management planning and communication (Jolly & de la Cruz, 2015; Oven et al., 
2016). Scenarios have proven to be beneficial amongst other studies, where research has 
shown that they enabled new understanding to stakeholders around volcanic risk, challenged 
existing assumptions, and identified new research opportunities (Reichardt, Ulfarsson, 
Pétursdóttir, 2019; Ramirez et al., 2015). They are particularly beneficial in a volcanic hazards 
and impacts context as they allow “what-if” ideas to move to the forefront of pre-event/”peace-
time” discussions and research, which reflects the focus during events/crises where “what if 
xyz occurs…?” would be the leading question to scientists and emergency management 




Traditionally, scenarios of volcanic unrest and/or eruption events are based on data and 
information on the frequency and severity of previous episodes of activity and computer 
modelling of the range of individual hazards produced by the volcano (Jolly & de la Cruz, 
2015). These scenarios can be developed to include several aspects of the hazards and impacts 
that could potentially occur and can be defined in terms of magnitude, location, timing, style 
of potential eruption, area affected, and the probability of occurrence (Potter, Scott & Jolly, 
2012; Reichardt, Ulfarsson, Pétursdóttir, 2019). By using historic and analogue data from local 
and international caldera volcanoes, possible future scenarios can be developed and 
communicated (Potter et al., 2015b). 
Scenario development benefits disaster risk management as it recognises the inherent 
weakness in more common tools such as forecasts, which are single-outcome methods focused 
on predicting the future, where scenarios focus on attempting to understand how uncertainties 
in organisational environments might interact in unexpected ways and therefore alter the 
future (Bowman et al., 2013). Scenarios allow development of multiple stories of possible 
different futures to demonstrate the underlying, unpredictable, unstable and uncertain nature 
of the future in order to communicate and characterise uncertainty to decision-makers (Moats, 
Chermack & Dooley, 2008; Kwakkel, Auping & Pruyt, 2013). 
Volcanic event scenarios can help stakeholders to logically think and step through the 
components of any hazard, impact or risk assessment. They can work in a similar style to 
event-trees but avoid the numerical probability aspect of event-trees, which can often over-
complicate the information presented and not hold much meaning to those who do not directly 
understand the statistics. This process of working through a scenario can help to improve 
understanding of the effects of unrest and/or eruptive activity on the vulnerabilities of affected 
populations (Gottsmann, Komorowski & Barclay, 2017). This also makes it easier to follow how 
one hazard or impact occurs alongside or as a result of another. This same process is a useful 
tool for conveying hazard and impact information among various diverse stakeholder groups, 
such as scientists, emergency managers, and communities (Newhall & Hoblitt, 2002). 
Scenarios, however, have their limitations, primarily that they differ from reality and are not a 
definitive prediction of actual future circumstances, as only one or a few scenarios, out of an 
infinite number of potential scenarios, is considered. This limitation could be labelled as 
misleading, particularly for stakeholders not from a research science background, however, 




point for initial awareness. This starting point can improve understanding of the wide range of 
possibilities presented by one volcano and that, as long as stakeholders involved are aware 
that the small number of scenarios presented does not cover all potential hazard variations 
and impacts, scenarios are still useful and useable. The research presented here emphasises 
this point, as it focuses on the scenario development, rather than the product itself and, by 
doing so, allows collaborators to understand the complexity of caldera risk and the broad and 
varied potential outcomes that can occur from these events. Therefore, even if stakeholders 
only choose to develop one scenario path, they are already aware of the limitations. 
Furthermore, by demonstrating that each scenario is only one path of many, these scenarios 
can address the inherent uncertainty of volcanic systems and can work as a useful tool for 
understanding and communicating what may happen in the face of these complex 
environments (Marzocchi, Sandri & Selva, 2010). 
Another limitation with scenario approaches is that researchers commonly have to attempt to 
capture the full breadth of uncertainty about the future into a small set of scenarios, restricting 
what uncertainty is actually presented within a suite of scenarios (Kwakkel, Auping & Pruyt, 
2013). To accommodate this challenge, the research here attempts to develop a modular, 
adaptable scenario framework; the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework (Chapter 3). 
 
1.6.2 Scenario Frameworks 
Currently, scenario planning literature provides models of scenario building, however, it lacks 
guidance and generally does not provide stakeholders with the information they need to 
properly undertake scenario planning onn their own accord (Keough & Shanahan, 2008). This 
lack of guidance and information stems from a broader disaster risk management gap where 
guidelines between those that provide and those that receive scientific advice are absent 
(Gottsmann, Komorowski & Barclay, 2017). To amplify this, the diverse and variable drivers 
of, and constraints on, the use of science and policy by different stakeholders further makes 
it difficult to provide one-size-fits-all management tools and recommendations (Oven et al., 
2016). The ECLIPSE Scenario Framework developed within this research aims to acknowledge 
and cater to these various and diverse needs and applications while also attempting to make 
it easier to understand what may happen in the face of complex caldera environments and 




As volcanic events, particularly from caldera volcanoes, involve multiple cascading and 
compounding hazards and impacts, caldera risk management is a complex issue that requires 
an interdisciplinary approach, incorporating knowledge and practical experience, towards its 
management. The framework tool developed therefore, must provide the appropriate level of 
detail to inform decision-making, should be derived from a common source, and should also 
consider different hazards and impacts from caldera volcanoes simultaneously in both space 
and time dimensions (Stirling et al., 2017; Barclay et al., 2008). This disaster risk management 
tool should also address the socio-economic causes and consequences of exposure to volcanic 
events, rather than focusing only on the hazards themselves, in order to achieve effective 
volcanic risk communication (Barclay et al., 2008). As different stakeholders often focus on 
different aspects of the overall risk presented by caldera volcanoes, the framework must 
provide a flexible, knowledgeable, and collaborative regime that is able to adapt to rapid 
changes in the risk environment (Cash et al., 2003; Barclay et al., 2008). 
The collaborative development approach (Chapter 2) of the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework 
(Chapter 3) follows these recommendations; it accommodates two-way communication 
between stakeholders where enough information is provided for decision-makers to judge 
whether or not they need more, rather than overwhelming them with too much, and possibly 
unnecessary, information (Doyle et al., 2018). By using the collaborative approach, and 
providing transparency throughout, stakeholders are also able to see how and why certain 
outcomes develop (Doyle & Paton, 2017). The framework also helps to combine the most 
important aspects of scientific information and the understanding of the context in which 
emergency management actions must be made (Gottsmann, Komorowski & Barclay, 2017). 
Furthermore, once a comprehensive scenario planning process, such as the ECLIPSE Scenario 
Framework, has been outlined, researchers and stakeholders alike are enabled to explore 
specific aspects of the overall framework, which ultimately helps stakeholders make better and 
more informed decisions (Keough & Shanahan, 2008). This is also beneficial as the exploration 
by end-users can potentially identify possible impacts that were previously not considered or 
identify research gaps within the science – where the development of science into a framework 
itself creates a further demand for more science information; the “demonstration effect” (Oven 





1.6.3 Previous and Aligned Scenario Research 
The research developed here also builds from aligned research from other natural hazard 
scenarios, such as the Alpine Fault Magnitude 8 (AF8) project (Orchiston et al., 2016) and the 
Determining Volcanic Risk in Auckland (DEVORA) AVF scenario suite (Hayes et al., 2018). The 
AF8 scenario follows a maximum credible hazard event and impact scenarios for a future Mw8.0 
Alpine Fault earthquake across A-NZ’s South Island, while the DEVORA research developed a 
suite of eight scenarios that represent the credible range of potential future AVF eruptions that 
can be used to inform volcanic impact and risk studies. 
This research also builds from previous scenario work undertaken by the Caldera Advisory 
Group (CAG), which details a caldera unrest scenario, developed in three stages (Waikato 





2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Globally, there is no standardised level of appropriate information between those who provide 
and those who receive scientific advice (Gottsmann, Komorowski & Barclay, 2016). However, 
current best practice has seen an increasing emphasis on open dialogue methodologies, rather 
than “policing” divides between domains and their information needs. This new practice has 
seen consistent communication and trust building become key to ensuring that processes and 
products are legitimate, useful, and useable (Fearnley & Beaven, 2017; Barclay et al., 2008). 
Current volcanic risk management initiatives further emphasise that it is in the best interests 
of research science to understand and work with policy-makers and the community so that 
research is designed to be useable, useful and used within policy and community strategy 
development (Boaz & Hayden, 2002). This is particularly important as the volcanic event 
decision-making process specifically requires comprehensive multi-disciplinary collaborative 
approaches to management and requires experts across a diverse range of fields (Marzocchi, 
Newhall & Woo, 2012; Stirling et al., 2017). 
This chapter outlines part of the literature review that was carried out to inform the methods 
used throughout the research project. This chapter partially addresses Objective Two; to 
develop methods for disaster hazard and impact scenario development for silicic volcanism. 
This chapter begins with a review of traditional disaster risk management approaches and 
their limitations (Section 2.1), followed by a description of the conceptual disaster risk 
management framework used to help frame and guide this research (Section 2.2), and 
finishing with an in-depth explanation of the methodological approach followed for the 
development of the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework and ECLIPSE Scenarios (Section 2.3). 
 
2.1 TRADITIONAL DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT APPROACHES 
Disasters are the serious disruption of the functioning of a community or society at any scale 
due to hazardous events interacting with exposed populations and/or assets and the 
vulnerability of those exposed populations/assets, leading to human, material, economic, 
and/or environmental losses and impacts (UNDRR, 2018). Society, therefore, works to 
recognise and understand the risks and factors that could lead to or cause disasters, and in 
particular, potential mitigation measures that could be implemented to minimise the impacts 




Risk management processes and practices have historically been driven by a “top-down” 
approach, with governments in the late 1970s beginning to institutionalise disaster risk 
management processes and practices. Traditionally, this management approach is hallmarked 
by themes of technical capacities and expertise, a hierarchical model of management where 
authorities have the skills, knowledge and experience that allows the management of risks, 
and a dependent public (Scolobig et al., 2015). This approach makes two assumptions; that 
the public must trust the authorities’ judgement and follow their advice closely, and that risk 
problems (especially those related to risk mitigations, warning systems and emergency 
management) can be solved through technical innovation, particularly if coupled with effective 
economic management (Scolobig et al., 2015). However, recent disaster experience and 
research have emphasised that there are fundamental challenges to traditional approaches to 
disaster risk management, illustrated by the limited uptake of research science into disaster 
management and policy (Scolobig et al., 2015; Davies et al., 2015). 
At a broad level, this recent experience and research has illustrated that the relationships 
between technical knowledge, social practices and political pressures are not as simple as the 
“top-down” approach presumes (Scolobig et al., 2015). This is emphasised by the common 
lack of communication between groups involved in the science and policy domains, which is 
imperative in order to achieve the implementation of science into policy applications (Davies 
et al., 2015). Often potential end-users do not know what science can or cannot say and 
therefore do not know what to ask of scientists. Similarly, scientists do not know what potential 
end-users need or want (Oven et al., 2016). Furthermore, the different goals of the different 
stakeholders involved can lead to differences in characterising the risk, which compromises 
effective communication and, therefore, effective risk management (Barclay et al., 2008). 
Research further suggests that technology-centred, passive, one-way risk communication is 
poorly interpreted, often misunderstood, and can potentially decrease public trust in 
authorities (Scolobig et al., 2015). This poor interpretation and misunderstanding is often 
driven by the overemphasis on probability-based disaster risk assessment and management, 
which involves statistical analysis and an understanding of what those statistical probabilities 
mean, something non-scientists may not necessarily be familiar with. This is also a particularly 
tricky issue for caldera eruptions because low-probability (infrequent) events, that are also 
poorly-quantified or poorly understood, can be perceived as a lesser priority, however, still 




These issues clearly demonstrate that stakeholders who use science need to be a part of the 
conversation as their demands ultimately drive whether or not science is useful and actually 
put into practice. Therefore, by including these stakeholders, the needs for science becomes 
clearer and the supply of science will better match those needs. It is also important that 
disaster management expertise should be combined with public concerns and local knowledge 
through these stakeholder-led processes (Oven et al., 2016; Scolobig et al., 2015). This further 
indicates that contemporary disaster risk management approaches must be adaptive, iterative, 
and flexible and therefore it is evident that alternative strategies (to the traditional strategies) 
are required to enable stakeholders to prepare for poorly-quantified or uncertain events. 
2.2 CONCEPTUAL DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 
It is widely accepted that the effective use, value, and application of information across 
science-policy domains depends on three criteria; scientific credibility of information, its 
relevance to the needs of stakeholders, and the legitimacy of both the information and its 
development process (Fearnley & Beaven, 2017). It is therefore important that volcanic risk 
management is not viewed and developed in isolation but within broader contexts, such as 
social and economic environments, and across disciplinary boundaries (Figure 1.2 in Chapter 
1; Barclay et al., 2008; Cash et al., 2003). 
To cross disciplinary boundaries requires “boundary objects”, such as scenarios, which are 
collaborative processes or products that are “both adaptable to different viewpoints and robust 
enough to maintain identity across them” (Cash et al., 2003, p.387). These objects require a 
method that can consolidate and translate information in a way which is legitimate. In order 
to achieve this legitimacy, the products must be both relevant, which is required within all 
government and community (policy) domains, and credible, which is required within the 
research science domain, illustrated in Figure 2.1 (Beaven et al., 2017). These requirements 
from each domain can create a range of incompatible demands. Therefore, methods that 
include collaboration and co-production can help provide balance, compromise and inclusion 
towards these demands, as well as providing stakeholders with more transparent access to 
the development process. These collaboration processes are also more likely to produce 
relevant information as they engage with end-users early, defining the data needs, and 
allowing these wants and needs to act as anchoring nodes to drive development in legitimate 




et al., 2018). Furthermore, the increase in transparency empowers stakeholders by allowing 
them access to information they would otherwise not have had (Scolobig et al., 2015). 
 
Figure 2.1: Boundaries between policy and science domains in collaborative research (Beaven et al., 2017; Cash et 
al., 2003; Parker & Crona, 2012; Sarkki et al., 2013). 
Scenarios are an effective volcanic risk management “boundary object” that can accommodate 
this cross boundary information integration and allow co-production throughout all stages of 
development (Davies et al., 2015; Ritchey, 2006; Oven et al., 2016; Barclay et al., 2008). 
Scenarios, developed with awareness of the relevant contexts, can act as a useful tool for 
developing risk management strategies. The information that informs the scenario in the future 
can be developed by both scientists and potentially affected communities (through 
representatives, such as CDEM Groups). Together these efforts can create hazard and/or 
impact scenarios (Davies et al., 2015). 
This co-production methodology invites two-way communication, where stakeholders are 
supported in understanding and acknowledging each other’s wants and needs (demand and 
supply). The methodology also ensures that all involved understand how information is 
credible and relevant (Doyle & Paton, 2017; Doyle et al., 2018; Fearnley & Beaven, 2017). 
The outcome, whether it be the process or the final product, is likely to be better than any 




engagement). The co-production process is therefore beneficial, not just because of mutual 
learning and sharing of knowledge, but because the knowledge, process, and products that 
result from it are more likely to be useful, useable and used across a more diverse range of 
applications because of the perception of their increased relevance (Davies et al., 2015). 
 
2.3 ECLIPSE SCENARIO FRAMEWORK METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH AND DEVELOPMENT 
A specific methodology for volcanic event management must be adaptable and flexible to 
accommodate the complex diversity of the physical setting and the social, cultural, economic, 
and political environments (Figure 1.2 in Chapter 1). As a result, volcanic risk management 
must sit in a broad, dynamic framework that incorporates a wide range of approaches and 
stakeholders that can inform the factors that contribute to disaster risk management and 
address uncertainty clearly. This framework needs a clear understanding of a range of basic 
components of volcanic risk management, including but not limited to the range of volcanic 
behaviour, the uncertainties associated with changing behaviour, and the types of information 
needed by decision-makers to act on. This robust framework needs to be accompanied by 
trust and understanding between the key stakeholders involved in its development (Barclay et 
al., 2008; Jolly & de la Cruz, 2015; Stirling et al., 2017). 
This research follows a multi-stage approach to the methodology and development of the 
ECLIPSE Scenario Framework and ECLIPSE Scenarios. Firstly, a review of previously developed 
individual scenario research and production in A-NZ and global silicic event impact case studies 
was undertaken (Chapter 1; Appendix F). This was coupled with a review of the hazard and 
impact data already established within A-NZ’s disaster risk management approaches and 
literature (Chapter 1). Then, workshops and individual interviews were undertaken throughout 
the scenario development process with key ECLIPSE stakeholders to scope, inform, refine and 
evaluate the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework and ECLIPSE Scenarios and this is illustrated in 
Figure 1.4 in Chapter 1 and in Figure 2.2. 
Key ECLIPSE stakeholders (Table 2.1) were previously identified within the ECLIPSE 
programme formation in 2017, an idea strongly supported by the CAG. Members included in 
the ECLIPSE programme, and thus this research, were invited to be involved as they play key 






Figure 2.2: ECLIPSE Scenario Framework and ECLIPSE Scenarios development and research timeline illustrated with research objectives, major stakeholder engagement 




stakeholders that have previously expressed interest in being involved with the development 
of preparedness and mitigation strategies for A-NZ’s caldera volcanoes. 
Table 2.1: List of organisations involved in the ECLIPSE stakeholder groups engaged with throughout this research. 
✔ illustrates that at least one representative from the organisation, and therefore stakeholder group, listed attended 












Bay of Plenty CDEM ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Waikato CDEM ✔ ✔ ✔ 
NEMA (formerly MCDEM) ✕ ✔ ✔ 
GeoNet  GeoNet Volcano team ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Industry Federated Farmers ✔ ✕ ✔ 
Ministry for Primary 
Industries (MPI) 
✔ ✕ ✕ 
Rural Support Trusts ✔ ✕ ✕ 
Iwi Ngāti Tūwharetoa ✔ ✕ ✕ 
Te Arawa ✔ ✕ ✕ 
Lifeline Utilities See Appendix D for full list ✔ ✔ ✕ 
Research Science Massey University ✔ ✔ ✕ 
University of Auckland ✔ ✔ ✕ 
University of Canterbury ✔ ✔ ✕ 
Victoria University ✔ ✔ ✕ 
 
Workshops are a literature-supported methodology for collecting qualitative data to inform the 
ECLIPSE Scenario Framework and ECLIPSE scenarios’ production. Workshops, a type of 
deliberative and inclusive process (DIP), have been increasingly used globally as they give 
previously excluded groups a voice in decision-making and bring together a diverse range of 
stakeholders to work together. The particular benefit of using workshops comes from scientific 
knowledge being openly deliberated upon, and sometimes challenged, by those who are 
experts within the policy and decision-making domains of disaster risk management (Barclay 
et al., 2008; Stirling et al., 2017). Workshops are also beneficial because they foster two-way 
communication and provide an environment for brainstorming and developing ideas, rather 
than searching for the “right” answer or solution (Doyle & Paton, 2017; Doyle et al., 2018). 
Therefore, semi-structured workshops, broadly guiding participants in particular topics, were 





2.3.1 ECLIPSE Scenario Development Workshop 
To start the engagement process for this research a workshop was undertaken with key 
ECLIPSE stakeholders on the 25th March 2019 at GNS Science, Wairakei. The aim of this 
workshop was to scope the wants and needs of stakeholders and end-users of A-NZ volcanic 
risk management to inform the scenario framework development. The ECLIPSE Scenario 
Development Workshop (ESDW) was also designed to communicate knowledge between 
stakeholders and the research team to build a shared understanding of the research. The 
specific objectives of the workshop were to; 
- Identify how scenarios might be used by different stakeholders. 
- Identify what useful and useable scenarios would look like. 
The ESDW was undertaken early in the process to ensure that the potential uses and 
applications of the scenarios were identified and embedded into the scenarios’ framework to 
begin with. This would help ensure that the scenarios were useful and useable for end-users 
from the beginning and allowed follow-up interviews/focus groups to occur throughout the 
development process, further expanding on requirements expressed within the ESDW. 
The ESDW involved stakeholders participating in a series of three exercises (Appendix B). 
These exercises involved prompt questions posed to participants, which were developed prior 
to the ESDW by consultation from the research team and ECLIPSE members. Stakeholders 
included representatives from a diverse range of organisations involved in disaster risk 
management in A-NZ (Table 2.1). Exercises were undertaken in groups with a facilitator to 
record answers, prompt discussion if it stalled, and mediate if necessary. 
The ESDW allowed the research team to gain a broad insight into the structures, values, and 
perspectives of particular emergency management organisations. The particular benefit was 
that participants had the ability to drive the discussion to more specific sub-topics in response 
to the broader prompt questions provided. This was a strength of the approach and allowed 
participants to emphasise issues of concern relevant to their specific discipline of practice, 





2.3.2 New Zealand Volcano Science Advisory Panel ECLIPSE Scenario Development 
Session 
The first stage of the review process for this research involved a brainstorming session with 
members of the New Zealand Volcano Science Advisory Panel (NZVSAP) on 21st August 2019 
at the NEMA Parliament building in Wellington. The aim of this session was to present the 
ECLIPSE Scenario Framework (Version 1.2; Appendix C) and the first ECLIPSE Scenario 
developed (Scenario A: Taupō Unrest Scenario; Chapter 4) to representatives of organisations 
involved in A-NZ’s national level volcanic risk management.  
The NZVSAP ECLIPSE Scenario Development Session (NZVSAP ESDS) involved stakeholders 
brainstorming ideas and participating in discussions surrounding three questions in response 
to the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework and ECLIPSE Scenario A. These questions were; 
- Are there any gaps or issues with the current approach [to the scenario framework 
and/or scenario]? 
- Will this [scenario framework and/or scenario] be useful for national level Civil Defence 
Emergency Management planning? 
- How could these scenarios help with your [the participants’] science objectives? 
The NZVSAP ESDS enabled the research team to identify areas of importance for national level 
emergency management within the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework. It allowed participants to 
emphasise points of interest or areas of further development, such as the ability of the 
framework to adapt with changing science in future and the need for guidance for use of the 
framework and/or scenarios.  
 
2.3.3 ECLIPSE Scenario Development Lifeline Utilities Workshop 
The second stage of the review process for this research involved a workshop with lifeline 
utilities representatives at the Waikato and Bay of Plenty Lifeline Utilities Forum on 22nd August 
2019 in Hamilton Gardens, Hamilton. The ECLIPSE Scenario Development Lifeline Utilities 
Workshop (ESDLUW) aimed to highlight that volcanic unrest at A-NZ’s caldera volcanoes is a 
risk which can affect lifeline utilities organisations and that the scenario presented (ECLIPSE 
Scenario A) could be one of the possible forms this future unrest could take. The specific 




- Raise awareness of unrest as an issue that can affect lifeline utilities organisations. 
- Identify the impacts of unrest on these organisations. 
- Identify the implications of these impacts on those organisations. 
The ESDLUW involved stakeholders answering a series of questions in response to a volcanic 
unrest scenario in multi-disciplinary groups (Appendix D). These questions were developed 
prior to the workshop with consultation from the research team. Participants included 
representatives from a diverse range of organisations involved in disaster risk management in 
the Waikato and Bay of Plenty regions. Facilitators roamed around the room, rather than 
having one facilitator per group, to answer questions from participants, prompt discussions if 
they stalled, and mediate if necessary. 
By presenting ECLIPSE Scenario A the workshop allowed participants to more clearly consider 
the impacts and the implications of the scenario on their respective organisations. Participants 
were specifically asked to look at the scenario from a strategic planning perspective as volcanic 
unrest is a highly uncertain and evolving phenomenon that could last up to decades before an 
eruption or a return to pre-unrest behaviour occurs (Newhall & Dzurisin, 1988; Potter, Scott & 
Jolly, 2012). This long-term perspective guided groups to look at the social and economic 
impacts of an event like this, rather than just the direct physical impacts of the geological 
hazards. 
Similar to the ESDW in March, the ESDLUW enabled the research team to gain insight into the 
priorities, values and perspectives that drive decision-making for lifeline utilities organisations 
in response to caldera unrest.  
 
2.3.4 ECLIPSE Scenario Framework Evaluation Interviews 
The third and final stage of the framework was the review process for this research, which 
involved one-on-one semi-structured interviews with representatives across all the discipline 
groups originally approached in the ESDW and engaged throughout the research (Table 2.1). 
Participants selected for this stage of the review include leads of specific stakeholder groups 
that are part of the ECLIPSE programme, “task groups” and play an important role within A-
NZ’s disaster risk management. These task groups allow each stakeholder group to nominate 
one or more people to represent them by participating in regular task group activities, such as 




The ECLIPSE Scenario Framework Evaluation Interviews (ESFE Interviews) took place over 
December 2019 and January 2020. These ESFE Interviews aimed to evaluate the relevance 
and potential usefulness of the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework by working through the 
framework with the participants and then a scenario (either Scenario A or Scenario B; Chapter 
4). These work-throughs were followed by a discussion around the framework and scenario, 
guided by questions outlined in a questionnaire (Appendix E). These questions were; 
- What is your organisation’s role, and responsibilities, in New Zealand volcanic disaster 
risk management? 
- How would your organisation use the scenario? 
- How useful and useable is the scenario for your organisations roles and responsibilities? 
- Would your organisation use the scenario framework to create your own scenario(s)? 
- For you organisation, what would be useful guidance for the use of the scenario 
framework? 
- Would having a common suite of scenarios, accommodating different applications, be 
useful? If so, how might that be useful? 
The method of semi-structured interviews was chosen for this part of the framework 
development process as it provides many benefits to qualitative research (Davidson & Tolich, 
2003). Semi-structured interviews allow the researcher to guide the participant into particular 
topic areas but what specifics are discussed are dependent on the participant themselves. This 
is a powerful research technique where the topic of interest is particularly complex, such as 
volcanic risk management, and allows thematic analysis of the data (Davidson & Tolich, 2003; 
Pathak & Intratat, 2012). 
The formatting and question design of the questionnaire (Appendix E) that guided the 
interview was based on theory by Davidson & Tolich (2003). They suggest that semi-structured 
interviews should open with simple, introductory questions that start the participant talking, 
followed by questions that link to themes that represent the research project’s interests, with 
generic prompts from the interviewer within each of those themes/questions to ensure 
relevant detail on the topic is gained. 
Prior to conducting the ESFE Interviews, an ethics application was made to the University of 
Canterbury Human Ethics Committee (2018), with the application approved on 9th December 
2019 (Appendix E). As a result, participants were asked to complete a consent form prior to 




where the interviewer took notes throughout the interview, on a questionnaire sheet, and 
complied these notes after the interview. These notes were then emailed to participants, 
providing them with the opportunity to emphasise points stated, add points missed (upon 
reflection), or correct any errors. Participants had until the 30th January 2020 to do this. 
The ESFE Interviews allowed stakeholders to have an in-depth look at the ECLIPSE Scenario 
Framework and either ECLIPSE Scenario A or B that had been developed out of the framework. 
This helped stakeholders specifically identify where they might utilise the framework and 
scenarios, why it would be useful in these contexts, and what guidance they might need in 
order to achieve this implementation. It also helped stakeholders identify the benefits of the 
framework and scenarios and where they could develop them further within their own 
agencies. 
The ESDS Interviews enabled the research team to robustly evaluate the ECLIPSE Scenario 
Framework and ECLIPSE Scenarios, by reviewing interview statements and identifying themes 
across the interviews. These evaluations allowed the research to outline the benefits of the 
framework and scenarios, identify limitations, and make future recommendations for use and 
application of the research as well as where it could be developed further in future, within the 





3 ECLIPSE SCENARIO FRAMEWORK FOR SILICIC VOLCANISM IN 
AOTEAROA-NEW ZEALAND 
The first part of this chapter reports the findings from three stakeholder engagements, the 
ECLIPSE Scenario Development Workshop (ESDW), New Zealand Volcano Science Advisory 
Panel ECLIPSE Scenario Discussion Session (NZVSAP ESDS), and the ECLIPSE Scenario 
Development Lifeline Utilities Workshop (ESDLUW), undertaken throughout this research 
(Section 3.1), addressing part of Objective Three. This is followed by analysis and discussion 
of those findings and how they shaped the development of the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework, 
including in-depth explanation of why particular attributes were included within the framework 
(Section 3.2), addressing both Objectives Two and Three. The third part of this chapter 
describes the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework itself and addresses Objective Two (Section 3.3). 
The fourth part of this chapter (Section 3.4), reports the findings from the ECLIPSE Scenario 
Framework Evaluation Interviews, undertaken at the end of the research project’s 
development timeframe, addressing part of Objective Three. This last section outlines how 
useful the scenario framework and scenarios were deemed by key stakeholders. 
 
3.1 ASSESSING THE SCOPE AND REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ECLIPSE SCENARIO 
FRAMEWORK FROM STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT FINDINGS 
As noted above, Section 3.1 presents the findings from the ESDW, the NZVSAP ESDS, and the 
ESDLUW. These findings are divided by application theme, driven from common themes pulled 
from disaster risk management literature (Chapter 1), and further divided by the themes’ 
occurrence throughout the scenario framework development process; Stage One, which is 
primarily findings from the ESDW, and Stage Two, primarily findings from the NZVSAP ESDS 
and ESDLUW (Figure 2.2 in Chapter 2). These findings are separated by the two stages as to 
illustrate how original statements made within the ESDW scoping workshop (Stage One) were 
reiterated and continuously emphasised throughout the development process or supported 
and further expanded on by new statements later on (which consisted of Stage Two, 
presenting versions of the framework and scenarios, and Stage Three, the evaluation in 




the framework and guided how and where these attributes should be included within the 
ECLIPSE Scenario Framework (Figure 3.1, outlined in Section 3.3). 
 
3.1.1 Planning and Policy 
3.1.1.1 Stage One 
Almost all stakeholder groups during the ESDW identified the use of caldera scenarios as being 
useful to inform caldera volcano event disaster risk management planning, from reduction and 
mitigation, through readiness and response, to recovery (the 4 R’s; NEMA, 2013). The 
stakeholders in particular noted their potential use to contribute to dynamic, adaptive pre-
planning pathways (i.e. how actions should be taken to inform planning involving multiple 
agencies). CDEM and Lifelines listed contingency planning, exercise and training module 
development (such as “what-if” play-throughs), and response planning as specific examples 
of planning applications. CDEM emphasised the importance of using the caldera scenarios to 
inform recovery planning, stating the scenarios would help inform potential impacts across all 
environments (Figure 1.2 in Chapter 1). As a result of this, CDEM requested the inclusion of 
indicators of what we might expect to see before or after a hazard occurs in the information 
provided alongside the scenarios, as this would help them to better prepare. 
Industry suggested scenario use for informing adaptable land-use policies in the context of 
volcanic risk, urban vs. rural management plans, and cordon management, suggesting that by 
using the scenarios they could visualise what the conditions might look like and what actions 
they may need to implement in response. Industry and Lifelines further emphasised the 
importance of understanding, and increasing the understanding of, the potential impacts from 
these events as they help inform readiness and reduction planning.  
Industry, Lifelines, and CDEM suggested including population statistics, such as demographic, 
employment, ethnicity, spatial location etc., as it would improve the scenarios in helping users 
to identify what industries may be affected and the number of people within those industries. 
Industry stated this would help inform the type and quantity of resources they may need to 




Iwi also suggested caldera scenario use for establishing robust recovery policy for volcanic 
event response, stating they thought it would be easier for the community to “bounce-back” 
if these actions were in place prior to an event. 
All stakeholders stated the importance of including a variety of impacts in the scenarios to help 
inform planning and policy, such as direct vs. indirect, physical, unrest, social (e.g. 
behavioural), political, infrastructural, and (social and traditional) media influence impacts. 
Industry, Lifelines, GeoNet, and CDEM emphasised the importance of including the scale of 
the impacts, suggesting the use of metrics to measure intensity similar to that of earthquake 
shaking – Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) scale –, highlighting that the scale would be 
integrated into recovery plans, would help to better inform preparedness and mitigation 
measures, and would help reduce scaremongering among the public and media. CDEM 
specifically identified the importance of unrest hazards and impacts developed within the 
scenarios, such as ground deformation hazards and economic, psychosocial, and 
infrastructural impacts. 
3.1.1.2 Stage Two 
Using the scenarios for planning and policy applications was emphasised again throughout the 
ESDLUW, with stakeholders suggesting that they would develop and practice business 
continuity, preparedness, contingency, fuel, evacuation, and (cyber-)security plans within and 
between individual organisations in response to ECLIPSE Scenario A (Chapter 4). Stakeholders 
stated that developing various credible scenarios, with a range of outcomes and likelihoods, 
would assist in preparing response and contingency planning, particularly if populated on a 
decision-tree. 
Stakeholders, in response to ECLIPSE Scenario A, identified that they would investigate the 
use of alternative network pathways and drive a potential shift in investments within affected 
areas, such as accelerating some planned projects (e.g. the Taupō control gate structure), but 
delaying other capital projects – opting for an increase in geotechnical maintenance or 
monitoring instead. Stakeholders stated that repairs on damaged infrastructure, such as 
substations affected by shaking or liquefaction, could extend several months and that 
maintenance would become a primary action throughout a prolonged unrest response. As a 
result, disruption to operations would be likely to occur in the short-term, with enhanced 




ESDLUW stakeholders further stated that, in response to prolonged unrest, discussions would 
open about the long-term service production, stating that there could be potential for reduction 
in services if populations migrated, reducing the demand for supply. Alongside this, evacuation 
plans for Lake Taupō shoreline communities would be reviewed and/or developed in 
preparation for long-term changes to the hydrology, including potential wave impacts and 
flooding infrastructure changes (e.g. flood-banks and dams). District Health Board (DHB) 
representatives specifically stated that it would be important to develop evacuation plans in 
the context of a welfare response with respect to neighbouring districts’ actions as to make 
sure these districts did not become overwhelmed. 
 
3.1.2 Community Engagement and Public Education 
3.1.2.1 Stage One 
All stakeholder groups identified the importance of using the scenarios for community 
engagement and public education applications. They emphasised that in order to reach these 
diverse groups of people, and to ensure the science was easily understood, the scenarios 
would need to have a minimal use of jargon, plain language, and easy to read formats. 
Stakeholders stated that it would be beneficial to have the scenarios relating to real 
experiences and stories, available in multiple languages (e.g. Te Reo Māori) and available 
within ECLIPSE’s web resources. 
Stakeholders suggested developing “seed” scenarios, as a tool for school-level education 
(amongst other sectors), to play-through, stating they would be beneficial as they would work 
to empower these traditionally excluded organisations and allow them to be more involved in 
planning and preparedness for caldera events. 
CDEM and Iwi emphasised the importance of humanising the scenarios (e.g. roads acting as 
relationships) and relating the event to people and their stories, to help contextualise the 
events and their impacts. To achieve this, they suggested the inclusion of local knowledge of 
tangata whenua, relationships, stories of experiences from other hazards, kōrero, links to 
kinship ties, and the use of meaningful real-world examples. They identified that this would 
further help the scenarios become more relatable to more diverse audiences. Iwi specifically 
stated the caldera scenarios would be used within school outreach, possibly even implemented 




CDEM, Lifelines, and Industry emphasised the importance of identifying potential impacts of 
losses of essential lifeline services, from a caldera event, and how these losses would impact 
households and individuals. This would help stakeholders to both understand the impacts and 
identify what information they may need to provide to the public. Industry and Lifelines stated 
that this understanding would help them prioritise response actions and enable them to clearly 
articulate how the hazards may affect those operators exposed. 
GeoNet requested the inclusion of commonly overlooked hazards, such as ground deformation, 
earthquakes, gas, and geothermal activity, and that unrest-specific hazards would need to be 
carefully developed within the caldera scenarios to increase stakeholders and the public 
familiarity with these potential hazards. However, Research Scientists also requested that not 
all the activity prior to an eruption should be directly related to the volcano/volcanic unrest, 
as activity can occur within the TVZ without it directly relating to volcanic unrest and/or 
eruption. 
3.1.2.2 Stage Two 
ESDLUW stakeholders further emphasised the importance of using the caldera scenarios for 
community engagement and public education, stating that various scenarios would help 
prepare communities for what they may need to do throughout different stages of an event. 
Stakeholders specifically identified that in an unrest event, the public need, and want, to know 
about what is going on, therefore, they are more likely to already be engaging with official 
information, which would be an advantage to organisations providing that information. 
Lifelines stated that, in response to an unrest event, they would hold more regular community 
meetings to help identify community leaders (if not already known), contact neighbouring 
districts, and address how they could collaboratively work to help each other. Lifelines and 
CDEM suggested the inclusion of similar global case studies to the caldera scenario(s), 
including consequences on people and infrastructure, authorities’ actions, and communities’ 
responses to both the events and authorities’ actions. 
Lifelines and CDEM stated that a key focus in response to an event would be bringing together 
key information for residents of affected areas, with DHB representatives suggesting that this 
would also include messaging on self-mental health (e.g. anxiety). They further stated that a 
coordinated response to the psychosocial impacts would be crucial to the DHB’s effective 




who had been displaced, would be vital. Furthermore, health stakeholders emphasised the 
importance of a communication focus on health and education around caldera unrest and what 
people should do in response. They stated that clear messages, with accurate and easily 
understood facts, would be crucial to inform the community. 
 
3.1.3 Communication 
3.1.3.1 Stage One 
All stakeholders stated that caldera scenarios would be a good tool to inform and structure a 
broad range of communications around caldera volcanoes and potential events. They stated 
that these scenarios would significantly help with consistent messaging across organisations, 
but also ensure accessibility to caldera volcano information as each organisation could reach 
its target audience from the same core material, ensuring consistency in information at a base 
level but tailoring it to their specific needs. They further stated it would help structure 
conversations with other stakeholders they work with as well as educate stakeholders on gaps 
in their knowledge or plans. In order to achieve these applications, stakeholders suggested 
interactive formats of the scenarios such as cartoons, games, stories, models, videos, 
animations, and graphics, as these would help with uptake for communication and education 
purposes. These formats could be partnered with more traditional decision- or event-trees 
which would further help the scenarios become translatable across different contexts such as 
school-level education or stakeholder planning and/or policy development. 
GeoNet identified the use of caldera scenarios within outreach and education, primarily by 
their Public Information Managers (PIMs), while Iwi identified that by using caldera scenarios 
and story-telling together, community resilience would benefit as people would have the 
opportunity to become more familiar with the hazards and impacts associated with caldera 
events in a less overwhelming way. Other stakeholders supported this, stating the caldera 
scenarios could enable more adaptable response from organisations, save people’s lives, be a 
trigger to build relationships in advance of an event, and trigger community meetings to ensure 
everyone is getting the same message and understanding. CDEM specifically, suggested the 
caldera scenarios could be used to identify triggers for actions and engagement with other 





CDEM suggested that the caldera scenarios could include impact-based actions and 
suggestions for their organisation to take, along with cues as to what other organisations, 
such as GeoNet or NEMA, would be doing. They stated this addition would help them shape 
and inform their own decision-making and identify what resources were/were not available to 
them. GeoNet similarly suggested including Volcanic Alert Bulletins (VABs) and Volcanic Alert 
Levels (VALs) in the scenarios, stating it would improve the scenario’s similarity to real-world 
situations. 
3.1.3.2 Stage Two 
Communication was emphasised as an important theme further throughout the engagement 
process during both the NZVSAP ESDS and the ESDLUW. 
Lifelines stated that their first response to a caldera unrest event (ECLIPSE Scenario A; Chapter 
4) would be to gather information, such as scientific data, information about who had been 
affected and information about where staff were located within affected areas, from within 
their own organisations, other organisations, and the public. They stated that heightened 
communications between organisations often occurs as a result of active events and so they 
would act on this, activating groups amongst the various organisations to respond 
appropriately to the event, such as the Taupō District Council (TDC) Emergency Management 
Team and the Waikato Regional Council (WRC) Regional Resilience Team. They further stated 
they would ensure efficient communication across and within these groups as it would be 
crucial to an effective response. 
Lifelines identified that consistent messaging would be a significant priority across all 
stakeholders and that the caldera scenarios may help in the creation of communication 
templates that would be developed and integrated across local and central government, 
lifelines utilities, and the media. They further identified that having a communication protocol 
would be essential to consistent messaging and a functioning response. They stated that 
hearing from other lifeline utilities organisations, including how they are managing uncertainty 
and physical changes, would be crucial to their effective response to an event. 
NEMA, GeoNet, and Research Scientists also highlighted the importance of communication 
applications of the caldera scenarios, stating that they would help in attempting to manage 




use of network-based or event-tree approaches to clearly demonstrate and translate the 
uncertainty. 
Lifelines stated that communications between organisations would be crucial as all 
stakeholders would need to have shared input into decision-making due to their dependence 
on aspects of each other’s services provided (e.g. telecommunication providers relies on power 
providers etc.). They further stated that in a prolonged event, Lifelines and CDEM would review 
how their groups were communicating throughout. 
Lifelines identified that there would likely be a rise in demand for information from the public 
experiencing the event and they would likely look to the internet for this information. As a 
result, stakeholders stated that those services that provide access to the internet would need 
to continue to function throughout an event to reasonable level. 
 
3.1.4 Science Gap Analysis and Testing Applications 
3.1.4.1 Stage One 
GeoNet and Research Scientists stated that the caldera scenarios could be used to help identify 
gaps in scientific hazard knowledge, such as where further research on hazard behaviour 
needs to be directed. They stated that this would help inform and frame research discussions 
around volcano systems models and caldera science in general. GeoNet and Research 
Scientists stated that because of this they would require a detailed science report alongside 
the caldera scenario(s) to outline and describe the science behind the scenario(s), including 
assumptions and limitations, which could help direct science research in future. 
Industry, Lifelines, and GeoNet all identified the use of caldera scenarios for informing network 
resilience by workshopping the scenarios to test systems and identify gaps in redundancy or 
knowledge. Stakeholders specifically listed applications such as; 
- Identifying the loss of infrastructure services from and on providers, 
- Applying quality assurance/quality control (QA/QC) measures to plans, 
- Evaluation of value chain resilience (on products such as kiwifruit or dairy), 
- Testing and supporting research systems, 
- Supporting and testing vent and hazard mapping, and 




In order to test the monitoring network regime, GeoNet further suggested the inclusion of the 
Volcano Monitoring Network as a specific attribute in the scenario framework. 
3.1.4.2 Stage Two 
GeoNet, Research Scientists, and NEMA stakeholders stated that the caldera scenarios, and 
approaches used to inform different parts of the scenario framework, could be sensitivity 
tested to improve their credibility and robustness. 
 
3.1.5 Decision-making Resources 
3.1.5.1 Stage One 
Stakeholders identified that developing a range of caldera scenarios, which could identify 
common themes and issues across all the scenarios, would be beneficial as it could feed into 
preparedness and response planning. They emphasised that this range should accommodate 
different contexts, such as locations, duration, size etc., including maximum credible events, 
events likely to occur within our lifetime, manageable events (to reduce scaremongering 
amongst the public), and unrest-focused events. 
Stakeholders suggested these scenarios could be built out of a modular, updateable 
framework, with the ability to change rapidly, stating that this framework would help to 
encourage dynamic, pathway thinking within disaster risk management. Stakeholders stated 
that the framework would need to be flexible and adjustable, possibly combined with event-
trees to help visualise thinking, and potentially have the ability to be used in real-time 
response. 
Stakeholders identified the importance of a well-developed, multi-parameter timeline of the 
scenario(s), detailing the hazards, impacts, hazard durations, seasonal occurrence, and 
snapshots of the different phases throughout the scenario – rather than just cumulative 
hazards or impacts at the end of the event. However, Research Scientists expressed caution 
in providing a detailed timeline, stating that it would need to be clear to users that time units 
as precise as hours and days would not be an achievable forecast in real-world events. 
Research Scientists further stated that these caldera scenarios would help to define parameters 




Stakeholders requested that GIS shapefiles and maps made within the scenarios should be 
available for individual stakeholder or community use, such as integration into RiskScape, 
which was strongly suggested by CDEM, and link to other models or forecasts, such as weather 
forecasts. These applications would require the files to have clear, concise metadata, as 
suggested by GeoNet, and a guide for use for those not as familiar with GIS systems, as 
suggested by Iwi. 
CDEM stated that they would use the caldera scenarios to inform development and 
visualisation of what is happening throughout a caldera event and further inform evacuation, 
resource prioritisation and allocation, and communication planning. They further requested 
detailed hazard information, such as ash fall composition, and stated that knowing whether or 
not these details would change the impacts would help inform their risk management efforts. 
Similarly, Industry and Lifelines stated that understanding the hazard-impact correlations and 
where they occurred would be important to their disaster risk management. They stated that 
hazard forecasting would be beneficial to couple with weather forecasting to inform impacts 
related to seasonal changes. 
3.1.5.2 Stage Two 
Stakeholders, during the ESDLUW, identified that various scenarios could help identify trigger 
points for decisions and actions around resources and their functionality, such as the influence 
of physical phenomena, voluntary evacuation from potentially affected areas, or where 
population migration may occur in response to prolonged unrest. For example, Lifelines 
identified that residents may choose to voluntarily migrate out of affected areas and that 
understanding the potential triggers for this migration would be important to their 
organisations. However, they identified that some residents in affected areas may not be able 
to leave, due to emotional connections to the area or constraints by ability and resources 
(lower socio-economic groups), and these people would still require support from lifeline 
utilities service providers in those affected areas. 
Lifelines stated that understanding how disruptions to their operations could occur as a result 
of loss of staff in affected areas would be important to informing their resource related 
decision-making, listing examples of medical staff leaving hospitals, GPs, pharmacies, and/or 
rest-homes, depleting healthcare resources for residents. DHB representatives stated these 
effects would cascade when combined with other impacts, such as an increased strain on 




having a scenario that details what might happen in this case would help them inform 
preparedness and contingencies. 
Stakeholders identified that understanding the scale – national, regional, local – of economic 
disruption would be important to understand how different industries, such as tourism, 
agriculture etc., would be impacted by prolonged unrest, particularly in the short-term. They 
stated that these industries would likely experience some form of decline initially and that 
investments (in real estate markets, infrastructure, specific projects etc.) may be affected, 
particularly due to the long-term uncertainty associated with caldera unrest. Lifelines further 
identified that there would be a change in priorities across organisations, such as planned 
projects bought forward, and that the loss of supply in response to the unrest events could 
result in prices increasing over the short-term because of increased maintenance costs. They 
identified that decisions would need to be made regarding when their organisations’ should 
look at building resilience, such as parallel networks, and who would lead this “recovery” in 
response to prolonged unrest. 
Stakeholders identified that there were a limited number of societal actions and range of 
impact in the framework and ECLIPSE Scenario A (Chapter 4), stating it would be useful to 
continue to expand this part of the framework. Lifelines and CDEM stated that hazard 
forecasts, including likelihoods, the potential extent of each hazard, what may happen next 
for each hazard, and more detail on the individual hazards, would be beneficial for informing 
decision-making throughout a scenario, alongside more detailed impact information across all 
environments (Figure 1.2 in Chapter 1). Stakeholders further requested information on the 
potential knock-on effects of impacts to adjacent districts and what interdependencies existed 
within lifeline utilities’ operations within the scenario as well as how the framework was aiming 
to accommodate the temporal aspect of scenarios. 
In response to ECLIPSE Scenario A, Lifelines and CDEM identified that prolonged unrest would 
at some point become the “new normal” with many service providers stated they would 
continue operating “business as usual” unless the physical impacts became more significant 
and that tackling uncertainty would be the most challenging factor to manage. Stakeholders 
identified that this new normal would influence migrations in the affected area, stating some 
people may move away initially, due to uncertainty, but could return if the unrest behaviour 
becomes the new normal. Lifelines also stated that a framework for decision-making in this 




Lifelines and CDEM stated that it would be useful to use the caldera scenarios to review what 
is happening during a real-world event against the scenarios to identify similarities and 
differences, helping stakeholders to respond more appropriately. This further scenario 
planning would also involve stakeholders seeking advice on the potential range of future 
scenarios that could influence their functionality. 
GeoNet, Research Scientists, and NEMA stated that there would need to be guidance on how 
to use the scenario framework to develop scenarios, suggesting a “choose-your-own-
adventure” style may further improve the uptake within non-physical science stakeholders. 
 
3.2 INTERPRETATION OF STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT FINDINGS TO INFORM THE DESIGN 
OF THE ECLIPSE SCENARIO FRAMEWORK 
From the four stakeholder engagements throughout the research, four main themes for the 
ECLIPSE Scenario Framework became apparent;  
1. that the physical phenomena aspect is a core part of developing a scenario, 
2. the physical impacts are a core part of developing the scenario into application uses, 
3. the uncertainty related to caldera volcano events is strongly characterised in the 
context of the unrest phenomena and psychosocial responses to that phenomena, 
4. the impacts on the cultural environment are significantly different, due to differing 
perspectives of the “hazard” itself. 
3.2.1 Physical Phenomena 
Stakeholders strongly identified that the physical phenomena of a caldera scenario was core 
to developing scenarios and therefore the framework. CDEM, NEMA, Industry, Lifelines and 
Iwi stated that they would need a simple physical phenomena scenario, informed from 
scientists or by working alongside scientists to develop it, to then develop their impacts 
scenario(s) from. Research Scientists also emphasised the importance of including robust, 
credible physical phenomena but at a far more detailed level than all other groups. This 
illustrated that a simple narrative of physical phenomena was a base level requirement for 
inclusion within the framework. This would then allow whichever perspective (remaining 
simplistic or developed to a more detailed level) to be created from there. This physical 




in Figure 3.1. The Hazard section aimed to characterise the volcano hazard by including four 
broad variables that help define volcanic events and inform the basis of decision-making. 
These variables are described below (Sections 3.2.1.1 – 3.2.1.4). 
3.2.1.1 Volcanic Hazards 
10 volcanic hazards that can potentially be experienced as part of caldera unrest and/or 
eruptions are listed within the Volcanic Hazards box in Figure 3.1. These hazards are standard 
inclusions when characterising a volcano globally and nationally and therefore included in the 
framework (GNS Science, 2010c). This was strongly supported by GeoNet and Research 
Scientists, during the ESDW, specifically requesting that commonly overlooked hazards, such 
as ground deformation, gas, and seismicity, should be included in the framework. The variety 
of hazards was further supported by Industry, Lifelines, and CDEM stakeholders, who 
emphasised the importance of scenarios that involved multi-hazard interactions and 
challenges.  
3.2.1.2 Event Size 
The potential Event Size (Figure 3.1) is measured by the Volcanic Unrest Index (VUI; Potter 
et al., 2015a) and the Volcanic Explosivity Index (VEI; USGS, 2017; Newhall & Self, 1982). 
Traditionally, there has always been more of an emphasis on eruptions rather than volcanic 
unrest, with caldera unrest management an underdeveloped field of volcanic risk 
management. However, it is important to understand how unrest, and its associated hazards, 
can impact surrounding environments and treat it as its own issue (Woo, 2018; Potter, Scott 
& Jolly, 2012). VEI is a common way for volcanic events to be defined globally and helps to 
give an understanding to the size of a potential event by comparing it to other global and 
national case studies (such as the 2008 Chaitén eruption, which was a VEI 4, or the Kaharoa 
eruption in 1314 AD which was VEI 5) – something which was explicitly requested by CDEM 
and Iwi during the ESDW. 
3.2.1.3 Geographic Domain 
Geographic Domain, in Figure 3.1, addresses the potential location or source of the volcanic 
event. These boundaries are first defined by previous research that has identified eight 
previous caldera centre boundaries (Section 1.4 in Chapter 1; Froggatt, 1997; Nairn, 1993). 
However, because these centres sit within a larger active volcanic zone (the TVZ; Figure 1.5), 




considered as sources of potential unrest and/or eruption (Potter, Scott & Jolly, 2012). This 
location variability was identified by GeoNet and Research Scientists throughout engagements. 
3.2.1.4 Magma Composition 
Magma Composition, in Figure 3.1, was included as, although most of the volcanic events from 
the TVZ’s caldera volcanoes have been rhyolitic, there is still the potential for variation in 
magma composition. This has been demonstrated in previous events, most recently by the 
1886 Tarawera eruption which consisted of more basaltic magma than rhyolitic (Nairn, 1993). 
This inclusion of variability was identified within the ESDW by Research Scientists. 
 
3.2.2 Physical Impacts 
What was apparent from all stakeholder engagements was that the natural phenomena 
presented by caldera volcanoes was important to the core structure of potential scenarios (as 
highlighted in Section 3.1). However, there was a split between Research Scientists, who 
wanted some extremely detailed purely hazard scenarios, and all other stakeholder groups, 
who wanted robust impact scenarios in response to a “simpler” hazard scenario. As a result, 
the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework became a useful tool to incorporate the physical phenomena 
but also accommodate the modularity of different impact scenarios driven from different 
perspectives of interest (the right-hand side of the framework; Figure 3.1). This is important 
to highlight as the hazard does have to be present in the first place in order to create the 
scenario, however, the level of detail those hazards need to have depends on the purpose of 
the scenario’s creation. For example, if CDEM were to develop a scenario to inform evacuation 
planning, they may only need to know that hazards currently occurring have imposed a 20km 
no-go zone from the centre of Lake Taupō and can inform their response decisions and actions 
from there. 
The physical impacts characterisation was accommodated within the ECLIPSE Scenario 
Framework by the Exposure and Vulnerability sections in Figure 3.1. There can be many 
different kinds of impacts as a consequence of caldera events, these sections of the framework 
aimed to cover spatial and physical attributes of assets and populations potentially affected by 
caldera hazards. Several initial variables were considered for inclusion in the framework and 
refined or expanded upon during stakeholder reviews throughout August of 2019 (Section 2.3 




onwards, it is important to acknowledge that these variables are, firstly, broad, commonly 
considered variables within disaster risk management and, secondly, not the only variables 
that could or should be included in future versions of the framework or within scenarios. The 
aim with providing broad starting variables is that individual stakeholders, who are subject 
matter experts within certain fields, can further populate and refine sections of the framework 
itself, which in turn, makes the information more credible, reliable and relevant. These broad 
variables are described below (Sections 3.2.2.1 – 3.2.2.2). 
3.2.2.1 Built Environment 
Having a spatial understanding of the built environment is important, alongside understanding 
the vulnerability of these built assets to various hazards (such as ash fall or ground shaking), 
to help inform preparedness, response and contingency measures (Loughlin et al., 2015). The 
built environment attributes across the Exposure and Vulnerability sections of the framework 
accommodate this by allowing stakeholders, subject matter experts, to inform the vulnerability 
and impact thresholds. This threshold accommodation was heavily supported by Lifelines 
throughout the ESDLUW. The more specific attributes are discussed further throughout 
Sections 3.2.2.1.1-3.2.2.1.4 below. 
3.2.2.1.1 Community Centres 
Community Centres were included as they are often places that are used by emergency 
management officials to set up relief or evacuation centres during crises and used to run 
workshops and exercises during non-crisis. The inclusion of this was supported by stakeholders 
during the ESDLUW, where Lifelines stated that mapping the locations of important assets, 
like marae or community gathering points, was important to their understanding and response 
to an event. These centres also play integral roles in a community’s functionality and sense of 
community, identified by NEMA during the NZVSAP ESDS. 
3.2.2.1.2 Emergency Services 
Emergency Services accommodates emergency responders, such as fire, police, search and 
rescue, as well as CDEM Groups, at both regional and district levels. It helps to build spatial 
awareness as to where resources may come from during an emergency and whether they may 
be compromised (due to proximity to hazards or lack of operational services). As well as 
providing staff and vehicle numbers, for example, to give a comprehensive understanding of 




spatial intelligence was identified within the ESDW by Industry and Lifelines and the need for 
resource understanding (in terms of staff) was identified by DHB representatives during the 
ESDLUW. 
3.2.2.1.3 Volcano Monitoring 
The GeoNet Volcano Monitoring Network was included within the framework for two primary 
reasons; firstly, previous events, both globally and locally, have shown that it is significantly 
important to have a functioning monitoring system in place, particularly during unrest, but also 
during response (see the successful management of the Pinatubo eruption in 1991; Pappas, 
2011; Newhall & Solidum, 2017). Secondly, it was identified by GeoNet, during the ESDW, that 
the monitoring network would need to be included as it was an important part of how they 
inform their decision-making (such as setting VALs and producing VABs), which therefore 
informs other stakeholders decision-making – as reflected by CDEM who stated they would 
use these GeoNet resources to inform their response actions. 
3.2.2.1.4 Core Lifeline Utilities: Telecommunications, Water, Transport, Electricity 
Core Lifelines Utilities are required for a functioning community and therefore are important 
for inclusion in the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework. Furthermore, Industry and Lifelines stated, 
during the ESDW, that having and understanding of the potential loss of services during an 
event would help them to better develop preparedness strategies. 
An understanding of the spatial locations of telecommunications (such as cell towers and lines) 
is significantly important pre-, during and post-crisis as a lot of decision-making, if not all, is 
reliant on communications between authorities, scientists, emergency responders, media and 
the public. Being able to anticipate that normal telecommunication functions may not be 
available can have a significant influence of the efficiency in response to an event, particularly 
in the immediate to short-term. 
Three waters, representing drinking water (potable), stormwater, and wastewater is critical in 
understanding the potential impacts felt by a community and in helping inform where 
resources should and could be allocated throughout a scenario. 
Transport encapsulates the four main modes of transportation of individuals, goods, and 
services in A-NZ. The spatial mapping aspect includes roads, tracks etc. as well as ports, 




within transport providers, CDEM Group evacuation planning or police cordon management, 
but is also beneficial for GeoNet as it helps them inform whether or not campaign monitoring 
(specialised monitoring in response to abnormal behaviour) would be a viable option and 
where they may be able to receive more data from. 
Electricity, including hydro-, wind, solar, geothermal, biomass and diesel/gas, is critical for 
both providers and receivers of power. Throughout the central North Island there are several 
energy providers that would be in some way affected by caldera phenomena and 
understanding where these systems may be impacted will help providers to prepare 
contingency and alternative operational plans and strategies (Section 3.1.1). It helps other 
lifeline utilities providers, such as DHBs and hospitals, to gauge whether or not they may need 
to rely on back-up systems, such as generators.  
3.2.2.2 Natural Environment 
The natural environment should also be considered when characterising potential impacts from 
caldera events as some of the decision-making made in previous environments can be heavily 
influenced by what the natural environment is experiencing. For example, soil health can have 
a significant influence on the agricultural industry in the affected areas or can impact the 
livelihoods of rural and Māori communities (Loughlin et al., 2015), as emphasised by Industry 
and Iwi during the ESDW. 
 
3.2.3 Uncertainty Defined by Unrest and Psychosocial Contexts 
The uncertainty associated with caldera volcanoes was a strong theme from all stakeholders 
across all engagements, with the uncertainty being characterised in two broad categories; the 
occurrence of unrest phenomena and psychosocial responses to that phenomena. This 
uncertainty was accommodated within the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework by the Exposure and 
Vulnerability sections in Figure 3.1. Alongside the spatial and physical attributes of assets and 
populations, these sections further aimed to cover societal and economic implications of 
impacts from these potential caldera hazards. Specifically relevant to this uncertainty theme, 
the Vulnerability section of the framework was designed to reflect NEMA’s Resilience 
Environments (Figure 1.2 in Chapter 1; MCDEM, 2018) to better address the variability within 
vulnerability and the influence different environments have on impacts from events and risk 




3.2.3.1 Social Environment 
Understanding and accommodating for social impacts from caldera events is an important part 
of understanding the risk and therefore important to be included within the ECLIPSE Scenario 
Framework. Acknowledging that these built centres, such as community and education 
centres, act as more than just a location to a community is important in understanding the 
stresses and strains they may experience prior to, during, and after a caldera event. This was 
emphasised by NEMA, at the NZVSAP ESDS, stating that these centres play an integral role in 
how a community comes together and remains resilient throughout crisis.  
3.2.3.1.1 Population 
Spatial awareness of populations potentially affected by caldera hazards is crucial in volcanic 
risk management as it helps inform evacuation planning for CDEM Groups, cordon 
management for police and where potentially affected people may be for emergency 
responders, particularly in the immediate-term. Understanding the population in other ways 
that make it vulnerable, such as demographics, employment, and ethnicity, is also important 
and was identified by Industry, Lifelines, and CDEM during the ESDW. Industry specifically 
identified that these attributes help to identify what industries could be affected by potential 
events and how many people within those industries may be affected. They further stated this 
would help give an indication on what and where to provide assistance, such as financial aid. 
3.2.3.2 Economic Environment 
Economic environments can be heavily impacted by caldera events, particularly by unrest 
where the uncertainty of whether or not an eruption will occur can influence strategic planning 
and long-term decision-making. The economic impacts can range from localised business 
losses to national scale market and industry changes and is therefore an important inclusion 
in the framework when characterising impacts and, ultimately, risk. NEMA, during NZVSAP 
ESDS, emphasised the importance of quantifying and mitigating the economic stresses and 
impacts from caldera unrest for A-NZ as a nation. Industry, during the ESDW, stated that 
characterising the potential economic impacts would help them understand what financial aid 
they may need to provide, particularly to rural communities, throughout a scenario. This was 
further supported by Lifelines, at both the ESDW and the ESDLUW, stating that understanding 






3.2.4 Cultural Environment Impacts 
The fourth theme that was essential for the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework to accommodate 
was the difference in cultural perspectives to caldera volcanoes and their events. The impacts 
to the cultural environment proved to be significantly different than those of other 
environments as expressed by Iwi throughout the research’s engagements. This cultural 
difference was accommodated within the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework by the Vulnerability 
section in Figure 3.1, specifically the Cultural Environment box, mirrored from NEMA’s 
Resilience Environments (Figure 1.2 in Chapter 1; MCDEM, 2018). 
As A-NZ is a multi-cultural society, with bi-cultural obligations (MCDEM, 2018), modern disaster 
risk management approaches must acknowledge the importance of increasing involvement 
from indigenous communities and more culturally diverse perspectives (Kearns & Joseph, 
1997). The needs of different cultural communities vary across communities prior to, during, 
and post-event and therefore, it was important a space for this was provided within the 
ECLIPSE Scenario Framework (Loughlin et al., 2015). Acknowledging these cultural influences 
on decision-making was identified during the ESDW with Iwi stating that allowing the scenarios 
to link to kinship ties and family stories was crucial to making sure the scenarios were useful 
and useable for Māori communities. Iwi, CDEM, and Industry further stated that this inclusion 
would help build a more realistic picture of a community level response to an event. 
 
3.3 DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECLIPSE SCENARIO FRAMEWORK 
This section presents the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework as a tool to contribute to A-NZ’s 
disaster risk management. This framework uses the learnings from the stakeholder 
engagement approach, specifically including the physical phenomena and impact requests 
from stakeholders expressed throughout the four engagements as part of this research 
(Section 3.2). The framework is further informed by the literature reviewed throughout 
Chapters 1 and 2. This section also addresses Objective Two of the thesis; to develop methods 
for disaster hazard and impact scenario development for silicic volcanism through the 
development of a modular, adaptable hazard and impact scenario framework for A-NZ’s 









combining integral themes and attributes of caldera volcano hazards and impacts alongside 
application and attribute requirements from a diverse range of sectors of disaster risk 
management in A-NZ into one coherent form. 
The structure of the left side of the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework is derived from common, 
globally accepted disaster risk practice, which is a function of hazard, exposure and 
vulnerability (Figure 1.6 in Chapter 1; UNDRR, 2015; Loughlin et al., 2015; GFDRR, 2016). 
Within disaster risk management there is often an inherent level of “acceptable risk” when 
dealing with low frequency, but high consequence, natural hazards; defined as “the level of 
potential losses that a society or community considers tolerable given existing social, 
economic, political, cultural, technical and environmental conditions” by the UNDRR (2016, 
p.14). This acceptable risk is often the basis for which emergency management plans are 
developed from as these plans are designed to be put into action once this level of acceptable 
risk has been exceeded (Jolly & de la Cruz, 2015). This approach of using impact-based 
thresholds (Sections 3.2.2-3.2.4), alongside geophysical thresholds (Section 3.2.1), makes the 
ECLIPSE Scenario Framework and ECLIPSE scenarios more useful as the thresholds 
significantly influence the management of the event and tend to be easier to define by 
stakeholders. 
The structure of the right side of the framework is derived from; 
- Literature (outlined in Chapter 1, Section 1.6.2), that supports these applications and 
uses and risk metrics included in the framework (Figure 3.1), 
- Previous research experiences (outlined in Chapter 1, Section 1.6.3), that have 
highlighted structures should reflect the collaborative nature of the methodology 
behind scenarios and the importance of diversity in scenarios’’ applications and uses, 
- Stakeholder engagements (outlined earlier in Section 3.1), that guided specific 
attributes added, particularly in the applications and uses column (in Figure 3.1). 
This part of the framework accommodates the diversity in applications and uses of potential 
scenarios and how these applications and uses may be defined through broader high-level risk 
metrics. 
The Risk Metrics column of the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework (Figure 3.1) acts to define how 
stakeholders may choose to measure hazards and impacts within the scenario. This could be 




measurements (such as hard metrics, like potential fatality numbers, or non-hard metrics, such 
as general societal risk). This column allows stakeholders to look at the themes (applications 
and uses) and then decide what impact they specifically want measured out of those themes. 
This method follows the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) 31,000’s (2009) 
risk assessment approach, where stakeholders identify their impacts, analyse their relevant 
parameters (the left side of the framework), and evaluate the impacts (and their risk) in the 
context of risk metrics. This allows stakeholders to specifically focus on what is important to 
their sector, for example, Industry may want to focus on response planning in the context of 
financial aid, focusing on how many employees of a particular primary industry may need 
subsidies following weeks of disruption from caldera unrest (a suggestion from the ESDW). 
Similarly, Lifelines may want to inform response planning but focus on network resilience 
rather than the cost of recovery, even though neither impact is mutually exclusive and both 
are relevant to Lifelines’ functionality, the drive behind developing a specific scenario may be 
more focused on one or the other. 
Potential Applications and Uses of the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework and ECLIPSE Scenarios 
were identified in the ESDW and further refined, prioritised or expanded upon throughout the 
NZVSAP ESDS, ESDLUW and ESFE Interviews. The specific examples listed in Figure 3.1 were 
identified within these stakeholder engagements, however, they do not represent a complete 
list of applications and uses, rather a broad overview. These potential applications and uses 
fell under three broad categories; planning, policy, and education and engagement, again 
however, these could and should be further expanded beyond this research project. 
The Impact Engine section of the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework acts as an engine room, 
combining themes and attributes from both sides of the framework, developing and refining 
them into a scenario. This scenario is then provided as an Output or product of the Impact 
Engine and therefore, the overall framework. 
 
3.4 EVALUATION OF THE ECLIPSE SCENARIO FRAMEWORK AND ECLIPSE SCENARIOS 
This section of Chapter 3 reports the findings from the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework 
Evaluation (ESFE) Interviews, where stakeholders were shown the ECLIPSE Scenario 




then taken through a questionnaire (Appendix E). These findings are divided by application 
theme (Sections 3.4.1-3.4.5), similar to that of Section 3.1. 
Industry, GeoNet, CDEM, and NEMA, stated that they would use and implement the ECLIPSE 
Scenario Framework and ECLIPSE Scenarios within their organisations, with each stakeholder 
further stating they would make some form of adaption to the resources. This indicated that 
the framework and scenarios developed had successfully provided a base or first step for 
further scenario development to continue to develop from. Stakeholders emphasised this 
usefulness of the framework and scenarios within their applications and uses, stating they 
could continue to develop further, more in-depth scenarios and listed potential applications of 
the framework and scenarios, which are detailed in Sections 3.4.1-3.4.5. 
 
3.4.1 Planning and Policy 
Industry stated that they would use the caldera scenarios to drive and inform response and 
recovery planning, particularly adaptable plans, as plans can often go out the window in 
emergencies, therefore, decision-makers must be able to adapt to evolving situations. Industry 
stated the scenarios would help visualise and workshop this adaptability and could work to 
present as many variations of events as possible so that most possibilities can be accounted 
for. CDEM also stated that they would use the knowledge presented in the caldera scenarios 
to inform planning and readiness and build reduction activities from. They stated they would 
achieve this by using the scenarios to increase the understanding of potential impacts from 
volcanic events and develop an unrest response framework, stating these scenarios and the 
ECLIPSE Scenario Framework are the first step in this response development process. NEMA 
and GeoNet further stated they would use the caldera scenarios to inform volcanic planning, 
indicating they would use them for internal training and education throughout teams such as 
operations, planning, duty, and capability. 
NEMA further stated that, due to the inherent uncertainty with caldera volcanoes, it is good to 
have the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework to emphasise the importance of not getting fixated on 
a single event because the outcomes can be so different across different events. They stated 





Industry and CDEM stated that they would use the caldera scenarios to help inform resource 
planning. Industry specifically suggested their use in identifying what resources might be 
needed throughout events and where development could occur in these plans. They further 
stated the scenarios would be used to help discuss how best to address the consequences of 
an event with respect to existing resources and what extra resources may be needed in future. 
GeoNet and Industry stated that they would use the caldera scenarios to inform contingency 
and evacuation planning, with Industry specifically stating they would be used to inform 
decisions from a welfare perspective about livestock evacuations. 
CDEM further stated that they would use the caldera scenarios to attempt to influence policy 
decisions and implementations if and where needed, such as building code standards. 
 
3.4.2 Community Engagement and Public Education 
CDEM, NEMA, and GeoNet stated they would use the caldera scenarios to inform some of the 
content included in public education activities and resources, such as informative posters, 
public messaging, with PIMs, and in organisational outreach. CDEM specifically suggested the 
focus should be on building awareness around caldera hazards and impacts rather than scaring 
people and that the scenarios would be used as a communication pathway within communities 
and with iwi partners. Industry stated that they would use the caldera scenarios to help inform 
and provide the best information to their organisations from scientists, which they could then 
provide to their relevant public audiences, particularly rural communities. Industry stated this 
would help improve organisational awareness to volcanic episodes and what their potential 
consequences may be. 
CDEM stated that the caldera scenarios were a good way to demonstrate how A-NZ might 
likely experience caldera volcano events, including helping to understand the degree of 
uncertainty and length of time unrest could involve and the degree of interruption caused as 
a result. NEMA further stated the scenarios would be useful in increasing understanding and 
awareness of caldera unrest and education on unrest and/or eruption from caldera volcanoes, 
particularly such as what patterns of unrest could involve, especially across the long-term. 
CDEM and NEMA both stated that the more visual aspect of the scenarios, such as the 
timelines, graphs, and maps, were particularly useful for communications and public 




NEMA further stated that the caldera scenario would be used to inform national warning 
systems training and that having a suite of scenarios from a common methodology would be 
useful as, assuming these are proofread by the same, diverse groups every time, it would 
ensure everyone was on the same page and agreed with the information presented. This 
would directly benefit public messaging and education, particularly during an event when the 
demand for information is high and expected to occur somewhat rapidly. This would also allow 




Industry, GeoNet, and NEMA stated that the scenarios would be used as a communication tool 
working to communicate the difference between events and series of hazards and/or impacts 
and the uncertainty associated with each step. 
Industry, NEMA, and CDEM stated that they would use the scenarios to initiate and support 
discussions with external stakeholders and establish relationships and contacts with new 
external stakeholders where they were missing, prior to an event. These discussions would 
cover topics such as what these partners can be prepared for (e.g. land-use planning) and 
how they might respond collaboratively and could be undertaken through channels such as 
exercises and training workshops. NEMA stated these organisations could include the Caldera 
Advisory Group (CAG) or insurance companies (and other economic focused organisations), to 
gauge different perspectives on impacts from an event. Industry highlighted that this would 
help improve synergy while reacting and responding to an event. CDEM stated these scenarios 
would be used to inform the balance of communications to suit the situation at hand and 
taking the necessary actions to ensure this communication balance takes place.  
GeoNet and NEMA stated that the caldera scenarios would also be used to open discussions 
internally within organisations and to prompt internal education, such as reviews of what has 
been done in the past and how that can be used in future. GeoNet stated these discussions 
could centre on science topics that may be more divisive issues or operational decisions, such 




NEMA also stated the scenarios could be used to evaluate and test the emergency 
management system as a whole, across all diverse environments (Figure 1.2) and 
stakeholders. 
CDEM and NEMA highlighted that the benefit of having a common methodology behind the 
scenarios (via the framework) ensured that planning and discussions around caldera events 
would be more streamlined and avoid confusion, ensuring everyone is on the same page. They 
stated that without the framework, there is a potential for individual organisations to rush off 
and make their own scenarios that may not necessarily be relevant or focus on only one 
evolution of events. CDEM stated it was good to have the guidance of the framework and that 
it was important that groups work on these scenarios together. 
NEMA stated that, by using the same suite of scenarios and framework, there are more 
organisations using the same base material which directly benefits the coordination of 
decisions and actions and ensures consistency across groups. Including social and cultural 
impacts focused scenarios would also be good to centre discussions around, which the 
framework provides the basis for the start of, with CDEM stating this would help anchor people 
in the people-focused impacts of caldera volcano impacts, rather than physical or natural 
environments. By using this co-production method, it would also help groups understand how 
their external partners are using the scenarios, further informing their own development 
actions and minimising the duplication of tasks. 
 
3.4.4 Science Gap Analysis and Testing Applications 
CDEM stated that the caldera scenarios were useful in demonstrating what has been done so 
far, in terms of caldera events, and was a huge step forwards and a good start for the 
development of caldera volcano scenarios. These scenarios and framework can be built onto 
in the next stages of development. 
Industry stated that the caldera scenarios were useful in showing gaps in previous thinking 
and resilience. They stated these would be used to further highlight gaps in the disaster risk 
management and caldera volcano knowledge during non-crisis times. The goal would then be 
to inform and educate organisations on these gaps, and work to fill them. CDEM complemented 
this, stating that the common methodology behind the framework and scenarios allowed them 





3.4.5 Decision-making Resources 
GeoNet stated that the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework and ECLIPSE Scenarios were a valuable 
resource for disaster risk management, the key is to make sure they are used across 
organisations. They stated that having a common method for development across the 
framework and scenarios was beneficial as it enabled them to think about different 
possibilities, with CDEM stating that this suite/framework already established saves time and 
resources for them. CDEM further stated that, rather than entirely different scenarios, 
development could be focused on different branches off the same base scenario/starting point, 
like a decision-tree format. This would allow CDEM to address and explore the variability of 
hazards and impacts, specifically cascading hazards and impacts. 
CDEM stated they would use the caldera scenarios to manage uncertainty in regards to caldera 
unrest, as they see unrest uncertainty as their biggest challenge for caldera event 
management. They stated they would further develop the scenarios with specific focuses such 
as involving industry stakeholders to further develop singular boxes/attributes from within the 
scenarios (timelines; Figures 4.1.2 and 4.2.1 in Chapter 4). 
Industry and CDEM stated that a potential credible suite of scenarios would need to include 
likelihoods (e.g. what is possible in a person’s lifetime, maximum vs. minimum etc.), impact-
focused scenarios (helping to identify the trigger points for management decisions), and best 
case vs. worst case scenarios (which could be in terms of the overall event or the individual 
hazards e.g. pyroclastic flows). They stated that a novel idea would be to have a scenario that 
focused on “distracting elements” such as a “rogue scientist” element, which would be useful 
to determine the efficiency of focus by organisations and teach them to not be distracted 
during response. Industry specifically stated that a more social element focused scenario would 
be interesting for them to workshop and implement. 
 
3.4.6 Discussion on the usefulness and guidance for the use of the ECLIPSE Scenario 
Framework and ECLIPSE Scenarios by key stakeholders 
Overall, all stakeholders interviewed during the ESFE Interviews stated that their organisation 




disaster risk management. All stakeholders stated that they could use these resources as the 
first step in comprehensively developing or refining more disaster risk management strategies 
across their diverse applications and organisations. Each organisation represented during the 
interviews was asked what they would need in order to use the resources, their responses are 
reported below (Sections 3.4.61-3.4.6.4; divided by organisation rather than theme). 
3.4.6.1 Regional Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups 
CDEM stated that they could focus on further developing specific community impact scenarios, 
lifelines impact scenarios, and far-reaching event scenarios, for example. They also stated that 
having the data (such as geospatial or statistical) already implemented in the framework 
attributes would make them much more inclined to use it than if they were to have to find it 
themselves. CDEM stated that in order to use the framework and scenarios they would need 
guidance in the form of explanations of the terminology used, so it is clear and not 
misinterpreted, and exemplars of what has been done with the current framework. 
3.4.6.2 National Emergency Management Agency 
NEMA stated they could use the framework to develop scenarios for exercises and possibly 
create scenarios for testing responses with more specific groups, such as economic 
stakeholders or the NZVSAP. NEMA stated that in order to use the framework and scenarios 
they would need to have a clear understanding of the assumptions made within them, the 
justification for these assumptions, and an understanding of what attributes have been 
modelled or just formulated at random, e.g. was an ash fall model run for the scenario or was 
an area of ash coverage chosen by the developer. 
3.4.6.3 Industry 
Industry stated that they would likely still need some assistance if they were to undertake 
developing a detailed hazard scenario but that the impacts could be informed by their 
organisations provided that they have been given or can find basic hazard information. In 
order to use the framework and scenarios, Industry stated that the more transparent, concise 
information provided, the more useful the resources would be for preparing and responding 
with. They suggested this informational guidance could include case studies from volcanoes 
similar to A-NZ’s caldera volcanoes, including the lessons learnt and what went well/not well 





GeoNet stated that they would use the framework and scenarios with some adaptions, such 
as shorter timeframe scenarios (“snapshot” scenarios). In order to use the framework and 
scenarios, GeoNet stated the resources within the scenarios, such as timelines, maps, and 
shapefiles, would need to be available and ready to use for organisations and individuals. 
These resources would need to be clearly labelled and linked to the scenario (e.g. good 
metadata) and the addition of a “how to use” manual would be beneficial. 
 
3.4.7 Recommendations following the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework Evaluation 
Interviews 
Due to the time constraints for this project no changes from the stakeholder feedback was 
implemented on the version of the framework presented in Section 3.3 and Figure 3.1. 
However, recommendations for future versions of the framework, based on these evaluation 
interviews are detailed below (with general recommendations outlined in Chapter 5). 
All stakeholder interviewed suggested that understanding the flow of impacts, as much as the 
flow of physical hazards, was an important aspect of the framework and scenarios and, 
therefore, should be further developed. CDEM and GeoNet stated that the addition of impacts 
on the built environment (such as fuel suppliers, cordoned areas, and transport) would improve 
the scenario(s), with Industry stating the addition of impacts on the natural environment (such 
as pasture smothering from ash fall) would also improve the usability of the scenario(s). CDEM 
and NEMA also stated that the economic impacts should be more fleshed out in future 
development of the framework and scenarios. All stakeholders interviewed also highlighted 
the lack of detailed social and cultural impacts and that future work should also be driven in 
these directions, suggesting inclusions such as a welfare lens on the scenario. 
CDEM and Industry suggested the addition of videos and images from historic events into the 
scenarios in addition to the mapped hazard extents (shown in Chapter 4). 
NEMA, Industry and CDEM all suggested further inclusion of what decisions are being made 
by other organisations throughout the scenarios (similar to that of the VALs shown in the 
scenarios in Chapter 4). Industry stated this would help gauge what discussions might be 




e.g. planning livestock evacuations based off police cordons informed by CDEM decisions. 
CDEM stated that decision points throughout the scenario(s) would improve it even more and 
help with the application into readiness, preparedness, and response planning. NEMA stated 
that most of the areas for improvement in the current framework and scenarios came from 
questions or perspectives that could be informed with further development with specific 
stakeholders to build narratives from those organisational perspectives.  
The main recommendations for specific future developments are summarised in the points 
below; 
- Develop the impacts on the built, social, cultural, and economic environments further 
– including specific relevant stakeholders and subject matter experts. 
- Develop a narrative for potential organisational decision points throughout the 
scenarios (beyond the VALs already included). 





4 ECLIPSE CALDERA SCENARIOS 
This chapter details the two scenarios developed as a result of the ECLIPSE Scenario 
Framework (Chapter 3); ECLIPSE Scenario A: The Taupō Unrest Scenario and ECLIPSE 
Scenario B: The Taupō Eruption Scenario (Sections 4.1 & 4.2 respectively). Each scenario 
section outlines the justification for developing each scenario (both from literature and data 
collected throughout stakeholder engagements; Sections 4.1.1 & 4.2.1), what events are 
involved in each scenario (Sections 4.1.2 & 4.2.2), and how each scenario plays out, including 
resources developed for end-user use of the scenario (Sections 4.1.3 & 4.2.3). The workflows 
for implementing attributes from the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework into these ECLIPSE 
Scenarios is outlined in Appendix G. 
 
4.1 ECLIPSE SCENARIO A: THE TAUPŌ UNREST SCENARIO 
ECLIPSE Scenario A: Taupō Unrest Scenario (TUS) was developed in August 2019 as a product 
of the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework. This section details how and why the TUS was developed, 
including what case studies that were used to inform the phenomena illustrated within the 
scenario. 
4.1.1 Taupō Unrest Scenario Characterisation 
Caldera volcano unrest phenomena commonly includes seismicity, ground deformation and 
changes in the geothermal and hydrothermal systems (Potter, Scott & Jolly, 2012). These 
phenomena can be potentially hazardous and can result in psychosocial and economic impacts, 
all of which have occurred in the past 160 years at the Taupō Volcanic Centre (TaVC), and 
overseas (Potter, Scott & Jolly, 2012). 
The importance of developing a scenario that consisted of caldera unrest, whether or not it 
lead to eruption, was also identified in the ECLIPSE Scenario Development Workshop (ESDW) 
in March 2019 (Chapter 3; Appendix B). CDEM Groups emphasised the importance of 
acknowledging and developing unrest impacts as part of the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework 
research, particularly impacts where physical hazards, such as ground deformation, cause 
multiple secondary impacts, such as economic, psychosocial, and impacts on infrastructure. 
Industry and Lifelines representatives complemented this, suggesting that a wide range of 




the multi-hazard aspect in these scenarios. GeoNet representatives further emphasised 
development of unrest scenarios, stating, in response to the exemplar scenario shown during 
the workshop (Appendix B), that including more unrest science would be beneficial and was 
missing from the exemplar. CDEM Groups, Iwi and Industry stakeholders also identified that 
the type of unrest would also have significant influence on their decision-making and actions, 
stating that the temporal aspect of unrest would be crucial to understanding and informing 
risk management (i.e. rapid-onset activity would drive different priorities than a relatively 
“slower”, more prolonged unrest period). 
Four significant episodes of caldera unrest have occurred historically in the TaVC (Table 4.1) 
and further research has indicated that many more episodes have occurred in between these 
(Potter, Scott & Jolly, 2012; Potter et al., 2015ab). These episodes range from minor unrest 
to months of earthquake swarm, resulting in significant social and economic implications and, 
based on the frequency of unrest in the TaVC, it is likely that this activity will occur in future 
(Potter, Scott & Jolly, 2012). Research in the TaVC (Potter, Scott & Jolly, 2012; Potter et al., 
2015ab) has further indicated that the phenomena from past episodes will almost certainly be 
repeated in future, at varying intensities, and therefore, two of these unrest episodes (1922 
and 1983) have been used to model some of the TUS behaviour. 
Table 4.1: Defined unrest episodes from the TaVC in the central TVZ (Potter, Scott & Jolly, 2012; Newhall & 
Dzurisin, 1988; Webb, Ferries & Harris, 1986). 
DATE OF UNREST 
EPISODE 
GEOLOGIC PHENOMENA IMPACTS AND IMPLICATIONS 
17th August – 
September 1895 
 
Mw6-7.5 earthquake causing 
hundreds of landslides, some large, 
blocking roads around Lake Taupō. 
Six weeks of aftershocks 
Collapsed chimneys and contents 




Effects on tourism. 
April 1922 – January 
1923 
 
Earthquakes migrated north to south 
through Taupō district over six months. 
Landslides blocking roads. 
~1m of uplift, followed by 3.7m of 
subsidence in the northern part of Lake 
Taupō. 




Impact on tourism in Taupō and Rotorua 




Minor changes to hot springs and 
geysers’ activity. 
Fissuring and faulting. 
 
Caused liquefaction and water 
“fountains” emerging from ground 
cracks, causing flooding. 
December 1964 – 
January 1965 
 
Up to 1,125 earthquakes over the two 
months. 
Potential tremor observed. 
<160mm of possible uplift. 
Cracks in buildings, chimneys moved, 
crockery broke. 
Rumours around unrest. 
Perceived impact on tourism of 
“exaggerated” reports. 
February – March 
1983 
March – June 1983 
16th June 1983 
23rd June 1983 
29th-30th June 1983 
Earthquake swarms northwest of Lake 
Taupō. <30 tremors recorded per day. 
Northern Lake Taupō shore uplift of 
5.7cm. 
New, stronger earthquake swarm 
(<Mw4.3). 





Rapid subsidence experienced northwest 
of Kaiapo Fault. 
Minor damage reported, including 
cracked chimneys and fallen ornaments. 
 
As unrest episodes usually do not leave any trace in the geological record, they are limited to 
areas of human occupation and written records, as a result, A-NZ’s record is reasonably limited 
(Potter, Scott & Jolly, 2012). However, there are a number of overseas caldera volcanoes that 
are similar to those in the central TVZ, such as Campi Flegrei (Italy), Yellowstone (USA), 
Chaitén (Chile), and Rabaul (Papua New Guinea), and therefore can be used for modelling 
unrest behaviour. For the TUS, the 1970s-1980s unrest at Rabaul caldera was used to 
complement the 1922 and 1983 TVC episodes, outlined below. 
The combination of caldera unrest literature, both global and local, and qualitative data from 
the ESDW therefore provided a sound evidence base for and drove the development of 
ECLIPSE Scenario A: Taupō Unrest Scenario. 
 
4.1.2 Taupō Unrest Scenario Development 
This section outlines how ECLIPSE Scenario A was developed, while the scenario itself is 




The location of the TUS was determined based on local history, which infers that a future vent 
will most likely be within Lake Taupō, near the Horomatangi Reefs or Motutaiko Island, near 
the most recently active vents (Figure 4.1.1) (Froggatt, 1997; Potter, Scott & Jolly, 2012). 
 
Figure 4.1.1: Area of the TUS developed from the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework. 
The Okataina Volcanic Centre (OVC) earthquake event in July 2004 (Appendix F.3) and the 
unrest episode at the TaVC in 1922 (Appendix F.1) were used to inform the initial earthquake 
and its direct consequences for the TUS. The initial earthquake and four substantial aftershocks 
were directly modelled from the 2004 OVC event, with landslides modelled from both the 2004 
and 1922 events. The seiching on lake shores and liquefaction in Waimarino Swamp at Stump 
Bay, as a result of the earthquake, were informed by expert advice within the research team. 
The earthquake swarms, starting in late 2019 and continuing throughout the TUS, were 
mirrored from the 1983 TVC (Appendix F.1) unrest and the Rabaul 1970-1980s (Appendix F.2) 
unrest episodes (taking the data and superimposing it onto the modern day area). The 
locations and spatial patterns of the swarms were taken from the 1983 TaVC events, however, 
in an opposite direction. The frequency over time and relative intensity pattern of the swarms 




The ground deformation within the TUS was modelled from both the 1922 and 1982 TaVC 
events, as well as the Rabaul unrest episode. The locations of ground deformation occurrence 
in the TUS was mirrored specifically from the TaVC unrest events, while the quantity, intensity 
and change through time was derived from Rabaul. The geothermal changes throughout the 
TUS were also modelled from the 1922 TaVC event. 
Finally, the change in the Volcanic Alert Level (VAL), from Level 0 to Level 1 was informed by 
expert advice from within research team and literature, which stated that if the VAL had existed 
during previous TaVC unrest episodes, the events may have been assigned a level of VAL 1 or 
even VAL 2 (Potter, Scott & Jolly, 2012). The social impacts, public anxiety and voluntary 
evacuations, were also informed by the impacts experienced in the 1922 TaVC event. 
 
4.1.3 Taupō Unrest Scenario 
ECLIPSE Scenario A: the Taupō Unrest Scenario (TUS) is a four and a half year long unrest 
scenario located within the TaVC (Figure 4.1.2; Table 4.2). The scenario begins with a Mw5.4 
earthquake occurring to the southeast of Turangi at 10km depth (Figure 4.1.1; Figure 4.1.4). 
The scenario then progresses through several hazards and impact suggestions resulting from 
the earthquake event that begin to indicate more than just tectonic behaviour. Scenario A 
concludes in open-ended fashion (Figure 4.1.3), allowing stakeholders several options on 
where to go next, such as leaving the scenario exercise there or choosing to have the 
behaviour lead onto an eruption. The impacts from the physical phenomena are indicative only 
and should be developed further from this project. The impacts are underdeveloped in 
comparison to the physical phenomena as they require an in-depth analysis themselves, which 
was out of scope for this project, and subject matter experts’ (and stakeholder) input to guide 
their development, which was also out of scope for this project (this also applies for the 
impacts developed as part of ECLIPSE Scenario B, Section 4.1). 
Table 4.2: ECLIPSE Scenario A: Taupō Unrest Scenario timeline in table form. The "Map" column relates to Figures 
4.1.4 to 4.1.9 below which map the hazards occurring throughout the scenario. 
YEAR  DATE OBSERVATIONS IMPACTS MAP 








Mw5.4 earthquake. 10km 
depth on Poutu Fault. 
Landslides reported around 
earthquake’s epicentre. 
Liquefaction in Waimarino 




Causes damage to State 
Highway 1 (SH1) near Stump 














Strongly felt Mw4.1 
aftershock occurs. 
 
Causes damage to SH1 
along the Tongariro River. 
Y1b 
SEP 12th  
 
 
Strongly felt Mw3.9 
aftershock occurs. 
More damage. Y1b 




Strongly felt Mw3.1 
aftershock occurs. 
Earthquake swarm at 
southern end of Lake Taupō 
(<Mw2.5). 
 
Public concern increased. Y1b 
 NOV 19th 
 
24th 
Motuoapa Springs increase 
in temperature. 
















Earthquake swarms continue 
throughout year (<Mw2.0-
2.5). 
~3cm of uplift recorded on 
eastern Lake Taupō shore. 








~1cm of uplift recorded on 






Motuoapa Hot Springs 
increase in temperature. 
Significant numbers of 



















 Earthquake swarms continue 
throughout year (<Mw2.0-2.5) 
with an increase in the 
number of earthquakes per 
swarm. 
 
~10cm of uplift recorded on 






~7cm of uplift recorded on 
the eastern Lake Taupō 
shore. 
Horomatangi geothermal 
system increases in activity. 
 
Volcanic Alert Level (VAL) 







Wide public anxiety. Some 
people starting to leave 





















 Earthquake swarms continue 
throughout year with an 






















~1cm of uplift recorded on 
the eastern Lake Taupō 
shore. 
 
~3cm of uplift recorded on 




























 Earthquake swarms continue 
through first quarter of the 
year with an increase in 
magnitude to Mw3.0-3.5. 
 
~10cm of uplift recorded on 
the eastern Lake Taupō 
shore. 
 
Earthquake swarms continue 
throughout later part of year 
with an increase in 
magnitude to Mw3.5-3.9.  
Some individual earthquakes 
are recorded at Mw4.0. 
 
Horomatangi geothermal 










Hundreds of people begin to 

























Figure 4.1.3: ECLIPSE Scenario A: Taupō Unrest Scenario logic-tree depicting the uncertainty of what happens next (which can ultimately be decided by the end-user through 






Figure 4.1.4: Map Y1a: Depicting phenomena experienced in July of 2019. The dark orange filled dots represent 
the earthquake swarm on July 1st 2019, while the lighter orange filled dots represent the earthquake swarm on 
29th July 2019. 
 
Figure 4.1.5: Map Y1b: Depicting phenomena experienced from August 2019 to December 2019, with past 
earthquake swarms in grey tones to illustrate the direction of swarm migration. The light orange dots represent 
the earthquake swarm on 19th October 2019, while the dark orange dots represent the earthquake swarm on 10th 




State Highway 1), with the 16th October 2019 aftershock the very northern star, the 24th November 2019 aftershock 
the very eastern star, and the 12th September 2019 aftershock the western, middle star. 
 
Figure 4.1.6: Map Y2: Depicting phenomena experienced throughout 2020, with past earthquake swarms in grey 
tones to illustrate the direction of swarm migration. 
 
Figure 4.1.7: Map Y3: Depicting phenomena experienced throughout 2021, with past earthquake swarms in grey 





Figure 4.1.8: Map Y4: Depicting phenomena experienced throughout 2022, with past earthquake swarms in grey 
tones to illustrate the direction of swarm migration. 
 
Figure 4.1.9: Map Y5: Depicting phenomena experienced throughout 2023, with past earthquake swarms in grey 





4.2 ECLIPSE SCENARIO B: TAUPŌ ERUPTION SCENARIO 
ECLIPSE Scenario B: Taupō Eruption Scenario (TES) was developed in October 2019 as a 
product of the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework. This section details how and why the TES was 
developed, including what case studies that were used to inform the phenomena illustrated 
within the scenario. 
 
4.2.1 Taupō Eruption Scenario Characterisation 
The TaVC has been the source of a range of eruption sizes, from small explosions to super-
eruptions, that occur relatively infrequently in comparison to other silicic centres, such as the 
OVC (Wilson, et al., 1984). These eruption events commonly include phenomena such as 
seismicity, ash fall, pyroclastic flows, and mudflows, amongst many other potential hazards 
(Potter, Scott & Jolly, 2012; Manville, Hodgson & Nairn, 2007; GNS Science, 2010c).  
The importance of developing a scenario consisting of a substantial sized eruption, with far-
reaching impacts, was identified in the ECLIPSE Scenario Development Workshop (ESDW) in 
March 2019 (Chapter 3; Appendix B), where stakeholders identified that having a scenario that 
crossed multiple regions would be useful to help build preparedness and to challenge planning. 
More specifically, stakeholders emphasised the importance of including commonly overlooked 
hazards, such as ground deformation and earthquakes, alongside built and societal 
environment impacts, such as societal behaviour. CDEM Groups identified that impacts should 
be present throughout the scenario, linked to each phase of volcanic behaviour and that cues 
as to what other organisations were doing, such as GeoNet (via VALs), would be useful for 
informing their responses. GeoNet representatives further emphasised this by suggesting that 
the inclusion of VALs would improve the similarity of the scenario to reality. Furthermore, 
GeoNet and Iwi representatives identified that timescales of the volcanic phenomena, with 
duration of each hazard and phase, would be beneficial. Overall, stakeholders identified that 
it was important that both the hazards and impacts were detailed and provided enough 
information to understand what was happening and form responses and actions based off the 




The combination of caldera eruption literature, detailed in Chapter 1, and the qualitative data 
from the ESDW therefore provided justification for and drove the development of ECLIPSE 
Scenario B: Taupō Eruption Scenario. 
 
4.2.2 Taupō Eruption Scenario Development 
This section outlines how ECLIPSE Scenario B was developed, while the scenario itself is 
outlined in Section 4.2.3 below. 
The location of the TES was determined based on local history, which states a future vent will 
most likely be within Lake Taupō, near the Horomatangi Reefs or Motutaiko Island (Froggatt, 
1997; Potter, Scott & Jolly, 2012). The location was further derived from the proximity to the 
vent that erupted during the 186 AD eruption (Figure 4.2.9) (Wilson & Walker, 1985a). 
The earthquake swarms, starting in January 2022 and continuing through until eruption, were 
mirrored from the 1983 TaVC unrest and the Rabaul 1970s-1980s unrest episodes (Appendices 
F.1 and F.2). The locations and spatial patterns of the swarms were superimposed from the 
1983 TVC events, with the frequency over time and relative intensities of the swarms informed 
from the Rabaul unrest episode. 
The ground deformation within the TES was derived from both the 1922 and 1983 TaVC 
events, as well as the Rabaul unrest episode. The locations of ground deformation were 
derived specifically from the TaVC unrest events, while the quantity, intensity and change 
through time was derived from Rabaul. The geothermal changes throughout the TES were 
also modelled from the 1922 TaVC event. 
The eruption phenomena throughout the TES were informed from the 186 AD eruption event 
(Appendix F.1). The ash fall (isopachs; eruption phases one to three and five to six) were 
derived from Walker (1980; 1981ab) and Wilson & Walker’s (1985a) previous research, and 
coupled with an understanding of the predominant wind directions over A-NZ’s central North 
Island (Wilson et al., 2009). The “waterspouting” (water falling from the eruption column), in 
phase four of the eruption, was derived from descriptions by Wilson & Walker (1985a), who 
drew similarities to “waterspouting” that occurred during the 1937 eruption event at Rabaul 




more widespread pyroclastic flow in the later part of phase six of the eruption were also derived 
from Wilson & Walker’s (1985ab) research.  
The post-eruption phenomena in the TES were also informed from the 186 AD eruption event, 
with the assumption that all rivers linking to the pyroclastic flow deposit from phase six would 
in some way or another present a mudflow (lahar) hazard (Wilson & Walker, 1985a). Previous 
research in the Taupō district had also identified that a catastrophic flood occurred post-186 
AD eruption and would therefore, likely occur again. This catastrophic flood resulted from a 
dam-break, where the outlet from Lake Taupō to the Waikato River had been dammed with 
pyroclastic material as a result of the eruption and, after re-filling over several decades, the 
lake level eventually overtopped the dam, sending 20km3 of water downstream in a single 
phase (Manville et al., 1999; Manville, 2002; Manville, Hodgson & Nairn, 2007). These lahar 
and river flooding events would likely occur for decades after the eruption, however, the 
scenario only details short-term post-eruption due to time constraints for development time 
for the scenario. 
The changes in the VALs throughout the scenario were informed by a combination of expert 
advice from within the research team, literature (Potter, Scott & Jolly, 2012; Potter et al., 
2015ab), and what has occurred previously in response to volcanic eruptions at A-NZ’s 
volcanoes. The social impacts, public anxiety and voluntary evacuations, were also partially 
informed by the impacts experienced in the 1922 TaVC event and the Rabaul unrest episode.  
 
4.2.3 Taupō Eruption Scenario 
ECLIPSE Scenario B: Taupō Eruption Scenario (TES) is a two year unrest to eruption scenario 
located within the TaVC (Figure 4.2.1; Table 4.3). The scenario begins with already present 
unrest causing the VAL to be at Level 1 (Figure 4.2.1). The scenario then progresses through 
several phases of unrest (Figures 4.2.2 to 4.2.8) before it eventually begins to erupt. It follows 
through the eruption, six phases of eruptive behaviour (Figures 4.2.9 to 4.2.16), before 
ceasing eruption. Scenario B ends indicating that long-term hazards are likely to continue 





Table 4.3: ECLIPSE Scenario B: Taupō Eruption Scenario timeline in table form. The "Map" column relates to Figures 
4.2.2 to 4.2.18 below which map the hazards occurring throughout the scenario. 
YEAR  TIME OBSERVATIONS IMPACTS MAP 
2022 JAN  Earthquake swarms of ~Mw2.5 – 3 















~3cm uplift recorded on north-eastern 





Horomatangi geothermal system 
increases in temperature. 
 U3 
2023 JAN  
 
 
Earthquake swarms of ~Mw3 – 3.5 





~10cm uplift recorded on eastern 





Earthquake swarms increase to 
~Mw3.5 – 3.9 with some individual 





Horomatangi geothermal system 
increases in activity. 
Hundreds of people 








An increase in the frequency of Mw4 





Horomatangi geothermal system 








Phreatomagmatic eruption occurs 
with the vent below the water’s 
surface. Eruption column – 10km 









Plinian eruption occurs with the vent 
above the water’s surface. Eruption 
behaves as a continuous gas blast 
with minor fluctuations throughout 
sustained activity. Eruption column – 
30km high. Local south-westerly 
winds, with high level west-south-
westerly winds. 
Ash reaches Taupō 
township – eventually 









A sudden increase in water (from the 
lake) into the vent causes the Plinian 
eruption column to interact with water. 
Water falls alongside ash. 
 
Ash eventually 







Water-spouting occurs – water falling 
from the eruption column extensively 























Plinian eruption occurs with a 30km 
high eruption column. Interaction with 
water continues and so ash falls at 












Largest Plinian eruption yet occurs 
with 38km high eruption column. 
Slumping of ground (caused by 
ground shaking) is experienced in 
Taupō township. 
Pyroclastic flows are generated 
(reducing eruption column height) and 


























Eruption climax produces a single, 
massive pyroclastic flow that spreads 
in all directions from the vent’s 
location in Lake Taupō in a matter of 
minutes. 
Area within 80km of 
Lake Taupō (radially) 















Explosions consisting of gas and 
deposited material occur sporadically. 
 
Mudflows travel for tens of hundreds 
of kilometres (eventually reaching the 
East Coast). 






rivers surrounding the 
Lake Taupō area and 
stretch to both the 













Dam-break flooding from Lake Taupō 
if eruptive products block Lake 
outlets. 
 














Figure 4.2.2: Map U1: Depicting phenomena experienced in January and March of 2022. 
 





Figure 4.2.4: Map U3: Depicting phenomena experienced in October of 2022. 
 





Figure 4.2.6: Map U5: Depicting phenomena experienced in April of 2023. 
 





Figure 4.2.8: Map U4: Depicting phenomena experienced in September and October of 2023. 
 





Figure 4.2.10: Map E2: Eruption Phase Two, depicting phenomena experienced in November of 2023. 
 





Figure 4.2.12: Map E4: Eruption Phase Four, depicting phenomena experienced in November of 2023. 
 





Figure 4.2.14: Map E6a: Eruption Phase Six, depicting phenomena experienced in November of 2023. 
 
Figure 4.2.15: Map E6b: Eruption Phase Six, depicting phenomena experienced in November of 2023. A closer 





Figure 4.2.16: Map E6c: Eruption Phase Six, depicting phenomena experienced in November of 2023. 
 












5 SUMMARY  
This research project provided the opportunity to map the breadth of stakeholders involved in 
silicic volcanism in A-NZ, as well as their respective requirements in order to appropriately 
prepare for and respond to caldera unrest and/or eruption events. The information and insight 
gained from these stakeholder engagements throughout the scenario development process 
has demonstrated the breadth of information requirements, factors, and decisions that inform 
what happens within volcanic risk management in A-NZ (reflected in Chapter 3). The findings 
from the engagements demonstrated that each group eventually found common attributes 
that they required to build an absolute bare minimum scenario around. These commonly 
shared requirements allowed this research to develop a consistent foundation for scenario 
development through the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework, and used the ECLIPSE Scenarios as 
exemplars of how the framework could evolve into tangible scenarios. This consistent, 
common foundation allows stakeholders and end-users to take this base step and further 
develop it to cater to more advanced applications (e.g. story-telling or science gap analysis), 
clearly demonstrating that the scenario development process was crucial in the individual 
scenario(s)’ development – a clear benefit in the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework. It is also 
notable that without the engagement process and the co-production methods it is likely that 
each one of these stakeholder groups could have built their own scenarios, however, it is likely 
each of those scenarios would have lacked one or more attributes from another groups’ 
discipline, therefore, missing an important part of the volcanic risk management picture – 
which is often where errors are made in the response to real-life events and/or disasters. 
 
5.1 LIMITATIONS 
This section outlines the limitations presented by the research methodology behind the 
ECLIPSE Scenario Framework and ECLIPSE Scenarios (Section 5.1.1) as well as specific 
limitations of the attributes present within the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework (Section 5.1.2). 






5.1.1 Limitations of the Methodology 
Due to the finite timeframe of the research project, parts of the methodology could not be 
completed. These steps were; 
- a more robust evaluation phase and, 
- a more robust inclusion of the social and cultural environments in both the ECLIPSE 
Scenario Framework and ECLIPSE Scenarios. 
Ideally, another stage of evaluation interviews should be undertaken, particularly as the set 
undertaken in this project only captured responses from CDEM, Industry, NEMA, and GeoNet 
groups – which is only four of seven of the key stakeholder groups outlined at the beginning 
of this project. This second evaluation would allow the researcher to refine the current 
framework version (2.2) and then re-present it to the same stakeholders (and those who were 
missing in the first set of interviews) and evaluate those additions or changes from the ESFE 
Interviews. This would benefit the framework as it would continue to develop in the desired 
direction of the key stakeholders and end-users. 
The social and cultural environments of volcanic risk management are often excluded from 
research in favour of more in-depth development on the physical science and built environment 
attributes. The research presented here attempted to accommodate the social and cultural 
environments but, as it was not the initial objective of the research project, the attributes 
present from these environments in the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework and ECLIPSE Scenarios 
are a basic attempt. However, by undertaking this research process, it has highlighted this 
gap and allows for the volcanic risk management community, and the ECLIPSE community 
specifically, the opportunity to ask the right questions moving forward, continuing to more 
robustly develop these gaps in the framework and scenarios. 
 
5.1.2 Limitations of the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework 
As stated throughout Sections 3.2-3.3, the attributes and factors included in the ECLIPSE 
Scenario Framework are not the “be all, end all” of potential attributes and factors that could 
or should be included. The level of detail provided for each section or sub-section is also not 




detail, can be expanded further within the ECLIPSE programme and/or externally with 
individual stakeholders. 
Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that while the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework 
attempts to open dialogue surrounding the uncertainty of individual hazards, impacts and 
overall risk, event outcome uncertainty is not necessarily improved as a result. This is as the 
outcomes are intrinsically related to the chaotic behaviour of volcanic systems, where small 
changes below the surface can result in substantial changes in behaviour at the surface and 
can often be difficult to identify or forecast (Barclay et al., 2008). 
 
5.2 CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this thesis was to develop a modular, adaptable framework for the development of 
scenarios to underpin the management of A-NZ’s caldera volcanic hazard risk within the 
ECLIPSE programme (as stated in Section 1.2). This involved using co-production methods to 
combine scientific, practitioner, and local knowledge from all perspectives and applications of 
volcanic risk management (Objective One). To inform the framework’s development, 
information was required from seven diverse groups (Regional CDEM Groups, GeoNet, 
Industry, Lifeline Utilities Groups, Iwi, NEMA, Research Scientists), and collected from 
engagement workshops and discussions throughout the research project (Chapters 2 and 3; 
Objective Two). These engagements involved presenting stakeholders with the ECLIPSE 
Scenario Framework and/or one of the ECLIPSE Scenarios (Chapters 3 & 4). The ECLIPSE 
Scenario Framework and ECLIPSE Scenarios were then presented in one-on-one interviews 
and evaluated for their potential usefulness and usability by stakeholders (Chapter 3; Objective 
Three). The main conclusions of these engagements are outlined below. 
 
5.2.1 The ECLIPSE Scenario Framework (Chapter 3) 
The ECLIPSE Scenario Framework proved to be a useful and useable resource for stakeholders, 
with all groups stating that the framework was a good foundation for combining cross 
boundary wants and needs from various stakeholder groups. This ECLIPSE Scenario 
Framework has given the disaster risk management community, and specifically the ECLIPSE 




highlighted gaps in the current co-production development methods (such as limited 
opportunities within individual projects to properly characterise all disaster risk management 
environments, Figure 1.2). 
 
5.2.2 The ECLIPSE Scenarios (Chapter 4) 
The two pillar scenarios, ECLIPSE Scenario A: The Taupō Unrest Scenario and ECLIPSE 
Scenario B: The Taupō Eruption Scenario, proved to be helpful in communicating the ECLIPSE 
Scenario Framework to stakeholders and allowing them to understand how the framework 
worked. All stakeholders interviewed stated that they would use or implement the scenarios 
in some way, relevant to their discipline, and that they were keen to continue developing and 
adapting the scenarios within their own organisations, and collaboratively with other external 
stakeholders. 
 
5.2.3 Summary of Conclusions 
Given the geographical location of A-NZ’s caldera volcanoes and their potential for prolonged, 
disruptive unrest and/or high-impact eruptions, caldera risk management is of significant 
importance to A-NZ and the stakeholders that play a role in volcanic risk management. Having 
a framework that pulls together important aspects of the hazards and impacts associated with 
caldera volcano events, undertaken through robust co-production methods, supports volcanic 
risk management, as noted throughout workshops and interviews with stakeholders.  
Overall, this research has demonstrated that using co-production methods with diverse, key 
stakeholders and participation by those stakeholders in the research development process can 
provide improvement in understanding each other’s wants and needs for translating, 
communicating, and applying volcanic risk management towards A-NZ’s caldera volcanoes. 
We hope that the outputs of the engagements and this thesis continue to help inform and 






5.3.1 Further Evaluate the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework 
Due to the time constraints of a 12-month MSc thesis, only one set of evaluation interviews 
could be held, with only a limited number of representatives from each key stakeholder group 
(see Table 2.1). For future co-production development of the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework 
and ECLIPSE Scenarios, it is recommended another set of interviews is held with both the 
same set of stakeholders and those who could not be involved in the set undertaken in this 
thesis (namely Iwi, Research Scientists, and Lifelines).  
 
5.3.2 Further Development of the ECLIPSE Scenarios 
Due to the time constraints of a 12-month MSc thesis, only two pillar scenarios were developed 
(Chapter 4). These two scenarios encapsulate the two main types of events from one of A-
NZ’s calderas that were heavily requested throughout the engagement process; a scenario 
addressing unrest from a caldera and a scenario demonstrating a large eruption by geologic 
constraints. Although both these scenarios are credible representations of possible volcanic 
behaviour from TaVC, these do not represent the full breadth of events that could occur from 
Taupō, neither do they represent the full breadth of events that could occur from other caldera 
centres in the TVZ (such as events from Okataina or Rotorua calderas). Because of this, it is 
recommended that more scenarios are developed, with stakeholders, using the ECLIPSE 
Scenario Framework. 
These ECLIPSE Scenarios developed also had more robust attributes from the built and natural 
environments and tend to cater to the more physical science-focused applications within the 
ECLIPSE Scenario Framework. It is therefore recommended that more specific future research 
is undertaken to improve the understanding of the social, cultural, and economic environments 
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Appendix A TERMINOLOGY 
A.1 DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT TERMINOLOGY 
Acceptable Risk: Risk that an individual is willing to accept, or that a public official is 
prepared to allow an individual or community in their charge to accept, in return for perceived 
benefits of taking that risk (Newhall & Hoblitt, 2002). 
Disaster: A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society at any scale due 
to hazardous events interacting with conditions of exposure, vulnerability and capacity, leading 
to one or more of the following: human, material, economic and environmental losses and 
impacts (UNDRR, 2017). 
Disaster Risk: the potential loss of life, injury, or destroyed or damaged assets which could 
occur to a system, society or a community in a specific period of time, determined 
probabilistically as a function of hazard, exposure, and vulnerability (UNDRR, 2017). 
Disaster Risk Assessment: A qualitative or quantitative approach to determine the nature 
and extent of disaster risk by analysing potential hazards and evaluating existing conditions of 
exposure and vulnerability that together could harm people, property, services, livelihoods and 
the environment on which they depend (UNDRR, 2017). 
Disaster Risk Management: The application of disaster risk reduction polices and strategies 
to prevent new disaster risk, reduce existing disaster risk and manage residual risk, 
contributing to strengthening of resilience and reduction of disaster losses (UNDRR, 2017). 
Disaster Risk Reduction: Aimed at preventing new and reducing existing disaster risk and 
managing residual risk, all of which contribute to strengthening resilience and therefore to the 
achievement of sustainable development (UNDRR, 2017). 
Event-tree: A graphical, tree-like representation of event in which branches are logical steps 
from a general prior event through increasingly specific subsequent events (intermediate 
outcomes) to final outcomes. For graphical and conceptual simplicity, events at any given level 
of the tree need not be mutually exclusive or exhaustive (Newhall & Hoblitt, 2002). 
Exposure: The situation of people, infrastructure, housing, production capacities and other 




Hazard: A process, phenomenon or human activity that may cause loss of life, injury or other 
health impacts, property damage, social and economic disruption or environmental 
degradation. These may be natural, anthropogenic, or socio-natural in origin. (UNDRR, 2017). 
Intermediate-term: Pertaining to the coming months and, occasionally, years. 
Intermediate-term hazard is typically estimated when a volcano is restless (or even erupting), 
but the unrest (or eruption) is not changing rapidly (Newhall & Hoblitt, 2002). 
Lifeline Utilities: The physical structures, facilities, networks and other assets which provide 
services that are essential to the social and economic functioning of a community or society 
(UNDRR, 2017). Also known as “critical infrastructure”. 
Long-term: Pertaining to the coming years, decades, centuries and longer. For most long-
term hazard estimates, the volcano in question is dormant and any seismicity, geodetic change 
or fumarolic activity is at background levels (Newhall & Hoblitt, 2002). 
Mitigation: The lessening of minimising or the adverse impacts of a hazardous event 
(UNDRR, 2017). 
Multi-hazard: Specific contexts where hazardous events may occur simultaneously, 
cascadingly or cumulatively over time, and taking into account the potential interrelated effects 
(UNDRR, 2017). 
Preparedness: The knowledge and capacities developed by governments, response and 
recovery organisations, communities and individuals to effectively anticipate, respond to and 
recovery from the impacts of likely, imminent or current disasters (UNDRR, 2017). Can be 
used in place of “readiness”. 
The 4 R’s: The New Zealand integrated approach to civil defence emergency management 
can be described by the four areas of activity, known as the ‘4 Rs’; reduction, readiness, 
response and recovery (NEMA, 2013). 
Reduction: Identifying and analysing long-term risks to human life and property from 
hazards; taking steps to eliminate these risks if practicable, and, if not, reducing the magnitude 
of their impact and the likelihood of their occurring (NEMA, 2013). 
Readiness: In order to be ready for, and to reduce the effects of an emergency, agencies 




and exercise for emergencies, and incorporate lessons identified into their planning and 
processes (DPMC, 2015). Can be used in place of “preparedness”. 
Response: Involves actions taken immediately before, during or directly after an emergency 
to save lives and property, and to help communities recover. Agencies respond to emergencies 
by activating their own plans and coordinating their activities with other agencies to manage 
the consequences of the emergency (DPMC, 2015). 
Recovery: The coordinated efforts and processes to bring about the immediate, medium and 
long-term holistic regeneration and enhancement of a community following an emergency 
(NEMA, 2013). 
Resilience: The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, 
absorb, accommodate, adapt to, transform and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely 
and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic 
structures and functions through risk management (UNDRR, 2017). 
Sendai Framework: Prevent new and reduce existing disaster risk through the 
implementation of integrated and inclusive economic, structural, legal, social, health, cultural, 
educational, environmental, technological, political and institutional measures that prevent and 
reduce hazard exposure and vulnerability to disaster, increase preparedness for response and 
recovery, and thus strengthen resilience (UNDRR, 2015). 
Short-term: Pertaining to the coming minutes to weeks. Short-term hazards are typically 
estimated when unrest (or an eruption) is changing rapidly (Newhall & Hoblitt, 2002). 
Vulnerability: The conditions determined by physical, social, economic and environmental 
factors or processes which increase the susceptibility of an individual, a community, assets or 
systems to the impacts of hazards (UNDRR, 2017). It can be stated in terms of a probability 
of damage, or as a percentages of the total exposed assets expected to be affected by a given 
peril (Jolly & de la Cruz, 2015). 
 
A.2 VOLCANIC TERMINOLOGY 
Ash fall: Fine material ejected from a volcano during an eruption. Derived of volcanic glass, 




Andesite: Grey to black volcanic rock with between about 52 and 63 weight percent silica. 
Andesite magma commonly erupts from stratovolcanoes as thick lava flows and can also 
generate strong explosive eruptions to form pyroclastic flows and surges and enormous 
eruption columns (USGS, 2016). 
Basalt: Volcanic rock that is characteristically dark in colour and contains 45 to 53 percent 
silica. Basaltic magma is commonly produced from shield volcanoes (USGS, 2016). 
Caldera: A depression in the ground formed by the withdrawal of underground magma 
causing the roof of the magma chamber to collapse (Potter, Scott & Jolly, 2012). 
Debris Avalanche: Moving masses of rock and soil that occur when the flank of a mountain 
or volcano collapse and slides downslope, incorporating everything in its way. They can 
transform into water-rich lahars as they travel (USGS, 2016). 
Dormant: Generally, means not-in-eruption (Potter, Scott & Jolly, 2012). 
Earthquake Swarms: Many earthquakes occurring close together in time and space, usually 
of a similar size (Potter, Scott & Jolly, 2012). Can also be known as “Seismic Swarms”. 
Episode of Unrest: A period of unrest of unspecified duration, preceded and followed by 
relative quiescence of equal or longer duration. Typically, unrest lasts several weeks to years 
and quiescence lasts several years to centuries (Newhall & Dzurisin, 1988). 
Eruption Column/Plume: The ascending, vertical part of the mass of erupting debris and 
volcanic gas that rises directly above a volcanic vent. Higher in the atmosphere, columns 
usually spread laterally into plumes or umbrella clouds (USGS, 2016). 
Fissures: Large cracks in the ground or line of vents (Potter, Scott & Jolly, 2012; GNS Science, 
2012). 
Fumarole: Vents, that occur along tiny cracks, long fissures, clusters and/or on the surfaces 
of lava flows or thick deposits of pyroclastic flows, from which volcanic gases escape into the 
atmosphere (USGS, 2016). 
Gas Poisoning: Volcanic gases include carbon monoxide (CO), carbon dioxide (CO2), sulphur 
dioxide (SO2), hydrochloric acid (CHl), hydrofluoric acid (HF), hydrogen sulphide (H2S) and 





Ground deformation: (Ground movement including uplift or subsidence) occurs as a result 
of magma moving beneath the ground surface, before, during and after eruptions. Can range 
from millimetres to metres, can affect wide areas and may cause fissures (Potter, Scott & Jolly, 
2012). 
Hydrothermal Explosions: Small gas and/or steam eruptions that can also occur without 
the influence of magma due to normal hydrothermal system processes or during drilling 
(Potter, Scott & Jolly, 2012). 
Isopach: A line on a map that connects geologic units of equal ash or thickness deposits from 
an explosive eruption (USGS, 2016). 
Ignimbrite: The rock formed by widespread deposition and consolidation of pyroclastic flows 
(USGS, 2016). 
Lahars: Are “mudflows” which are mixtures of volcanic ash, blocks and water, formed on 
volcanoes. The source can be from a crater lake, a dam collapse or heavy rainfall washing ash 
from the slope of a volcano (GNS Science, 2010c). 
Lava: Magma (molten rock) erupted at the ground surface (GNS Science, 2012). 
Lava Dome: Mound that forms when viscous (sticky) lava is erupted slowly and piles up over 
the vent rather than moving away as a lava flow (GNS Science, 2012). 
Lava Fountain: Fountain of runny lava from a vent or fissure (GNS Science, 2012). 
Magma: Underground molten rock (Potter, Scott & Jolly, 2012). 
Magma Chamber/Reservoir: The location beneath the vent of a volcano where magma is 
stored prior to eruption (USGS, 2016). 
Pyroclastic Flows: Hot (several hundreds of degrees Celsius), gaseous clouds formed from 
eruption column collapse during an eruption. These can travel hundreds of metres per second 
and cause total destruction of the areas they cover (GNS Science, 2010c). 
Phreatic Eruption: An eruption driven by the heat from magma interacting with water 




Plinian: Type of eruption with a high rate of magma discharge, sustained for minutes to 
hours, forming tall eruption columns (20-35km) and cause wide dispersion of ash (GNS 
Science, 2012). 
Pumice: Magma that has been “frothed up” by escaping gases and then cooled and solidified 
during the eruption, typically silicic in composition (USGS, 2016). 
Phreatomagmatic: An eruption that involves both magma and water, which typically interact 
explosively, leading to an ejection of steam and pyroclastic fragments (USGS, 2016). 
Phreatoplinian: An eruption where silicic magma interacts violently with abundant water, 
often residing in caldera lakes (Sigurdsson et al., 1999). 
Rhyolite: Volcanic rock that characteristically is light in colour, contains 69 or more percent 
of silica. Rhyolitic lavas are viscous and tend to form thick blocky lava flows or lava domes. 
Rhyolite magmas tend to erupt explosively (USGS, 2016).  
Supereruption: Term used to describe explosive VEI 8 eruptions from supervolcanoes that 
typically form a caldera (USGS, n.d.). 
Supervolcano: A volcanic centre that has had an eruption of VEI 8 but often experience 
much smaller eruptions in between these VEI 8 supereruptions (USGS, 2015). 
Surge: Ground-hugging clouds of ash, rock and volcanic gas that move at hundreds of metres 
per second and have temperature of several hundred degrees Celsius (USGS, 2016). 
Silica: Silicon dioxide (SiO2), the most abundant rock-forming compound on Earth and the 
predominant molecular constituent of volcanic rocks and magmas (USGS, 2016). 
Silicic: Describes magma that contains more than about 63 percent silica and is generally 
viscous, gas-rich and tens to erupt explosively (USGS, 2016). 
Seismicity: The phenomenon of earthquakes caused by the brittle fracturing of rocks in 
Earth’s crust (USGS, 2016). 
Subduction: The process of the oceanic lithosphere colliding with and descending beneath 
the continental lithosphere (USGS, 2016). 




Tephra: Any type and size of rock fragment that is forcibly ejected from the volcano and 
travels an airborne path during an eruption (including ash) (USGS, 2016). 
Unrest: Anomalous volcanic activity that changes above normal background levels, 
potentially, but not necessarily, precursory to an eruption (Newhall & Hoblitt, 2002). Volcanic 
unrest occurs when regional tectonic and/or volcanic processes cause magma and/or its fluids 
to interact with pre-existing rocks and sub-surface fluids. This can cause earthquakes, ground 
surface deformation, fumaroles, hydrothermal explosions, and change in regional groundwater 
levels and spring temperatures (Potter, Scott & Jolly, 2012). 
Volcanic Alert Levels (VALs): Used for the communication of the current level of volcanic 
activity at multiple volcanoes (Potter et al., 2015a). 
Volcanic Explosivity Index (VEI): A numeric scale that measures the relative explosivity 
of volcanic eruptions. Volume of products, eruption cloud height, and qualitative observations 
are used to determine the explosivity value. The scale is open-ended (largest volcanic 
eruptions in history, supereruptions, given VEI 8) and is logarithmic, with each interval on the 
scale representing a tenfold increase in observed ejecta criteria, with the exception of between 
VEI 0, VEI 1 and VEI 2 (USGS, 2017). 
Volcanic Unrest Index (VUI): A semi-quantitative rating of unrest intensity at caldera 
volcanoes. Integrates the intensity of multiple volcanic unrest parameters attained through 
monitoring, observations, and modelling into one number per time period of elevated activity 
(Potter et al., 2015a). 
Viscosity: Resistance of fluid (liquid or gas) to a change in shape, or movement of 
neighbouring portions relative to another. High viscosity magma is sticky, while low viscosity 
is runny and flows faster (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2018). 
Vent: Any opening at the Earth’s surface through which magma erupts or volcanic gases are 






Appendix B  ECLIPSE SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT WORKSHOP 
B.1 ECLIPSE SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT WORKSHOP OUTLINE 
The ESDW began with an introductory series of presentations (Figure B.1) from presenters 
listed in Table B.1. This section of the workshop provided background on the ECLIPSE 
programme (Section 1.1.1), the scenario development approach (Chapter 2), workshop 
objectives (Chapter 2), and the overall context (including indigenous worldviews on volcanism, 
the TVZ geology, and the hazards, exposure and risks associated). 
Appendix Table B.1: Presenters of the ESDW in March 2019, with their respective organisations and topics 
presented. 
PRESENTER NAME ORGANISATION TOPIC PRESENTED 
Tyronne (Bubs) 
Smith 
Ngāti Tūwahretoa Indigenous Overview 
Thomas Wilson University of Canterbury Introductions & Exposure/Risks 
Sylvia Tapuke Toi Ohomai Indigenous Perspectives 
Colin Wilson Victoria University TVZ geology 
Graham Leonard GNS Science Hazards of the TVZ 
 
Following the introductory presentations, participants were divided into groups based on their 
practicing discipline for exercises one and two. These groups were CDEM, GeoNet, Industry 
and Lifelines, Iwi, and Research Science (Table B.2) – each facilitated by a facilitator (Table 
B.3). 
Appendix Table B.2: Organisations that attended the ESDW in March 2019, related to their broad stakeholder group. 
STAKEHOLDER GROUP ORGANISATIONS 
CDEM Bay of Plenty CDEM 
Waikato CDEM 




GeoNet Volcano Team 
Industry and Lifelines Federated Farmers 
Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI) 
Rural Support Trusts 
University of Canterbury 
Iwi Ngāti Tūwahretoa 
Toi Ohomai 
Te Arawa 
Research Science Massey University 
University of Canterbury 
Victoria University 
University of Auckland 
 
Appendix Table B.3: Facilitators involved in the ESDW and their related groups facilitated. 
FACILITATOR NAME DISCIPLINE GROUP “JIG-SAWED” GROUP 
Graham Leonard GeoNet Three 
Lucy Kaiser Iwi One 
Mary Anne Thompson CDEM Four 
Simon Barker Research Scientists Four 
Thomas Wilson Industry and Lifelines Two 
 
B.1.1 Exercise One 
Exercise One, with participants in discipline-based groups (Table B.2), asked broad questions 




requirements they would want or need to have implemented into the potential scenarios and 
framework. Three broad questions were asked around the use, factors and format of 
scenarios; 
- In your current role, how might you use caldera eruption scenarios? 
- To be useful, what do these scenarios need to have? What are the factors, issues and 
attributes which all make the scenarios useful and useable for our ECLIPSE community 
of practice? 
- To be useable, how should these scenarios be available? 
Participants were given 30 minutes to brainstorm, with the facilitator recording, ideas and 
answers to these questions, which are collated and summarised in Chapter 3 and Appendix 
Section B.3. 
 
B.1.2 Exercise Two 
Exercise Two, with participants remaining in discipline-based groups (Table B.2), involved the 
critique of a traditional unrest-to-eruption exemplar scenario. The scenario followed the unrest 
behaviour through to the eruption cease of the historic 1314 AD Kaharoa eruption from the 
OVC.  Participants were asked to critique the scenario’s potential usefulness and application 
through the questions listed below; 
- Is it useful? How might you use it? 
- Anything missing? What frustrates you? 
- Where possible, explain why? 
Participants were given 30 minutes to undertake a critical review of the traditional scenario 
and brainstorm, with the facilitator recording, ideas about what was provided that did already 
suit their neds, what did not suit their needs, what was missing, and how the scenario could 
be improved. The results are collated and summarised in Chapter 3 and Appendix B.3. 
 
B.1.3 Exercise Three 
After Exercises One and Two were completed, participants were asked to re-form into four 




of the five key stakeholder group (Table B.2) was present in each of the four “jig-saw” groups. 
The aim of this “jig-sawing” was to enable comparison and contrast of the potential similarities 
and differences between each discipline in regards to the scenarios and framework 
development. 
Exercise Three aimed to answer three questions similar to that of Exercise One (B.1.1) but 
with a focus on identifying the similarities and differences in needs and priorities across the 
five different disciplines. The exercise also addressed how the groups were independent of or 
co-dependent on each other in particular aspects. This exercise further focused on assessing 
what kind of scenarios would need to be developed in order to challenge the groups in their 
disaster risk management mitigations, strategies and plans. The questions posed to 
participants were; 
- What are the most important potential uses or applications of the scenarios? 
- What are the tricky or challenging situations you think are more important to include? 
- To be useful, what do these scenarios need to have? What do you need to know? 
If participants wanted to, or if facilitators felt that it was necessary in order to prompt 
discussion and ideas, optional qualitative scenarios (Tables B.7-B.8) were provided. Each 
group was offered one hazard scenario and one impact scenario. These scenarios did not 
match each other in that the impact scenario was not derived from the hazard scenario (as 
further indicated by the labels given). These broad and brief scenarios allowed a more 
simplistic look at possible scenario templates and pathways that future scenarios could be 
developed to accommodate. 
Participants were given 30 minutes to brainstorm, with the facilitator recording, ideas and 
answers to these questions (and, if used, qualitative scenarios), which are collated and 
summarised in Chapter 3 and Appendix B.3. 
 
B.2 ECLIPSE SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT WORKSHOP RESOURCES 
The 1314 AD Kaharoa Eruption event was the historic event used as a traditional scenario 
example for the ESDW. The scenario unrest and eruption timeline and hazard footprints 










Nairn et al. (2001), Johnston, Nairn & Martin (2002), and Sherburn & Nairn et al. (2004) and 
the poster style (Figure B.2) was inspired by Hayes et al. (2018). The ash fall isopachs, used 
in Figures B.3 and B.8-B.10, were from Johnston et al. (2000), the building impacts data 
(Figure B.7 and Table B.2) was from GNS Science & RiskScape (2019), and the agricultural 
impacts data (Figure B.7 and Table B.3) was from Asure Quality (2018). 
 




Appendix Table B.4: Timeline of individual hazard events from the 1314 AD Kaharoa Eruption poster in Figure 
A#.2.2 above, showing unrest and eruption. 
Timeline of individual hazard events 
DAYS OBESERVATIONS 
-1,800 Deep long-period (DLP) earthquakes, most <Mw2.5. 
Lake-levelling at Lake Tarawera believed to be ‘regional tilting’ or tectonic origin. 
-365 Small, shallow long-period (SLP) earthquakes begin. 
Increased temperatures and fumaroles at hot springs. 
-120 Temperatures increase until a small hydrothermal eruption occurs and a volcanic 
earthquake follows by a continuous, diminishing volcanic tremor. 
-60 DLP earthquakes increase in size and frequency with swarms of <Mw2.5 volcano-
tectonic (VT) earthquakes and an increase in the frequency of SLP earthquakes. 
Lake-levelling data re-examined and fumarole gas analysed. 
-14 <Mw3.0 DLP earthquakes occur and VT earthquakes reach 50-100 per day. 
Short swarms of SLP earthquake daily, associated with small, frequent hydrothermal 
eruptions. 
Tilt at Lake Tarawera accepted as inflation, volcanic origin. 
-7 Seismic activity at all depths intensifies (DLP reach >Mw3.0, VT reach >Mw4.0), this 
causes slumping of lake floor sediments causing seiches. 
Uplift and cracking of ground surface at Tarawera summit. 
-hours Seismic activity continues to intensify. Vent-opening explosions from Crater Dome and 
Northeast Crater. 
+0 Plinian eruption columns (>20km) at Crater Dome. Partial column collapse causes 
pyroclastic flows ~10km across surrounding area and enter Lake Tarawera and causes 
a tsunami wave to wash western shore 4-7m above existing level. 
More Plinian eruptions from Crater Dome and explosive vent-opening of Tarawera 
Dome. 
+10 Plinian eruptions from Wahanga vent. Extrusion at Crater Dome starts. Explosive 
eruptions from Tarawera and Ruawahia vents. 
+40 Extrusion of Crater Dome. 
+110 Pyroclastic eruptions from Ruawahia. Extrusion of Tarawera, Wahanga, and Ruawahia 




+130 Block-and-ash flows from Ruawahia and Wahanga Domes, spread northwest, 
northeast, and south for ~10km. Lake Tarawera outlet is dammed. 
+1,300 Minor steam and gas explosions in domes and extrusion of all domes ends. 
+1,400 Lake Tarawera reaches maximum elevation and the outlet dam fails causing a 
catastrophic flood to pass down the Tarawera River to the sea. 
Minor steam and gas explosions in the domes. 
+1,500 Eruption geologically over. 
 
 





Appendix Figure B.4: Pyroclastic flows from the early eruption phase of the 1314 AD Kaharoa Eruption scenario. 
 






Appendix Figure B.6: Flood event experienced in the final stages of the 1314 AD Kaharoa Eruption scenario. 
 





Appendix Table B.5: 1314 AD Kaharoa Eruption scenario ash fall impact on buildings from the ESDW impacts 
poster in Figure B.7. 
BUILDING IMPACTS FROM ASH FALL 
Ash Thickness 
(mm) 
Total Residential Commercial Education Hospital Civil Defence 
>3,000 4 0 0 0 0 0 
1,000 203 56 0 3 0 0 
600 5,684 3,155 14 48 0 0 
300 10,008 4,333 19 42 2 0 
200 39,129 22,875 123 39 29 0 
100 72,810 45,538 735 271 52 0 
50 92,766 49,624 603 200 62 2 
20 198,418 124,141 1,891 1,075 67 0 
Total exposed 
to ash fall 
419,022 249,722 3,385 1,678 212 2 
 
Appendix Table B.6: 1314 AD Kaharoa Eruption scenario ash fall impact on agricultural farms and livestock from 
the ESDW impacts poster in Figure B.7. Listed in total number of assets exposed to ash fall. 
AGRICULTURAL IMPACTS FROM ASH FALL 
Farms exposed to Kaharoa ash fall: 
Pastoral 35,630 
Horticultural 5,782 
Livestock exposed to Kaharoa ash fall: 
Sheep 17,479,454 
Beef Cattle 4,124,082 




















Appendix Table B.7: The optional qualitative hazard scenarios provided to the four "jig-sawed" groups in Exercise 









Time Episodicity Geographic 
Location 
Time Magnitude Time 
Combo 1 Three Long Steady Unknown Short Small Long 
Combo 2 One Short Steady Known Long Moderate Short 
Combo 3 Four Rapid 
onset 
Rapid onset Known Long Very Large Long 
Combo 4 Two Long Sporadic Known No Eruption - 
 
Appendix Table B.8: The optional qualitative impact scenarios provided to the four "jig-sawed" groups in Exercise 





Impacts and Consequences 
Combo 1 Two Pre-Eruption: Prolonged social anxiety from ‘unrest’ informed by natural 
cues. Risk perception decreases and low trust follows. 
Syn-Eruption: eruption does occur. 
Combo 2 Three Syn-Eruption: Lahars down the Waikato River causing cascading damage 
and disruptions of all hydro-electric power generation. 
Ash fall also covers ~500km of transmission line and 8 GXPs (only Taranaki 
HV line working) causing a deficiency of power to Auckland City. Taupō 
town is destroyed. 
Post-Eruption: Lahars down the Waikato River, impact on transport (roads, 
rail etc.) downstream. 
Combo 3 One Syn-/Post Eruption: Daily ash events across the North Island during 
springtime causing: 
- Aviation issues (incl. weekly ash at Auckland Airport). 
- Around 1,000 pastoral farms are non-functional. 
- Horticulture germination and flowering is effect, around 500 Bay 
of Plenty farms impacted. 
- Sporadic power issues due to ash loading. 
Combo 4 Four Pre-Eruption: ‘Unrest’ drives concern about magma beneath Taupō town 
causing complex evacuation measures. 





B.3 ECLIPSE SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT WORKSHOP DATA 
Appendix Table B.9: ECLIPSE Scenario Development Workshop data from March 25th 2019. The “Domain” and “Node” columns relate to Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2 where domain 
describes whether the group and/or statement from the group sit within the Policy or Science domains and where the node describes what specific interest the groups’ statement 









Decision-making. Policy Applied 
Science 


































Guide development of 

























Recovery planning: economic 




















Training modules. Policy Applied 
Science 

















Response planning (can't write 
for every scenario but identify 
themes, common issues): use 
credible, all levels, multiple 












development and visualisation of 
what's happening (identify 
triggers for action and 









Educate and inform 










Focus on hazards not 'event' to 











Tsunami Example: Flood 
response planning e.g. useful 
and necessary, cyclone paths. 
  















Different levels of impact - Not 









Positive impacts as well as 









Reasonable number of 










Ones that will be worth planning 

















































Impacts of unrest - Deformation, 
physical impacts to empower 








Where they sit in terms of 
likelihood and consequences to 
set context when applying 
(qualitatively) - Matrix. 
Policy Applied 
Science 











DEVORA video, visual model 




Impacts Formats? Format 
CDEM Exercise 
One 
















Science-based decision trees 
but also jargon-free explanations 
- analogies are useful! 
Policy Simple 
Information 
Utility of scenarios Formats? Format 
CDEM Exercise 
One 
Meaningful real world examples 














Community impacts a real focus, 
people first (animals are on 
there but people are not). 
Policy Demand-
driven 
























Impacts throughout scenario not 
just at end - link to each stage. 






Blue to show the PDC on lake 











Impacts: what is the impact of 
that ash fall and exposure (so 










Ash fall posters are good; 
































Significance of type of ash and 











































Cultural significance of the area 
and how it relates to indigenous 
korero and lands. 
Policy Inter-
disciplinarity 
















What are GNS and MCDEM 






















Linked transparently with other 










Process in timeline not linked to 
the map / locations - WHERE 




















What typically comes before or 











Ability to 'play it out' visually 
through time. 






Good that it covers multiple 












Different languages - including 














Maybe group hazards by 
consequence and process (air 























Too small to read and see detail, 









Tsunami: Lake volcanogenic 
























Duration of events happening at 











People / population and different 
levels of impact (e.g. different). 
Policy Applied 
Science 
















Storytelling would help 
contextualise (e.g. family living 



































Support and test vent and 
hazard mapping applications. 
Science Quality 
Assessment 
Utility of Scenarios Use Use 
GeoNet Exercise 
One 
Test the loss of nodes in the 
monitoring, network: Designing 
Science Quality 
Assessment 




monitoring, networks and 
















Societal Behaviour: social media 



















Enough science detail to provide 



















Earthquake: MM7 duration (not 

















Need to allow plans, injects and 










Clarify link to underpinning 
science behind any assumptions 
Science Basic 
Science 




Day and season agnostic? 
Mostly 7 but Christmas?? 
Science Long Term Preferred 
Scenarios 
























Shapefiles, KML, and maps that 
are images that can be cut and 










Metadata: files consistently 
named, non-confusing, easy-to-
find files 




Names as well as numbers 
(letters): versions, dates, latest-
version-source-address 




Discoverable in the final 














































Impact metrics Science Basic 
Science 




Single summary observations 









Road network reference Policy Simple 
Information 




























Months and years for bigger 
time units (less precise at longer 











Timeline of impacts, percentage 
of buildings, as well as total 



























More detail in the eruption 


























Detailed report behind those 



















































VABs and VALs - Iterative with 










Synergy with near-real-time 
GeoNet impact forecasting. 

















































Footprints of all 10 hazards with 




















































What to do - Include more 















Cordon management? Access 














































Range would be useful - unrest, 
small event, medium eruption, 




What do the 
scenarios need to 













What do the 
scenarios need to 











Scenarios need to consider 
(allow exploring) management 
and communications responses. 
Policy Real Time Planning and/or 
Policy 
What do the 
scenarios need to 















What do the 
scenarios need to 














What do the 
scenarios need to 








Animal welfare (ash fall) = 
instant and widespread. Will be 
huge demand; water supplies 
(earthquake impact, blockage), 
evacuation (?), emergency feed, 
change in land use (?). 
Policy Demand-
driven 
Impacts What do the 
scenarios need to 








Loss of essential services 
important - seasonal variability. 




Impacts What do the 
scenarios need to 








Ash impacts on machinery. Policy Simple 
Information 
Impacts What do the 
scenarios need to 








What preparedness activities 





What do the 
scenarios need to 








Uncertainty of duration? What 
impact intensity? - Tipping 
points 
Policy Real Time Preferred 
Scenarios 
What do the 
scenarios need to 








Which hazard has the most 
impact? Lahar, ash fall. 
Policy Demand-
driven 
Impacts What do the 
scenarios need to 








Accurate information on likely 






What do the 
scenarios need to 











Good to have spatial intelligence 
- footprint and intensity useful 














Impacts not hazard - Animals, 
infrastructure, buildings (where 
should the focus be?). 
Policy Applied 
Science 









Timeline of what occurs - 
Forecasting (preferred, 
likelihood of future) vs. 
prescriptive: event tree 
approach would be useful. 
Policy Demand-
driven 









Scenarios…would be useful to 
test management decision - 
Factors which influence major 













Impact states (sever, moderate, 
low - Priority). High priority e.g. 
Dairy vs. Sheep - When will this 
erupt? How long will it erupt for? 









Type of ash? Where ash is 














Plain language (what 
























































Statistics New Zealand - 
Population demographic of 
whole area, including rural and 










As soon as we get into a rest 
period 'He Tohu?' (What's up?). 
Policy Timely 
Process 
Decision-making How might you use 
caldera scenarios 





Environmental trigger for the 
social (and political stuff - and a 
spiritual thing). Holistic, crosses 





How might you use 
caldera scenarios 





During a period of unrest - Quite 
a reluctance for Tangata 




How might you use 
caldera scenarios 





2009 - took a lot of convincing to 
get people to evacuate - Forced 




How might you use 
caldera scenarios 





People won't evacuate unless 
there's a certainty that the 
whenua will still be there. 
Policy Simple 
Information 
Decision-making How might you use 
caldera scenarios 





Trigger for whole community 
meeting - Everybody is getting 





How might you use 
caldera scenarios 





Early notification, engagement, 






How might you use 
caldera scenarios 








Embedded into school 
curriculum - Whanau centred - 





How might you use 
caldera scenarios 





If you have a good recovery 





How might you use 
caldera scenarios 





If people leave they will follow 
their whakapapa lines (which 
may be immediate neighbours) - 
Concept of home; everything it 
stands for. 
Policy Real Time 
 
How might you use 
caldera scenarios 





Life threatening - Went into a 
state of karakia (prayers). 
Policy Real Time Impacts How might you use 
caldera scenarios 





The mountain won't harm me 
because I've lived here forever 




How might you use 
caldera scenarios 









Decision-making How might you use 
caldera scenarios 









How might you use 
caldera scenarios 











How might you use 
caldera scenarios 








Stories - Recent, past, overseas 
including experience. 
Policy Real Time Public Information 
and Education 
How might you use 
caldera scenarios 





Opportunity every 3-4months to 





How might you use 
caldera scenarios 





Cultural connotations of 
language - Away from negative 





How might you use 
caldera scenarios 











How might you use 
caldera scenarios 





Scenario development - 
Monitoring, engagement, 






How might you use 
caldera scenarios 






Response/discussion triggers at 











Purakau and stories of 
population movement - To link. 
Look at Sylvia's example for 
how to get people to connect to 












Interactive maps with video 
examples - impact of ash fall: 
Tarawera ash fall before and 


























































Water supply - Land, rivers, 










Kinship ties – Ngāti Tūwahretoa, 











More than health centres - Civil 











In a GIS - Someone guiding 












How do we cater to different 





















Photos/images where you can 













To define parameters to help 











Know what we need to develop 
(e.g. Better understanding of 























Real-time response (eventually). Policy Real Time Preferred 
Scenarios 










Be flexible (general for Okataina 














Two-ways e.g. reversible from 













Be bullet-proof to avoid 
confusion/false alarms. 
Seamless model to estimate 
unrest to eruption. 
Science Quality 
Assessment 








Response to data coming in 
real-time (eventually). 
Policy Real Time Preferred 
Scenarios 








Has to be centralised (if poorly 
developed) for decision makers. 
But not public? -Separate 
interface? 
Science Disciplinarity Planning and/or 
Policy / Public 
Information and 
Education 







Limited use as it is a red 
eruption (rigid form, if it 
happened again on any day it 
would be different). 
  
















Isopach maps start at 20mm! 























Not all thing should be linked to 
volcano, e.g. Tectonic 
































Some percentage chances, 
timeframes, windows, (where is 





Decision-making Missing? Scenario 
Critique 
Group One Exercise 
Three 
Testing/training. Policy Applied 
Science 
Utility of Scenarios Most important 
potential uses or 
applications? 
Use 
Group One Exercise 
Three 





potential uses or 
applications? 
Use 
Group One Exercise 
Three 
Saving people's lives. Policy Real Time Utility of Scenarios Most important 
potential uses or 
applications? 
Use 
Group One Exercise 
Three 







potential uses or 
applications? 
Use 
Group One Exercise 
Three 
Autonomy in planning response 
to scenario (we can't change the 
disaster scenario but we have 
autonomy on how we can plan 






potential uses or 
applications? 
Use 




communities to information. 
Policy Applied 
Science 




potential uses or 
applications? 
Use 
Group One Exercise 
Three 
Credible scenario that people 






potential uses or 
applications? 
Use 









potential uses or 
applications? 
Use 
Group One Exercise 
Three 





potential uses or 
applications? 
Use 
Group One Exercise 
Three 
Pushing out information from a 
range of sources (farmers news, 










































Group One Exercise 
Three 






What do the 
scenarios need to 
have to be useful? 




Group One Exercise 
Three 




What do the 
scenarios need to 
have to be useful? 




Group One Exercise 
Three 






What do the 
scenarios need to 
have to be useful? 




Group Two Exercise 
Three 




What do the 
scenarios need to 
have to be useful? 




Group Two Exercise 
Three 




What do the 
scenarios need to 
have to be useful? 










What do the 
scenarios need to 






What do you need 
to know? 
Group Two Exercise 
Three 






What do the 
scenarios need to 
have to be useful? 




Group Two Exercise 
Three 
Timeframes - Accuracy, 
uncertainty. 
Policy Real Time Preferred 
Scenarios 
What do the 
scenarios need to 
have to be useful? 




Group Two Exercise 
Three 
Timely Information. Policy Timely 
Process 
Utility of Scenarios What do the 
scenarios need to 
have to be useful? 




Group Two Exercise 
Three 
Continuous communications. Policy Inter-
disciplinarity 
Utility of Scenarios What do the 
scenarios need to 
have to be useful? 




Group Two Exercise 
Three 
People in room don't hear it, 









Group Two Exercise 
Three 
Building in realistic community 
response - People won't be 
lemmings. 
Policy Real Time Preferred 
Scenarios 
What do the 
scenarios need to 
have to be useful? 




Group Two Exercise 
Three 
Scenarios - Need to be 
developed within the NZ CDEM 






What do the 
scenarios need to 
have to be useful? 







Group Two Exercise 
Three 
Co-production - Needs to have 
users all contributing in their 






What do the 
scenarios need to 
have to be useful? 




Group Two Exercise 
Three 






What do the 
scenarios need to 
have to be useful? 




Group Two Exercise 
Three 
Everyone in same room getting 
the same story so they can 






potential uses or 
applications? 
Use 
Group Two Exercise 
Three 
Co-production - Time poor, 
people can chip in as project 






What do the 
scenarios need to 
have to be useful? 




Group Two Exercise 
Three 







potential uses or 
applications? 
Use 
Group Two Exercise 
Three 
Include social media in the 





What do the 
scenarios need to 
have to be useful? 




Group Two Exercise 
Three 





What do the 
scenarios need to 
have to be useful? 




Group Two Exercise 
Three 
Relating the scenarios to people 
- Humanise it, e.g. Relating it to 





What do the 
scenarios need to 
have to be useful? 







Group Two Exercise 
Three 
MUST BE: Plain language, 
understandable, e.g. Volunteer 
group, average reading age of a 





What do the 
scenarios need to 
have to be useful? 
What do you need 
to know? 
Format 
Group Two Exercise 
Three 
Seed scenarios: to allow other 
work with the develop eg. Play 
centres, schools. Needs tools to 







potential uses or 
applications? 
Format 
Group Two Exercise 
Three 
Modular nature of framework: 
being able to change quickly, 
event tree?? 
Policy Real Time / 
Timely 
Process 
preferred scenarios Most important 
potential uses or 
applications? 
Format 
Group Two Exercise 
Three 
Frustrations/Challenge: Public 









Group Two Exercise 
Three 






What do the 
scenarios need to 
have to be useful? 




Group Two Exercise 
Three 





potential uses or 
applications? 
Use 
Group Two Exercise 
Three 
Scenarios which run through 




Utility of Scenarios Most important 
potential uses or 
applications? 
Use 
Group Two Exercise 
Three 






What do the 
scenarios need to 
have to be useful? 




Group Two Exercise 
Three 
Iwi - Really input to build in 
Mātauranga Māori contribution 





What do the 
scenarios need to 





What do you need 
to know? 
Group Two Exercise 
Three 
School level planning 
(education) - Scenario would be 






potential uses or 
applications? 
Use 
Group Two Exercise 
Three 
Scenarios would be useful as 
QA/QC management plans - 








potential uses or 
applications? 
Use 
Group Two Exercise 
Three 
Pre-planning - Scenarios can be 







potential uses or 
applications? 
Use 
Group Two Exercise 
Three 





potential uses or 
applications? 
Use 
Group Two Exercise 
Three 




Utility of Scenarios Most important 
potential uses or 
applications? 
Use 
Group Two Exercise 
Three 
Pre-planning - Involving multiple 
agencies - Show how they fit in. 
Policy Inter-
disciplinarity 
preferred scenarios Most important 
potential uses or 
applications? 
Use 
Group Two Exercise 
Three 
CDEM - Explore the what-ifs - 





Utility of Scenarios Most important 
potential uses or 
applications? 
Use 
Group Two Exercise 
Three 
Understanding multi-hazard - 
Detailed scenario. Dynamic, 
adaptive pathway planning, 








potential uses or 
applications? 
Use 
Group Two Exercise 
Three 
Small package that we can 
























































Utility of Scenarios Most important 































Applicable to wide range of 












Impacts - Phenomena (triggers 
and links) - Where to run away, 
when to come back? 







Description of the uncertainty 
and how to express that - 














The scenario relates to the 
customers language/'why' - 
Public, emergency 
management, lifelines etc. 













Dynamic adaptive pathway 






What do the 
scenarios need to 
have to be useful? 











Relatable to real experience - 





What do the 
scenarios need to 
have to be useful? 








Able to be 'adapted' and flexible 
during an event - Real-time 
scenario 
Policy Real Time / 
Timely 
Process 
Utility of Scenarios What do the 
scenarios need to 
have to be useful? 








Show the range of scenarios 
and maximum credible scenario 





What do the 
scenarios need to 
have to be useful? 








Prolonged unrest potentially 
easier because time to 






What do the 
scenarios need to 
have to be useful? 








Rural support - Unrest; unrest, 
quick response necessary. 
Policy Demand-
driven 
Decision-making What do the 
scenarios need to 
have to be useful? 








Focus is on event in CDEM and 
that's harder to constrain. 
Policy Demand-
driven 
Decision-making Most important 








Rapid onset very dependent on 






What do the 
scenarios need to 
have to be useful? 











Iwi used to rapid response - 
Skillset in rapid onset unrest, 
hangi etc. but relationships and 
protocols and tikanga not always 
clear. Slow onset - Time to 
consider and have 













Farming recovery starts next 
day - Animals first. 
Policy Demand-
driven 
Decision-making Most important 








Damage to cow sheds and 
supplies then act. 
Policy Demand-
driven 
Decision-making What do the 
scenarios need to 
have to be useful? 








Uncertainty forces tough political 
conversations and there's more 













Access control' vs. 'cordon'. Policy Demand-
driven 
Decision-making Most important 








Once eruption starts - This is an 
incident, need to deal with it. 
Policy Real Time Decision-making Most important 








Event-based response - Don't 
leave unless eruption evidence 
(Iwi, CDEM, rural) - But defining 
unrest/eruption; what is that 















Eruption more likely than not for 
trigger actions. 
Policy Real Time Hazard 
Requirements 
Most important 








Needs to consider rural and 














Rapid onset forces focus on 
highest demand (e.g. Urban) so 




Decision-making What do the 
scenarios need to 
have to be useful? 






















Undertake response planning, 




Policy / Impacts 
Most important 











































Rapid onset to big eruption - 
Safety first. 
Policy Real Time Planning and/or 
Policy 
What do the 
scenarios need to 
have to be useful? 














What do the 
scenarios need to 
have to be useful? 








Rapid onset - Will another one 






What do the 
scenarios need to 
have to be useful? 











Before send someone in - Life 














Loss of a 'pattern' compared to 






What do the 
scenarios need to 
have to be useful? 













Utility of Scenarios Most important 








Impacts to distal tribe from 
Tarawera - e.g. Stories of 
experience from other hazards - 
legacy of Tarawera. 
Policy Applied 
Science 




































Appendix C NZVSAP ECLIPSE SCENARIO DISCUSSION SESSION 
C.1 NZVSAP ECLIPSE SCENARIO DISCUSSIONS SESSION OUTLINE 
The New Zealand Volcano Science Advisory Panel (NZVSAP) ESDS was part of an all-day 
NZVSAP Committee Meeting (Table C.1), held on the 21st August 2019 at the NEMA (formerly 
MCDEM) Bowen House in Wellington. 
The ESDS opened with a presentation on what the ECLIPSE programme is, what scenarios 
are, and how they might be used. Participants were then asked to keep a series of questions 
in mind when presenters walked-through the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework (Version 1.2) and 
Scenario A. These questions were; 
1. Are there any gaps or issues with the current approach [to the scenario framework 
and/or scenario]? 
2. Will this [scenario framework and/or scenario] be useful for national level Civil Defence 
Emergency Management planning? 
3. How could these scenarios help with your [the participants’] science objectives? 
Participants were then asked to answer the questions individually and then brainstorm ideas 
and have a discussion as a group, of which the findings are detailed in Chapter 3 and Section 
C.3 below. 
 
C.2 NZVSAP ECLIPSE SCENARIO DISCUSSIONS SESSION RESOURCES 
Appendix Table C.1: NZVSAP Committee Meeting Agenda. 
TIME ITEM LEAD 
 Morning Tea on arrival 
10:00-10:10 Welcome, housekeeping, and introductions. Chair 




11:45-12:30 Hazard and Impact Scenario Development for 




13:00-13:50 Terms of Reference Update: Scientific Advice in 
an Emergency. 
Chair 
13:50-14:10 MetService satellite-based eruption detection 





14:10-14:30 Discussion on Consistent Messaging: Volcanic 
Activity and Geothermal Activity section 
updates. 
Alistair Davies 
14:30-14:40 Update on National Volcanic Risk Assessment 
Profile. 
Chair 
14:40-14:55 Any other business. Chair 
14:55-15:00 Confirm actions & wrap-up. Chair 
 
 
Appendix Figure C.1: ECLIPSE Scenario Framework Version 2.0 “Flow Chart of Framework” that was presented at 
the NZVSAP ESDS in August 2019. 
 
Appendix Figure C.2: ECLIPSE Scenario Framework Version 1.2 “Base Framework” that was presented at the 




C.3 NZVSAP ECLIPSE SCENARIO DISCUSSIONS SESSION DATA 
Appendix Table C.2: NZVSAP ECLIPSE Scenario Discussion Session Data from August 21st 2019. The “Node” column 
relates to Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2 where node describes what specific interest the groups’ statement strongly relates 
to. This was done within the research project to help guide the research in credible and relevant directions. 
Workshop Group Discussion / Comments Node 
Research Scientists Event Size Box: Change to “Event Magnitude” as VEI 
measurements may not be the most beneficial. 
Applied Science 
Research Scientists Temporal Aspect: Might be as easy as a time series of 
outputs as the situation and inputs changes. 
Real Time 
GeoNet / Research 
Scientists 
Managing uncertainty. Applied Science 
GeoNet / Research 
Scientists 
Communicating uncertainty. Simple Information 
Research Scientists Link the uncertainty to network-based approaches to 
help better communicate it. 
Inter-disciplinarity 
Research Scientists Network-based approaches to framework 
development, e.g. Event-Tree. 
Inter-disciplinarity 
Research Scientists Ensure the ability to future proof the framework. 
 
Real Time 
Research Scientists Allow sensitivity testing (also links to the network-
based approach). 
Inter-disciplinarity 
GeoNet / NEMA / 
Research Scientists 
Framework will need guidance on “how to use” – 
could use examples of maximum credible event 
scenario vs. other scenarios. 
Applied Science 
GeoNet / NEMA / 
Research Scientists 
Possibly create a “choose-your-own-adventure” style 
guidance. 
Simple Information 
Research Scientists Outputs. 
 
Demand driven 
NEMA / GeoNet There are a limited number of societal actions/ranges 
at this phase/version (also links to the limitation on 







Appendix D ECLIPSE SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT LIFELINE UTILITIES WORKSHOP 
D.1 ECLIPSE SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT LIFELINE UTILITIES WORKSHOP OUTLINE 
The ECLIPSE Scenario Development Lifeline Utilities Workshop (ESDLUW) took place as part 
of the annual shared Waikato and Bay of Plenty Lifelines Forum (Figure D.1). 
 




The workshop itself began with two introductory presentations (Table D.1) from presenters 
listed in Table A#.2. These presentations provided context on the ECLIPSE programme 
(Section 1.1.1), caldera risk in the Waikato and Bay of Plenty regions (Chapter 1), scenarios 
and their use (Chapter 1), and a walk-through of ECLIPSE Scenario B: Taupō Unrest Scenario 
(TUS) (Chapter 4). 
Appendix Table D.1: Workshop specific agenda for the ESDLUW held on 22nd August 2019. 
TASK TIME ALLOCATED CONTENT 
Introductory 
Presentations 
15 minutes ECLIPSE programme. 
Taupō Volcanic Zone history. 
Aims and objectives of the workshop. 
Walk-through of Taupō Unrest Scenario. 
Workshop Activity 30 minutes Multi-disciplinary groups’ brainstormed ideas 
and answers for question provided. 
Feedback and Wrap-up 15 minutes Each group reported back one idea/answer of 
importance. 
Where to next. 
 
Appendix Table D.2: Presenters and facilitators of the ESDLUW and discussion, listed in order of presentation. 
PRESENTER / 
FACILITATOR NAME 







GNS Science, ECLIPSE 
ECLIPSE programme. 
Taupō Volcanic Zone history, 
specifically Taupō Volcanic 







University of Canterbury, 
ECLIPSE 
Aims and objectives of the 
workshop. 
Walk-through of the Taupō unrest 
scenario (TUS). 
Facilitated feedback. 





Massey University, Joint 








Following the introductory presentations, participants were asked to move into groups that 
consisted of representatives from various different organisations (listed in Table A#.3 below). 
Ideally, this would result in one participant from each discipline in each group (e.g. one 
participant from a power provider, a telecommunications provider, CDEM, District Council, 
District Health Board (DHB) and so on). This was done, rather than having participants stay in 
discipline-based groups, to highlight how the response to an unrest event, like the TUS, would 
require communication and collaboration across multiple disciplines and organisations 
(Leonard et al., 2014; Gottsmann, Komorowski & Barclay, 2017). 
Appendix Table D.3: Organisations that participated within the ESDLUW, listed by their related discipline 
categories. 
DISCIPLINE GROUP ORGANISATIONS IN ATTENDANCE 
Civil Engineering BECA 












Thames-Coromandel (Emergency Management) 
Waikato 
Waipa 
Western Bay of Plenty 
District Health Boards Bay of Plenty (BoP DHB) 
Lakes (Lakes DHB) 







Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) 
National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), formerly 
Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM) 













Regional Councils Bay of Plenty (Emergency Management) (BoPRC) 




GNS Science (GNS) 
Massey University (Joint Centre for Disaster Research; JCDR) 





Radio New Zealand (RadioNZ) 
Spark 
UltraFast Fibre 




Port of Tauranga (PoT) 
 
Once participants were in multi-disciplinary groups, they were provided with three broad 
questions to answer in response to the TUS; 
- What would your organisations response to this scenario look like? 
- What are the direct and indirect implications of a scenario like this to your organisation? 
- What information would your organisation need to effectively respond to this scenario? 
The goal was for participants to discuss how the impacts, and implications from these impacts, 
would affect their organisations, particularly from a long-term strategic planning perspective. 
Participants were given 30 minutes to brainstorm and list actions and ideas to these questions, 
which are collated and summarised in Chapter 3 and Appendix Section D.3. 
After the workshop activity, the research team facilitated 10 minutes of feedback. This involved 
going around each group and asking them to share, with all groups, what they felt was the 
most important or stand out issue, response, and/or action they had listed. This is collated 
and summarised in Chapter 3 and Appendix Section D.3. 
 



















D.3 ECLIPSE SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT LIFELINE UTILITIES WORKSHOP DATA 
Appendix Table D.4: ECLIPSE Scenario Development Lifeline Utilities Workshop data from August 22nd 2019. The “Domain” and “Node” columns relate to Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2 
where domain describes whether the groups’ statement sits within the Policy or Science domains and where the node describes what specific interest the groups’ statement 
strongly relates to. This was done throughout the research project to help guide the research in credible and relevant directions. 
Workshop 
Group 
Questions Discussion / Comments Domain Boundary Node Broad Theme 
Group A Question One Plan for the worst Policy Applied Science Planning/Preparedness 
Group A Question One Make and practice plans (Business Continuity 
plans, BC plans, Evacuation plans, 
preparedness plans, security plans, fuel plans) 
within our own business and between agencies. 
Policy Inter-disciplinary Planning/Preparedness 
Group A Question One Good communications Policy Inter-disciplinary Communications 
Group A Question One How are we communicating as a lifeline utility, as 
DHB, as TA…? 
Policy Inter-disciplinary Communications 
Group A Question One Regular community meetings Policy Inter-disciplinary Communications 
Group A Question One Identify community leaders. Policy Inter-disciplinary Communications 
Group A Question One Mapping location of our own staff (all). Science Disciplinary 
 
Group A Question One Business continuity, if roading networks affected. Science Disciplinary Critical Infrastructure 
Group A Question One Plus, Health and Safety of own staff. Policy Demand-driven 
(consultancy) 
Health 
Group A Question One Trigger point about when CDEM emergency 
declared - pre-arranged/pre-understood 
protocols. 
Science Uncertain, complex 
information 
Trigger Points 
Group A Question One Long-term planning: potential shift of 
investments. 
Science Long Term Planning/Preparedness 
Group A Question Two Psychological impacts Policy Demand-driven 
(consultancy) 
Health 
Group A Question Two DHB: psychological issues. Policy Demand-driven 
(consultancy) 
Health 




Group A Question Two Those who can't leave (lower socio-economic 





Group A Question Two Loss of supply with uplift and subsidence - power 
companies, also water/wastewater. 
Policy Applied Science Critical Infrastructure 
Group A Question Two Loss of all utilities. Policy Inter-disciplinary Critical Infrastructure 
Group A Question Two Access to community if roading network affected. Policy Timely Process Critical Infrastructure 
Group A Question Two Economic impact - regionally, nationally. Policy Demand-driven 
(consultancy) 
Economic 





Group A Question Two Emotional connection to place - people that don't 





Group A Question Two Ashfall/Gas - contamination of water. Science Basic Science Health 
Group A Question Three Knowledge of prevailing winds. Science Basic Science Hazard Information and 
Forecasts 
Group A Question Three Lifeline interdependencies Policy Inter-disciplinary Critical Infrastructure 
Group A Question Three Location of; critical infrastructure, 
marae/gathering point of the community. 
Policy Inter-disciplinary Critical Infrastructure 
Group A Question Three Case studies of similar events worldwide 
including consequences on people and 
infrastructure. 
Policy Simple Information Critical Infrastructure 
Group A Question Three Plus authorities' actions and community 
response. 
Policy Simple Information Response/Decisions 
Group A Question Three What is going to happen? GNS crystal ball & area 
of impact. 
Science Uncertain, complex 
information 
Hazard Information and 
Forecasts 
Group A Question Three Trigger points for escalation and evacuation. Science Uncertain, complex 
information 
Trigger Points 
Group A Question Three Likelihood and consequences of 
decisions/actions e.g. evacuation. 
Policy Applied Science Response/Decisions 
Group A Question Three Knowledge of impacts e.g. make-up of gas, ash 
etc. and what is its impact on 
water/wastewater/people/stock/tsunami risks. 





Group B Question One Identify affected parties. Policy Inter-disciplinary 
 
Group B Question One Gather information science data, including expert 
advice. 
Policy Simple Information Hazard Information and 
Forecasts 
Group B Question One Consider knock-on effects to other communities. Policy Inter-disciplinary 
 
Group B Question One Consider hydro-power. Science Disciplinary Critical Infrastructure 
Group B Question One Establish evacuation plans - Waikato (mystery 
creek) and neighbouring districts. 
Policy Applied Science Scenarios 
Group B Question One Establish other potential scenarios e.g. ash 
clouds, road closures… 
Policy Real Time Scenarios 
Group B Question One Contact neighbouring districts - how can they 
help. 
Policy Inter-disciplinary Communications 
Group B Question One Heightened communications. Policy Inter-disciplinary Communications 
Group B Question Two Mental health - strain on services. Policy Demand-driven 
(consultancy) 
Health 
Group B Question Two Access to services Policy Demand-driven 
(consultancy) 
Critical Infrastructure 
Group B Question Two Potable water quality - maintenance and 
performance. 
Science Quality Assessment Critical Infrastructure 
Group B Question Two Economic implications e.g. dairy industry. Policy Demand-driven 
(consultancy) 
Economic 
Group B Question Two Resource intensive (people and economics) Science Supply-driven 
(autonomy) 
Economic 
Group B Question Two Power and transport disruptions. Policy Demand-driven 
(consultancy) 
Critical Infrastructure 
Group B Question Three Interdependencies Policy Inter-disciplinary Critical Infrastructure 
Group B Question Three Contingency plans for various scenarios. Policy Applied Science Planning/Preparedness 
Group B Question Three Knock-on effects to adjacent districts, industry… Policy Inter-disciplinary 
 
Group B Question Three Communication protocols and educating 
community. 
Policy Inter-disciplinary Communications 
Group B Question Three Preparing community for what they need to do. Policy Inter-disciplinary Planning/Preparedness 
Group B Question Three Long range weather forecasts e.g. ash cloud 
direction. 





Group C Question One GEMO: response and recovery team 
established. 
Policy Timely Process Response/Decisions 
Group C Question One WRC (regional resilience team) work with GNS, 
CDEM, and TPC to get out consistent messaging 
to public and build a cleaner picture of event. 
Policy Inter-disciplinary Communications 
Group C Question One Work with Mercury (FIDC) to manage lake levels 
and changes to flood and erosion risk. 
Policy Inter-disciplinary Communications 
Group C Question One Health: coordinate psychological response and, 
in particular, messaging on self-mental health 
(anxiety) care. 
Policy Timely Process Health 
Group C Question One Generators; watching brief and respond as 
appropriate. 
Science Quality Assessment Response/Decisions 
Group C Question One Distribution network and transmission Science Disciplinary Critical Infrastructure 
Group C Question One Seek advice on potential range of scenarios. Science Uncertain, complex 
information 
Scenarios 
Group C Question One Prepare/revise response plans. Policy Applied Science Planning/Preparedness 
Group C Question Two Distract from other CDEM work. Science Disciplinary Response/Decisions 
Group C Question Two WRC more work Science Disciplinary Response/Decisions 
Group C Question Two Office in Taupo may be affected Policy Real Time Response/Decisions 
Group C Question Two Would need to put more resource into Taupo, 




Group C Question Two Health: loss of medical staff in hospitals, GPs, 





Group C Question Two Potential lake shore flooding SW of Lake Taupō 
(Turangi etc). 
Science Basic Science Hazard Information and 
Forecasts 





Group C Question Two Distribution network; potential for damage to 
network and outages from initial earthquake. 
Policy Real Time Critical Infrastructure 
Group C Question Two Repair could be extended (several months) for 
substations affected especially by shaking or 
liquefaction. 









Group C Question Two Transmission Grid; potential loss of pylon towers, 
especially in Waihi area. 
Policy Applied Science Critical Infrastructure 
Group C Question Two Could result in generation constraints but unlikely 




Group C Question Two General for all local organisations; loss of 




Group C Question Three Scientific knowledge - decisions. Science Basic Science Hazard Information and 
Forecasts 
Group C Question Three WRC; Information on earthquake sequence, 
geothermal changes, deformation, potential 
options for future. 
Science Basic Science Hazard Information and 
Forecasts 
Group C Question Three Health; communication of clear messages with 
accurate and easily understood facts. 
Policy Simple Information Health 
Group C Question Three Lifelines organisations; range of outcomes and 
likelihoods populated on a decision-tree to assit 
in preparing response plans. 
Science Uncertain, complex 
information 
Critical Infrastructure 
Group D Question One First Gas; Increasing monitoring all gas mains in 
the area (Taupo). 
Science Quality Assessment Response/Decisions 
Group D Question One Helicopters standby Science Supply-driven 
(autonomy) 
Response/Decisions 
Group D Question One NZTA; increase NOC monitoring to SH1 and 
SH32. 
Science Quality Assessment Response/Decisions 
Group D Question One Review status/condition of all SH detour routes. Science Quality Assessment Planning/Preparedness 
Group D Question One Set up internal and external communications - all 
key stakeholders. 
Policy Inter-disciplinary Communications 
Group D Question One Fuel (Z); Look at supply lines and continuity. Science Quality Assessment Response/Decisions 
Group D Question One Consider refuelling regimes and extra fuel to 
main less vulnerable stations. 
Science Long Term Planning/Preparedness 
Group D Question One Taupo District Council; Bringing together key 
information for residents - communications 
Policy Inter-disciplinary Communications 




Group D Question One Monitoring of water and wastewater systems - 
more regular. 
Science Quality Assessment Response/Decisions 
Group D Question One Potential for wave action issues along the lake 
edges. 
Science Basic Science Hazard Information and 
Forecasts 
Group D Question One PoT; Mainly BAU. Science Disciplinary Response/Decisions 
Group D Question One Keep informed. Policy Inter-disciplinary Communications 
Group D Question Two NZTA; preparations for possible closures of SH1 
and SH32. 
Policy Timely Process Planning/Preparedness 
Group D Question Two First Gas; Being prepared and assess risks of 
gas line ruptures near Taupo. 
Science Quality Assessment Planning/Preparedness 
Group D Question Two TDC: Review or develop evacuation plans for all 
lake edge communities. 
Policy Applied Science Evacuation 
Group D Question Two Decline in Tourism - economic impacts. Policy Demand-driven 
(consultancy) 
Economic 
Group D Question Two Fuel(Z); Assessing risks at individual stations. Science Quality Assessment Critical Infrastructure 
Group D Question Two Z consider reduced supply or closure of some 
stations (Z, Caltex, Challenge). 
Science Long Term Critical Infrastructure 
Group D Question Two Consider/implement "purchase order" system for 
major customers. 
Science Long Term Critical Infrastructure 
Group E Question One 70% assets below ground core network. Science Basic Science Critical Infrastructure 
Group E Question One 30% assets distribution below ground. Science Basic Science Critical Infrastructure 
Group E Question One Minimal physical damage but, manageable at 
this stage. 
Policy Real Time Critical Infrastructure 
Group E Question One Investigating the use of alternative network 
pathways; to maintain same to other centres as 
well as Taupo. 
Policy Applied Science Planning/Preparedness 
Group E Question One Could see the delay to capital projects. Policy Demand-driven 
(consultancy) 
Planning/Preparedness 





Group E Question Two Could see planned projects bought forward - 




Group E Question Two Potential in the long-tern for reduction in service 







Group E Question Two Unlikely that business would be negatively 
impacted due to staff affected living in the area. 
Policy Real Time Economic 
Group E Question Two Short-term; rise in demand for information from 
people living through unrest. 
Policy Inter-disciplinary Communications 
Group E Question Two Wanting information through internet. Policy Inter-disciplinary Communications 
Group E Question Two Unrest would become the "new norm". Science Long Term 
 
Group E Question Two Some people may leave initially due to 
uncertainty but after that people are quick to 
adapt. 
Policy Real Time Evacuation 
Group E Question Two Permanent repairs vs. temporary as a result of 
forecast aftershocks/unrest. 
Science Long Term Planning/Preparedness 
Group E Question Three To hear from other utilities (interdependencies) 
and how they are tackling the uncertainty and 
physical changes. 
Policy Inter-disciplinary Communications 
Group F Question One Lake level rise implications on the control gates 
at Taupo; power generator, water supplies, 
flooding risk. 
Policy Applied Science Critical Infrastructure 
Group F Question One Wairakei - geothermal activities. Science Basic Science Hazard Information and 
Forecasts 
Group F Question One Change in lake level - lower output to Waikato, 
decrease generation capability. 
Policy Real Time Critical Infrastructure 
Group F Question One Increasing monitoring, clearances of floodgates, 
usual inspections. 
Policy Real Time Response/Decisions 
Group F Question One Look at black swan scenarios. Science Uncertain, complex 
information 
Scenarios 
Group F Question One Brush up on contingency plans, review 
scenarios; 
Policy Applied Science Scenarios 
Group F Question One What is looking the same? What is looking 
different? 
Policy Real Time Planning/Preparedness 
Group F Question One Review fuel supplies and back-up resources. Policy Applied Science Response/Decisions 
Group F Question One Cyber-security. Policy Applied Science Response/Decisions 




Group F Question Two Potential for seiching more likely. Science Basic Science Hazard Information and 
Forecasts 
Group F Question Two Effect of ground deformation on infrastructure. Policy Applied Science Hazard Information and 
Forecasts 
Group F Question Two Impact on transmission stations. Policy Applied Science Critical Infrastructure 
Group F Question Two Continue to operate as a BAU unless significant 
impacts. 
Policy Real Time Response/Decisions 
Group F Question Two Be aware that there may be more issues, pop-
up. 
Science Long Term Planning/Preparedness 
Group F Question Two "New normal" operating - automated technology. Policy Real Time 
 
Group F Question Two Consideration of changes in 5 year plan. Science Long Term Planning/Preparedness 
Group F Question Two At what point would we look at building resilience; 
e.g. parallel network. 
Policy Timely Process Trigger Points 
Group F Question Two Resource consents. Policy Applied Science Planning/Preparedness 
Group F Question Two Implications of increased operating costs are 
significant. 
Policy Real Time Economic 
Group F Question Three What are the potential future scenarios? Science Uncertain, complex 
information 
Scenarios 
Group F Question Three Need backing from support agencies to spend 
$$. 
Policy Inter-disciplinary Economic 
Group F Question Three Credibility around scenario likelihood. Science Quality Assessment Scenarios 
Group F Question Three Push for resistance building from CDEM is 
helpful to support readiness requirements. 
Policy Inter-disciplinary 
 
Group G Question One If water rises, will start to lower lake down the 
line. 
Policy Applied Science Response/Decisions 
Group G Question One Repair roads Policy Applied Science Response/Decisions 
Group G Question One Ensure alternative routes are available. Policy Timely Process Planning/Preparedness 





Group G Question One Displaced affected people and welfare support. Policy Demand-driven 
(consultancy) 
Evacuation 




Group G Question Two Impact on flooding infrastructure e.g. flood-banks 
(dams). 
Policy Applied Science Critical Infrastructure 
Group G Question Two Increase maintenance cost. Policy Demand-driven 
(consultancy) 
Economic 
Group G Question Two Road closed will have disruption to communities. Policy Real Time Critical Infrastructure 
Group G Question Two Potential future changes. Science Long Term Planning/Preparedness 





Group G Question Two Hydrology changes over the long run (long-term). Science Long Term Response/Decisions 
Group G Question Two Recovery Policy Timely Process Response/Decisions 
Group G Question Two Time of the recovery period. Policy Real Time Response/Decisions 
Group G Question Two Who is going to lead the recovery 
(National/Regional/Local)? 
Policy Inter-disciplinary Response/Decisions 
Group G Question Three Lake Changes Science Basic Science Hazard Information and 
Forecasts 
Group G Question Three The change in the level of the lake Science Basic Science Hazard Information and 
Forecasts 
Group G Question Three Temperature of the lake Science Basic Science Hazard Information and 
Forecasts 
Group G Question Three The runoff does not run into lake due to lake rise 
(pumps). 
Policy Simple Information Critical Infrastructure 
Group G Question Three Ground deformation Science Basic Science Hazard Information and 
Forecasts 
Group G Question Three Forecast position of land movement. Science Uncertain, complex 
information 
Hazard Information and 
Forecasts 
Group G Question Three Extent of uplift and direction of movement. Science Uncertain, complex 
information 
Hazard Information and 
Forecasts 






Group H Built 
Environment 
Ashfall Science Basic Science Hazard Information and 
Forecasts 
Group H Built 
Environment 
Earthquakes affecting distribution. Policy Applied Science Critical Infrastructure 
Group H Built 
Environment 
Real Estate. Policy Applied Science Economic 
Group H Built 
Environment 
Roads. Policy Applied Science Critical Infrastructure 
Group H Economic 
Environment. 
Mercury Science Disciplinary Economic 
Group H Economic 
Environment. 
Lakes Science Basic Science Economic 
Group H Economic 
Environment. 
Loss in Tourism Policy Applied Science Economic 
Group H Social 
Environment 
Lakes DHB Science Disciplinary Health 
Group H Social 
Environment 
Evacuation Policy Demand-driven 
(consultancy) 
Evacuation 
Group H Social 
Environment 
Psychological impacts Policy Demand-driven 
(consultancy) 
Health 
Group H Social 
Environment 
Hospital staffing Policy Demand-driven 
(consultancy) 
Evacuation 
Group H Natural 
Environment 
WRC Science Disciplinary 
 
Group H Natural 
Environment 
Lake/water management Science Basic Science Planning/Preparedness 
Group H Natural 
Environment 
Slips/land movement (Waihi). Science Basic Science Hazard Information and 
Forecasts 
Group I Question One ____ an early communication piece that needs to 
be integrated across local government, central 
government, lifelines, and media. 
Policy Inter-disciplinary Communications 
Group I Question One The people need (and want) to know and the 
advantage of this situation is that it has been 
brewing for a long time. 




Group I Question One And the message across all invested 
stakeholders needs to be consistent. 
Policy Inter-disciplinary Communications 
Group I Question One There will be some pre-event contingency 
planning that everyone will be doing 
Policy Applied Science Planning/Preparedness 
Group I Question One And perhaps this would see an increased 
monitoring regime. 
Policy Real Time Planning/Preparedness 
Group I Question One And if also needs the credible scenario 
mentioned below. 
Science Quality Assessment Scenarios 
Group I Question Two There's an uncertainty piece and this needs to be 
managed 
Science Uncertain, complex 
information 
Hazard Information and 
Forecasts 
Group I Question Two ____ means that on decision(s) Policy Applied Science Response/Decisions 
Group I Question Two Regarding stay or go Policy Real Time Evacuation 
Group I Question Two Regarding preparations and planning. Policy Applied Science Planning/Preparedness 
Group I Question Two Regrading triggers for eventual evacuating. Policy Demand-driven 
(consultancy) 
Trigger Points 
Group I Question Two Regarding enhanced monitoring and 
inspections. 
Policy Real Time Response/Decisions 
Group I Question Two All need to be made an all key players need to 
have input into this decision. 
Policy Inter-disciplinary Communications 
Group I Question Two And the framework for making these decisions 
and who is making these decisions needs to be 
understood by all. 
Policy Inter-disciplinary Planning/Preparedness 
Group I Question Three A credible scenario Science Quality Assessment Scenarios 
Group I Question Three The triggers for evacuation or future decisions. Policy Real Time Trigger Points 
Group I Question Three That need to be shared with the public and then 
the public will need to know if the triggers have 
been met following an event(s). 
Policy Inter-disciplinary Communications 
Group I Question Three An understanding of who is leading the overall 
contingency planning/response planning and 
how individual agencies feed into it. 
Policy Inter-disciplinary Planning/Preparedness 
Group I Question Three An i____ is how much time/effort/money is spent 







Group I Question Three An additional ____ is that we're talking a slow-
burn, gradual escalation that's occurring here 
and it can be hard to anticipate 
enthusiasm/willingness for planning and 
preparation over a suspended time. 







Appendix E ECLIPSE SCENARIO FRAMEWORK EVALUATION INTERVIEWS 
E.1 ETHICS APPROVAL 
 
Appendix Figure E.1: Letter of Approval from the Human Ethics Committee for Ethical research within the ECLIPSE 




E.2 ECLIPSE SCENARIO FRAMEWORK EVALUATION INTERVIEWS QUESTIONNAIRE 
 





Appendix F HISTORICAL CALDERA EVENTS 
This appendix details the historical events at caldera around the world that were used to inform 
and model the ECLIPSE Scenarios; Scenario A: Taupō Unrest Scenario (Chapter 4, Section 4.1) 
and Scenario B: Taupō Eruption Scenario (Chapter 4, Section 4.2). 
F.1 TAUPŌ VOLCANIC CENTRE, AOTEAROA-NEW ZEALAND 
F.1.1 Taupō Caldera 186 AD Eruption 
The most recent eruption from the TVC, and one of the largest explosive eruptions in the world 
within the past 7,000 years, occurred around 1,800 years ago from a vent within the 
Horomatangi Reefs in modern day Lake Taupō (Wilson & Walker, 1985ab).  
The eruption began with minor phreatomagmatic activity, followed by a Plinian outburst from 
the dry vent. Following this, large quantities of water entered the vent during a phreatoplinian 
ash phase, eventually stopping the eruption, however, large amounts of water continued to 
be ejected from the vent area – termed “water-spouting” – causing gullying through already 
deposited ash. This was followed by a break in eruptive activity for several hours to weeks 
with phreatoplinian activity resuming after, generating more ash (Figure F.1a; Wilson & 
Walker, 1985a). The vent again became dry with the eruption rate and power increasing into 
the most powerful Plinian outburst yet. Simultaneously, partial collapse of the eruption column 
caused small pyroclastic flows to travel northeast. Furthermore, because the magma driving 
the previous phases of eruption was removed rapidly, the vent area lost support and local vent 
collapse was triggered.  
   
Appendix Figure F.1: A: Ash fall dispersal pattern deposits from the “Taupō Eruption” with the inferred wind 





thickness (in centimetres) at the cease of the eruption. The area covered by the final pyroclastic flows, “Taupō 
ignimbrite” is also shown (Wilson & Walker, 1985a). 
This initiated the devastating “Taupō ignimbrite” pyroclastic flows (Figure F.1b) that travelled 
radially out from the Lake Taupō vent covering approximately 20,000km2 in area (Wilson & 
Walker, 1985ab). 
Post-eruption, local severe ground shaking occurred associated with subsidence in the Lake 
Taupō basin, with more widespread ground shaking triggering degassing within the pyroclastic 
flow deposits. Some of this degassing may have triggered phreatic explosions where water 
flashed to steam and ejected already deposited material on the surrounding pyroclastic flow 
deposits (Wilson & Walker, 1985a). Mudflows (lahars) and more dilute muddy-flood deposits 
also extended for tens of hundreds of kilometres beyond the pyroclastic flow deposit limits, 
likely deposited by catastrophic flooding on all rivers draining the central North Island. These 
more frequently occurred in the first few hours to months post-eruption, however, subsequent 
mudflows may have continued for years to decades (Wilson & Walker, 1985a). 
F.1.2 Taupō Volcanic Centre April 1922 to January 1923 Unrest Episode 
From April 1922 to January 1923, the Taupō Volcanic Centre (TVC) experienced the largest 
episode of caldera unrest known to have occurred in A-NZ during historical time without a 
subsequent eruption (Potter, Scott & Jolly, 2012). Earthquakes, migrating north to south, were 
felt throughout the Taupō district resulting in landslides (Figure F.2) blocking roads, several 
chimneys collapsing, household contents being thrown to the floor, and the Taupō town clock 
stopping (Potter, Scott & Jolly, 2012).  
 




3.7m of subsidence, along the northern edge of Lake Taupō, caused a sunken shoreline at 
Whakaipo Bay (Figures F.3ab), resulting in hundreds of water fountains emerging from ground 
cracks, causing flooding. Fissuring, faulting and minor changes to activity at hot springs and 
geysers were also reported. Voluntary evacuations occurred and tourism was impacted in 
Taupō and Rotorua due to incorrect international reporting (Potter, Scott & Jolly, 2012). 
   
Appendix Figure F.3: A: flooding caused by subsidence at Whakaipo Bay, 1922 B: Flooding caused by subsidence 
at Whakaipo Bay, 1922 (Gerard Ward Collection, Taupō Museum).  
F.1.3 Taupō Volcanic Centre February 1983 to December 1984 Unrest Episode 
Another significant period of caldera unrest occurred in the TVC from February 1983 to 
December 1984. Unrest began with an earthquake swarm to the northwest of Lake Taupō, 
6km west-northwest of Kinloch, at 4-8km depth, covering a 30km2 area (Figure F.4; Newhall 
& Dzurisin, 1988; Webb, Ferries & Harris, 1986; Potter et al., 2015b). The February swarm 
started abruptly, was active for 10 days, then continued at a lower level of activity for another 
50 days. The swarm consisted of three large (Mw3.7) events and moderate shaking intensities 
were reported (Webb, Ferries & Harris, 1986). From March to June 1983 the northern shore 
of Lake Taupō uplifted 5.7cm and a hydrothermal eruption occurred at the Wairakei 






Appendix Figure F.4: February, July and June 1983 earthquake swarms in the Taupō district area (derived from 
Webb, Ferries & Harris, 1986). 
Throughout June and July 1983, several phenomena occurred to further the unrest. On 16th 
June, a new, stronger, earthquake swarm (<Mw4.3) occurred and rapid subsidence follow on 
the northwest of the Kaiapo Fault (Figure F.4; Newhall & Dzurisin, 1988). Another swarm 
centred near Kaiapo Bay peaked in intensity on 20th-21st June, with over 30 earthquakes per 
day. Tension cracks also formed and moderate shaking intensities were reported (Potter et 
al., 2015b). On 23rd June 1983, the Kaiapo Fault ruptured, with 1.2km of displacement and 
43mm of subsidence on the western side of the fault. The rupture resulted in minor damage 
to household contents and chimneys (Potter, Scott & Jolly, 2012; Potter et al., 2015b). Another 
earthquake swarm occurred on 19th-30th June, swiftly followed by another on 1st-2nd July 1983 
(Webb, Ferries & Harris, 1986). A possible volcanic earthquake was also recorded on the 2nd 
July and the western side of the Kaiapo Fault increased in subsidence from 43mm to 55mm 
(Potter et al., 2015b). The late June, early July earthquake swarms started and ended abruptly, 
with most of the activity centred under Lake Taupō. The activity showed a northern migration 
with time, with a sudden reoccurrence of activity to the south near the end of the swarms. 




under the Lake, further from populations (Webb, Ferries & Harris, 1986). Further small, 
localised earthquake swarms were felt on 4th August, 20th September, 4th October 1983 and 
February and March 1984 (Potter et al., 2015b). In late 1984, the northeast shore of Lake 
Taupō experienced 1-1.5cm of uplift (Newhall & Dzurisin, 1988). 
F.2 RABAUL CALDERA, PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
F.2.1 Rabaul Caldera 1970s to 19802 Unrest Episode 
Rabaul caldera, located on the eastern end of New Britain Island in Papua New Guinea (Figure 
F.5), has experienced both very large and relatively small eruptions and frequent unrest 
throughout its lifetime (Potter, Scott & Jolly, 2012). 
 
Appendix Figure F.5: Location of the Rabaul caldera, the Tavurvur and Vulcan vents, and Rabaul city in Papua New 
Guinea (derived from Le Blond et al., 2010). 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Rabaul experienced significant unrest behaviour. The unrest 
episode began with two large (Mw8.0) earthquakes in the Solomon Sea (130km and 230km 
from Rabaul) in 1971, after which changes in the geologic environment at Rabaul were noted 




1983, possibly in relation to a Mw7.6 earthquake 200km east of Rabaul. Volcanic behaviour at 
this time typically consisted of hundreds of earthquakes within an hour, with moderate shaking 
intensity. Prior to November 1971, Rabaul experienced 60 earthquakes per month on average, 
this increased to 320 earthquakes by August 1983 (Newhall & Dzurisin, 1988). Rabaul also 
experienced substantial uplift during this unrest, with the average uplift rate at 7cm per month 
between August 1983 and July 1985, compared to 0.8cm per month for the preceding decade. 
Overall, 3.5m of total uplift occurred between 1971 and 1984 (Newhall & Dzurisin, 1988; 
Potter, Scott & Jolly, 2012). This unrest caused some preparedness actions to take place and 
response plans and legislation were updated (Potter, Scott & Jolly, 2012). 
Rabaul caldera would eventually erupt out of the Tavurvur (Figure F.6a) and Vulcan vents in 
September 1994 (Figure F.6b). This caused an evacuation of 53,000 people from Rabaul city 
and surrounding areas and claimed five lives (Potter, Scott & Jolly, 2012; GVP, 2016). Vulcan 
stopped erupting in October 1994, but Tavurvur continued erupting into 1995. However, 
Tavurvur has remained intermittently active since ceasing in 1995 (GVP, 2016). 
   
Appendix Figure F.6: A: Tavurvur cent erupting, 1994. B: Rabaul city covered in a blanket of ash, 1994 (GVP, 
2016). 
F.3 OKATAINA VOLCANIC CENTRE, AOTEAROA-NEW ZEALAND 
F.3.1 1314 AD Kaharoa Eruption Event 
The Okataina Volcanic Centre (OVC) in A-NZ’s North Island is home to the largest eruption to 
occur in A-NZ in the last 1,000 years, the 1314 AD Kaharoa eruption, erupting more than 4km3 
or rhyolite magma and producing more than 5km3 of pyroclastic material (Johnston et al., 
2000; Johnston, Nairn & Martin, 2002). The eruption occurred from at least seven vents spread 
along an 8km linear zone (Figure F.7) and was likely preceded by a lengthy period of unrest 





The eruption began with explosions from the Crater Dome with pyroclastic flows (Figure F.7) 
entering Lake Tarawera, causing a tsunami wave to wash upon the opposite (western) 
shoreline. Plinian eruptions later occurred from the Ruawahia and Wahanga vents, with this 
pyroclastics and Plinian phase lasting for a few months. The Ruawahia and Wahanga Domes 
later partially collapsed after years of dome building activity, generating block-and-ash flows 
(Figure F.7), with gas and steam explosions continuing for some years until cooling in the 
domes was completed. 
 
Appendix Figure F.7: 1314 AD Kaharoa Eruption vent and crater locations with pyroclastic and black-and-ash flow 
deposits (derived from Johnston, Nairn & Martin, 2002). 
F.3.2 Lake Rotoehu Earthquake Event 
A Mw5.4 earthquake ruptured in the Lake Rotoehu area on Sunday 18th July 2004 (Figure F.8; 
GeoNet, 2004b). The earthquake, located 20km northwest of Kawerau, was felt throughout 
the Bay of Plenty region and was followed by hundreds of shallow earthquakes (GeoNet, 
2004a). At least another five significant earthquakes were big enough to have been felt 
throughout the region. The earthquake epicentres remained clustered northwest of Kawerau 
and were determined to be related to long-term tectonic stretching of the area.  
This earthquake event caused numerous landslides, particularly on State Highway 30 between 




The event also resulted in school closures the following day. Monday 19th July 2004, as well 
as one casualty and a few moderate injuries (New Zealand Herald, 2004). 
 
Appendix Figure F.8: July 2004 earthquake epicentre and landslide (shown in Figure F.9 below) locations within 
the Okataina Volcanic Centre (derived from GeoNet, 2004b; Hancox et al., 2004). 
 
Appendix Figure F.9: Ground cracking and landslide on Pongakawa Valley Road as a result of the July 2004 




Appendix G ECLIPSE SCENARIO WORKFLOWS 
G.1 ECLIPSE SCENARIO A: THE TAUPŌ UNREST SCENARIO 
 




G.2 ECLIPSE SCENARIO B: THE TAUPŌ ERUPTION SCENARIO 
 
Appendix Figure G.2: The set of attributes selected in the ECLIPSE Scenario Framework to develop ECLIPSE Scenario B. 
